By: Aniya Goodrum
Volume X – Issue II – Spring 2025
I. DEFINING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
Solitary confinement, often called Administrative Segregation or Special Housing Units (SHU), operates as a prison within a prison. Inside these walls, the incarcerated are subject to extreme forms of physical and social isolation. These cells are half the size of a regular prison cell, measuring about six by nine feet––smaller than the inside of a car—for up to twenty-three hours a day. [1] Some cells are lit around the clock with no windows or clocks, impeding the ability to distinguish between day and night or track the number of days that have passed. [2] Outside of the physical constraints, inmates have virtually no contact with other human beings, aside from correctional officers when receiving meals or being escorted to the yard or showers for one hour. [3] Additionally, inmates are routinely restricted access to work, prison programming, and reading materials. [4] Solitary confinement has been associated with a range of adverse health effects, including insomnia, paranoia, hallucinations, and aggression. [5]
Correctional officers and wardens maintain broad discretion over the implementation of administrative segregation visits. [6] Generally, administrative segregation is intended for inmates accused of misconduct and found guilty in disciplinary proceedings. Individuals accused of violent behavior, such as fighting or assault, are placed in solitary. [7] However, minor infractions, such as using profanity, talking back to officers, or possessing minor contraband can also lead to a stay in these cells. [8] Furthermore, the SHU is also utilized as a form of protective custody for individuals with mental health disorders, victims of sexual assault, or those who are part of populations with heightened risks of victimization, including members of the LGBTQ+ community, pregnant, young, or individuals with disabilities. [9]
II. FROM MEDLEY TO MODERNITY
The federal courts first discussed solitary confinement in 1890 in In re Medley (134 U.S. 160 (1890)). In this case, the petitioner, James Medley, was sentenced to death after being convicted of murder. Colorado placed Medley in solitary confinement after retroactively applying a statute, which mandated solitary confinement for those facing capital punishment. [10] The court overturned the statute, citing that under solitary if inmates did not turn “violently insane” or “commit suicide” they “in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.” [11] Despite acknowledging the cruelty of solitary confinement, the Supreme Court has never directly decided to review the constitutionality of the practice. Instead, the Court's decisions have been more focused on clarifying the rights of the incarcerated and providing legal guidelines for appropriate prison procedures. [12]
In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has rejected, so far, all of the writs of certiorari regarding solitary confinement and its conditions, even the most extