By: Aryan Batada
Volume X – Issue II – Spring 2025
I. BACKGROUND
While elections have been occurring in America since 1789, the future of democracy is by no means a guarantee. [1] Tactics over time have attacked democracy at its core – literacy tests required voters to be able to read and write, poll taxes required voters to pay a sum, and grandfather clauses exempted voters from these stipulations. In recent years, new tactics arose as election administration has become increasingly contested. State election officials are required by law to routinely update voter lists for accuracy, unregistering voters who have passed away, moved out of state, or become otherwise ineligible. Under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), also deemed the “Motor Voter” law, federal guidelines exist for voter removal processes. [2] The NVRA mandates that any program to systematically remove ineligible voters must be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and not fall within 90 days of a federal election. [3] These safeguards supposedly protect voters from disenfranchisement and targeted attacks on their right to vote. However, watchdog groups increasingly warn that private citizens—rather than statebased actors—attempt to carry out voter purges
Most states allow private citizens to challenge a registered voter’s eligibility. These laws trace back to the post-Reconstruction era, used to disenfranchise Black voters. Rules and parameters exist as to when voter challenges can be filed. Typically, private citizens who are registered voters can challenge voters in the same jurisdiction. While the criteria for a challenge varies based on the state, many challenges point to disqualifying voters for not being a resident, living in two states, and other claims of ineligibility. Some states require challengers to have personal knowledge of ineligibility, while others have allowed challenges based on data or third-party evidence (accounting for the majority of recent cases). [4] Challengers can file challenges pre-election against a voter’s registration or at the polls against a person’s ballot on Election Day. This also depends on specific state law; in theory, these provisions made use of local knowledge to keep rolls accurate. In practice, election officials today have far more reliable and modern tools – from death records to interstate exchange programs – to maintain voter lists, so mass challenges by private actors can offer little benefit and instead disrupt election administration. [5]
One of these tools is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), a nonprofit organization that has helped states modernize their voter registration systems and improve the accuracy of voter rolls. [6] Election officials across the country came together to establish ERIC, in a bipartisan partnership, after a 2012 report found that more than 10% of voter registrations were invalid or inaccurate. [7] Through ERIC, states can share data securely amongst themselves, allowing them to see if voters have registered to vote in multiple jurisdictions, have passed away, or have moved within or out of the state. They can then identify other voters who meet the criteria to be removed, efficiently maintaining voter rolls. In 2022, 31 states and D.C. were members of ERIC and used its reports to maintain their voter rolls. [8] That year, state election officials used ERIC to make over 7 million in-state updates to voter rolls and found more than 200,000 duplicate in-state registrations. However, ERIC’s membership has fallen significantly to only 13 states in 2025 as election conspiracy theories grew in momentum in the leadup to the 2024 election. When nine Republican-led states exited ERIC in 2023, media outlets reported that these states were left without a comparable replacement. [9]
For some election activists, this void offered an opportunity to propose their own solutions. In Georgia, retired Dr. Rick Richards has engineered his own tool, known as Eagle AI, that activists believe identifies inaccuracies in voter registration data. The software allows users to pull lists of ineligible voters and challenge voter registrations at their county’s Board of Elections. Before the 2024 primaries in the state, one challenger brought a list of almost 800 voters (almost 1% of the respective county’s voters). [10] A glaring concern is that many of the voters on the list were legitimate – 159 of them were college students who shared the same address (a shared mailing address is typical at many American universities). The introduction of new tools such as EagleAI, which do not have access to the same information as ERIC, poses a new risk to election security: Inaccurate information presented by these applications could unregister legitimate voters. States with more permissive laws for voter challenges are specifically vulnerable, where a single individual can lodge mass challenges targeting hundreds or thousands of voters at once. This article will explore laws and precedent that protect against mass voter challenges, evaluate voter challenges as a form of illegal voter intimidation, and contrast several states and their applicable law that enables – or protects against – voter challenges.
II. LAWS & PRECEDENT
i. National Voting Rights Act (NVRA)
Under the NVRA, states must follow several statutory guidelines when maintaining voter lists. Voters can only be removed if they have requested to be removed, State law warrants their removal (e.g., criminal conviction, mental capacity), they have passed away, or they have relocated (specific guidelines apply). States also must abide by requirements as to when and how they can identify voters for removal. For example, the state can not systematically remove voters within 90 days of a federal election: 52 U.S.C. §20507(c) states that “A State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.” [11] Courts have ruled against states who have violated the NVRA’s statutory requirements: In Arcia v. Florida Secretary of State (2012), the court ruled that Florida’s 2012 attempt to use a data-matching program to purge voters within 90 days of a federal election was in violation of the NVRA’s “90-day provision.” In this case, however, the Florida Secretary of State’s office was the primary actor, directly organizing and authorizing the purge within the 90-day timeframe. On the contrary, there are also times where the court has ruled on voter challenges based on the NVRA’s protections.
Federal courts have held that labeling voter purges as citizen-initiated challenges does not exempt them from the NVRA. In Majority Forward v. Ben Hill County Board of Elections (2021), a federal court approved a temporary restraining order prohibiting Georgia counties from removing thousands of challenged voters before the January 2021 U.S. Senate Runoff. [12] The court found that a coordinated removal of voters in large numbers based on the National Change of Address (NCOA) registry would be considered a “systemic” purge subject to the NVRA. The court further ruled that the NVRA’s 90-day provision is to prevent large-scale disenfranchisement close to an election, and this applies even if the purge is triggered by private challengers rather than through a state-initiated program. Similarly, in North Carolina NAACP v. State Board of Elections (M.D. N. C. 2016-2018), the court struck down the mass cancellation of voters in three counties based on individual challenges. [13] Thousands of voters – who were disproportionately Black – were removed simply because one piece of mail to their address was returned as undeliverable. The NVRA specifies that if a notice to a voter is found undeliverable, the state may ask for confirmation of the voter’s address when voting, and remove said voter if they choose not to vote in two federal elections following the undelivered notice. [14] As such, the court ruled that these voter removals had violated the NVRA’s required notice-and-wait procedures and constituted a systematic purge within 90 days of the election. Likewise, in Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson (7th Cir. 2020), the Seventh Circuit affirmed an injunction against Indiana’s voter purge law, which had sought to immediately remove voters flagged through an interstate database program (Crosscheck) without the notice and wait period. [15] The court agreed that Indiana’s process violated the NVRA and that states must either seek confirmation or follow the “wait two cycles” rule before canceling a registration on the grounds of a change-of-address. [16] These precedents clearly show that election officials cannot use mass voter challenges as a loophole around the NVRA. [17] Election officials risk violating federal law if they approve broad challenges without regard to the NVRA’s safeguards. The Justice Department has issued recent guidance to election officials to avoid this, clarifying that the NVRA’s protections “apply whether the process is initiated by the state or is responsive to third-party submissions.” [18] Officials must treat mass challenges with the same caution as any other purge program – no large-scale removals based on unconfirmed data and especially during the 90 day period.
ii. Voting Rights Act (VRA)
While the NVRA has procedural limitations, other laws, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, address the ulterior motives behind mass challenges. Section 11(b) of the law broadly prohibits any person from “intimidating, threatening, or coercing” voters, or attempting to do so, in any aspect of the voting process. This includes intimidation related to registering to vote or remaining a registered voter. [19] If mass challenges are used in a way that targets certain voters to discourage them from voting – for example, by intentionally singling out minority communities or inflicting undue burden on voters so they would stay home – this could be deemed unlawful voter intimidation under 52 U.S.C. § 10307 Section 11(b). Notably, Section 11(b) does not require proof of racial motive; any concerted effort to scare voters away from the polls can violate this position. Section 11(b)’s use is explored further in the context of Georgia and Fair FIght, Inc v. True the Vote in a later section.
The VRA also formerly included a Section 5, which required certain jurisdictions with histories of discrimination to obtain federal “pre-clearance” before changing any voter laws. This regime blocked many discriminatory voting changes – potentially including overly aggressive purges or challenge practices – before they could take effect. In Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Supreme Court struck down the VRA’s coverage formula as outdated, effectively ending the pre-clearance requirement. [20] New restrictive voting measures immediately spread throughout the South. [21] Within hours of the decision, Texas announced it would enforce a strict voter ID law that had been blocked under Section 5 – one of many states that would enact new laws in the aftermath of Shelby. [22] While not all of these new laws were associated with voter challenges, the loss of a federal “pre-clearance” requirement removed a crucial check that might have otherwise scrutinized laws like Georgia’s post-2020 challenger expansions for racial or partisan impact (explored under Section III. States: Georgia). [23] Shelby County’s legacy is that plaintiffs now bring legal challenges to voting laws (including challenge provisions) after implementation, under Section 2 of the VRA or other statutes, instead of preventing them in advance. For context, Section 2 of the VRA “prohibits voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or membership in one of the language minority groups identified in Section 4(f)(2).” [24] These language minority groups include American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and Hispanic citizens. [25]
III. CASE STUDIES
i. Georgia
In Georgia, various organizations including out-of-state groups have mounted mass challenge efforts: Ahead of the January 2021 U.S. Senate runoffs, an election integrity group called True the Vote coordinated challenges to over 360,000 Georgia voters across several counties. [26] The Texas-based group derived these challenges from change-of-address data that suggested voters might have moved, similar in some ways to EagleAI. County election boards overwhelmingly rejected these claims for lack of evidence and/or failure to meet legal standards. [27] Forsyth County in Georgia ultimately rejected over 15,000 challenges in 2022.28 Mass voter challenges in the state sparked legal pushback, as seen in Fair Fight, Inc v. True the Vote, where a group of voters and activists sued True the Vote, arguing that the challenges generated by its system were both inaccurate and unlawful. In a January 2024 decision after a trial, the federal court sharply criticized True the Vote’s methods, finding the organization’s NCOA-based purge list “utterly lack[ed] reliability” and “verg[ed] on recklessness.” [29] Errors in the data caused officials to wrongfully challenge many eligible voters. However, the court did not hold the organization liable, citing two main reasons: (1) insufficient proof that any specific voters were disenfranchised (given that most challenges were rejected), and (2) state law provides local officials with the discretion to reject challenges without ever burdening the voter (which in many cases they did). The courts discredited the mass challenge tactic as factually baseless, though they did not necessarily deem it illegal because safety nets caught most problems before they harmed voters.
Mass voter challenges have only grown in Georgia since 2021. Reports indicate that six rightwing activists were responsible for challenging over 92,000 Georgia voter registrations in 2022.30 Gwinnett County received challenges to 37,500 voters – more than 6% of its voter roll. Handling this volume required emergency hearings and diverted staff time during the busy pre-election period. Voting rights groups intervened to protect voters: In fall 2022, advocacy organizations in Georgia moved to block an eleventh-hour purge of over 5,000 voters in DeKalb county after a local Republican activist demanded action on his mass challenges. The county board had refused, noting the allegations (many targeting voters of color) were unsubstantiated and that purging so close to Election Day would likely violate the NVRA. The challengers sued to force the purge, but civil rights groups responding argued that this would be an illegal voter purge on the eve of an election. Ultimately, these challenges did not move forward.
It is also important to note Georgia’s new state laws that have enabled voter challenges. SB 202, an omnibus election law that (among many provisions) explicitly authorized unlimited voter challenges, allows any one person to file challenges against an unrestricted number of voters in their county. [31] Then, in 2024, Georgia passed SB 189, which permits voter challenges based on a broad array of data indicators (e.g. if a person is registered in another state or has a property tax homestead exemption elsewhere) and allows removals up to 45 days before an election. [32] Georgia’s new law also attempts a halfway safeguard by stating that a voter’s appearance in a change-of-address database like NCOA alone is not sufficient evidence to sustain a challenge. The law now allows challengers to use a voter’s appearance in the database, along with other nominal data points, as “evidence” to get around the rule. Georgia’s influx of mass challenges has continued: state officials have issued some guidance to county boards on challenge, but its embrace of permissive challenge laws leaves it vulnerable to mass disenfranchisement of voters. Both the NVRA’s protections and the vigilance of county officials, advocacy groups, and courts have been tested to their core, but even one invalid challenge falling through these safeguards could disenfranchise a voter.
ii. Michigan
Michigan historically had stricter limits on voter challenges, but it too has seen a recent spike in mass challenges. In November 2023 in Waterford Township, Michigan, a single voter challenged the registrations of over 1,000 residents. The clerk accepted these claims at face value, canceling all 1,000+ registrations, and it was later determined by courts that many of these voters were legitimate. Earlier, in 2022, Michigan was one of the states where activists “flooded election offices with challenges” according to a New York Times investigation. [33] Similar to Georgia, many of these challenges were from letters and spreadsheets built using changeof-address data. Michigan law already limits pre-election challenges – they generally must be based on personal knowledge and be filed well in advance—but this scenario demonstrates how dangerous mass voter challenges are taking place in local jurisdictions where bureaucratic safeguards are not always in place. [34]
iii. Nevada
In Nevada, a conservative group self-described as the “Pigpen Project” filed challenges in mid2023 to more than 30,000 voter registrations statewide.35 The group claimed that these voters had filed change-of-address forms with the Post Office and therefore might no longer live at their registration address. However, Nevada’s election laws set a high bar for such private challenges, requiring a challenger to have personal knowledge of each change (the law explicitly defines this as “firsthand knowledge through experience”). [36] Nevada’s Secretary of State issued guidance in August 2024 reminding county officials of this requirement and advising that data-driven challenges should be summarily dismissed. [37] Nevada’s scenario offers a potential best practice for states to follow: requiring individualized proof and firsthand knowledge to prevent illegitimate mass voter challenges.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Mass challenges have grown significantly over the past few years, driven by EagleAI and a similar software platform known as IV3. [38] These platforms generate highly over-inclusive and error-prone lists. They rely on change-of-address records, tax filings, and even commercial data, operating on limited and public data without the more precise identifiers that election officials use (like full date of births, driver’s license numbers, etc.). [39] These platforms can also incorrectly label temporary moves (like college students or military deployments) as permanent relocations. Theoretically, by targeting students who attend college outside of their districts, partisan groups could target their voter registrations because the youth vote tends to be skewed in one direction.
These challenges also place a burden on local election offices. Smaller county boards can struggle to manage the paperwork and administrative tasks that come with massive challenge lists. One county proposed charging the challenger mailing fees for the notices mailed to challenged voters. [40] Some evidence suggests that certain partisan actors deliberately deploy mass challenges to overburden election offices. For instance, shortly before the 2022 general election, activists in multiple states dumped challenge lists on election offices with the apparent aim of forcing last-minute chaos. [41] As such, mass challenges present a threat to election administration.
