By: Max Ehrlich ‘26
Volume X – Issue II – Spring 2025
I. INTRODUCTION
As attacks on transgender individuals become more commonplace both in the courts and the federal executive branch, special attention has been paid to how the Roberts Court will rule on laws banning gender affirming care for minors. U.S. v. Skrmetti, which challenges Tessancess’s ban on gender affirming care under the 14th Amendment, is a pressing case expected to be decided by the Court by the end of its 2024–2025 term. At the center of the case is whether the Court will consider the Tennessee statute at issue as sex discrimination, given that the text of the statute directly categorizes individuals based on their sex. The way it is decided will tell us a great deal about the Court’s commitment to textualism as its defining legal principle, as they consider whether to keep to their holding in Bostock v. Clayton County. Under textualist interpretation, which the Court has applied to statutory text relating to sex discrimination’s applicability to Title VII in Bostock v. Clayton County, the statute should clearly be considered sex discrimination. However, the Court seems to be tilting in the other direction. [1] This article takes the position that the Court’s hedging on their textualist viewpoint from Bostock weakens the argument that the current Court adheres exclusively to legal principles rather than policy considerations. At the very least, their commitment to a textualist interpretation of equal protection that protects the LGBTQ community is in serious doubt.