Aside from straining election boards, these challenges can directly harm many voters as well. Even when election officials ultimately dismiss false challenges, a hearing notice or a letter casting doubt on a voter’s eligibility can still be intimidating. Such actions can amount to voter intimidation, as past lawsuits have alleged. In 2006, the Department of Justice filed suit in Long County, Georgia, after three candidates running for election challenged the registration of over 5% of the county’s Hispanic population on the grounds that they were not citizens. [42] As discussed, there are also instances where voters are purged and only reinstated after a court order, showing a clear vulnerability for widespread disenfranchisement posed by voter challenges. Additionally, even when voters are not formally removed, an unresolved challenge can force them to vote provisionally on Election Day or take extra steps to prove their identity/residence. Some argue that this creates a “paperwork poll tax” on the voter—an extra burden that other voters do not face. As the Brennan Center has observed, even if not intentionally targeting marginalized groups, mass challenges will disproportionately hit voters who have limited resources (e.g. those who have to relocate frequently for financial reasons) and who may find it harder to contest a challenge at a hearing. [43]
V. CONCLUSION
The risks that voter challenges pose are clear: potential voter intimidation, widespread disenfranchisement, and attacks on election administration. While the NVRA and the VRA both provide protections against this, states like Georgia and North Carolina are particularly vulnerable in the aftermath of Shelby County v. Holder. Election activists are gaining power in local election boards, many of which are resource-strapped and treat inaccurate voter lists with legitimacy. As the New York Times reported, one county in Georgia even decided to implement EagleAI in their official election maintenance processes. [44] Widespread distrust in election administration has ushered in a new era of challenges, pushing legal safeguards to their limits while burdening innocent voters. Depending on where you live, where you vote, and even who you are, your right to vote can be challenged.
Endnotes
[1] “United States Presidential Election of 1789,” Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/United-Statespresidential-election-of-1789
[2] National Voter Registration Act of 1993, U.S. Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voterregistration-act-1993-nvra
[3] Brennan Center for Justice, Protections Against Mass Challenges to Voter Eligibility, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/protections-against-mass-challenges-voter-eligibility
[4] Voter Challenges,” Protect Democracy, https://protectdemocracy.org/work/voter-challenges/
[5] “Frivolous Mass Challenges: Voter Eligibility and Democracy,” Campaign Legal, https://campaignlegal.org/update/frivolous-mass-challenges-voter-eligibility-damaging-democracy.
[6] “Explaining the Campaign Against the Nonpartisan Voter Roll Tool ERIC: A Four-Part E-Course,” American Oversight, https://americanoversight.org/explaining-the-campaign-against-nonpartisan-voter-roll-tool-eric-a-fourpart-e-course/
[7] “Inaccurate, Costly and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade,” Pew Trusts, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2012/02/14/inaccurate-costly-and-inefficientevidence-that-americas-voter-registration-system-needs-an-upgrade
[8] “ERIC Statistics,” Election Registration Information Center, https://ericstates.org/statistics/
[9] “ERIC Investigation: Follow-Up on Voter Data and Election Integrity,” NPR, https://www.npr.org/2023/10/20/1207142433/eric-investigation-follow-up-voter-data-election-integrity
[10] “Voter Registration Mass Challenges in Georgia,” NPR, https://www.npr.org/2024/06/04/nx-s1-4991945/voterregistration-mass-challenges-georgia
[11] Arcia v. Florida Secretary of State, No. 12192 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012), https://clearinghouse.net/case/12192/
[12] Majority Forward v. Ben Hill Cty. Bd. of Elections, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2021)
[13] N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 U.S. Dist. (M.D.N.C. 2016–2018)
[14] U.S. Department of Justice, National Voter Registration Act of 1993: Notice-and-Wait Procedure, https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra
[15] Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson, 978 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2020).
[16] DemocracyDocket, Georgia Mass Voter Challenges Lawsuit, https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/georgiamass-voter-challenges-lawsuit/.
[17] Brennan Center for Justice, “Victory Voting Rights Judge Permanently Blocks North Carolina Purge,” https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/victory-voting-rights-judge-permanently-blocks-northcarolina-purge
[18] U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Issues New Guidance on Federal Law Regarding Voter Registration, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-new-guidance-federal-lawregarding-voter-registration.
[19] Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 11(b).
[20] Brennan Center for Justice, Effects Shelby County v. Holder Voting Rights Act, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/effects-shelby-county-v-holder-voting-rights-act.
[21] Brennan Center for Justice, States Have Added Nearly 100 Restrictive Laws as SCOTUS Gut Voting Rights, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/states-have-added-nearly-100-restrictive-laws-scotusgutted-voting-rights.
[22] Associated Press, Texas Enforces Strict Voter ID Law After Shelby Decision, https://apnews.com/article/courtsvoting-race-and-ethnicity-racial-injustice-laws-871be7654df041549cf74eb1a1d377ca.
[23] Ten Years after Shelby County: The Effect of Ending Preclearance on Voting Rights, Zuckerman, https://www.zuckerman.com/sites/default/files/2024- 08/Ten%20Years%20after%20Shelby%20County_The%20Effect%20of%20Ending%20Preclearance%20on%20Vo ting%20Rights_0.pdf.
[24] U.S. Department of Justice, Section 2 Voting Rights Act, https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act.
[25] U.S. Department of Justice, “About Language Minority Voting Rights,” https://www.justice.gov/crt/aboutlanguage-minority-voting-rights
[26] Brennan Center for Justice, Guide: Laws Against Intimidation of Voters and Election Workers, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-laws-against-intimidation-voters-and-electionworkers
[27] Protect Democracy, Voter Challenges, https://protectdemocracy.org/work/voter-challenges
[28] ACLU Georgia, “Press Release: ACLU Georgia Commends Forsyth County’s Dismissal of Thousands of Voter Challenges,” https://www.acluga.org/en/press-releases/press-release-aclu-georgia-commends-forsyth-countysdismissal-thousands-voter
[29] Fair Fight, Inc. v. True the Vote, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist
[30] Doug Bock Clark, “Close to 100,000 Voter Registrations Were Challenged in Georgia — Almost All by Just Six Right-Wing Activists,” ProPublica, July 13, 2023, https://www.propublica.org/article/right-wing-activists-georgiavoter-challenges.
[31] Brennan Center for Justice, New Georgia Law Spurs Bogus Challenges to Voter Eligibility, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-georgia-law-spurs-bogus-challenges-votereligibility.
[32] DemocracyDocket, Pro-Voting Groups Sue Over Georgia Law Making It Easier to Challenge Voter Eligibility, https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/pro-voting-groups-sue-over-georgia-law-making-it-easier-tochallenge-voter-eligibility/.
[33] “Election Activists Flood Offices With Voter Challenges,” The New York Times, September 28, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/28/us/politics/election-activists-voter-challenges.html.
[34] “MI Challenge Explainer,” All Voting Is Local, https://allvotingislocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-06-MIChallenge-Explainer.FINAL_.pdf.
[35] “Indy Explains How Mass Challenges to Nevada Voter Registrations Face Uphill Legal Battle,” The Nevada Independent, https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/indy-explains-how-mass-challenges-to-nevada-voterregistrations-face-uphill-legal-battle.
[36] Brennan Center for Justice, Nevada Limits Voter Eligibility Challenges, https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/nevada-limits-voter-eligibility-challenges.
[37] Nevada Secretary of State, Guidance on Voter Challenges, https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showpublisheddocument/15818/638725553768500000.
[38] Brennan Center for Justice, Four New Initiatives Driving Mass Voter Challenges, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/four-new-initiatives-driving-mass-voter-challenges.
[39] National Association of Secretaries of State, NASS Report: Voter Registration Maintenance, https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/reports/nass-report-voter-reg-maintenance-final-dec17.pdf
[40] Associated Press, Georgia Cobb Election Voting: Mass Voter Challenges, https://apnews.com/article/georgiacobb-election-voting-mass-voter-challenges-2ce08562b35148110c15300635ef50e0.
[41] New York Times, “Election Activists Flood Offices With Voter Challenges,”.
[42] United States v. Long Cty., 2006 U.S. Dist.
[43] Brennan Center for Justice, Protections Against Mass Challenges to Voter Eligibility.
[44] "Georgia County Election Deniers Trump New Safeguards," The New York Times, December 1, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/01/us/politics/georgia-county-election-deniers-trump.html.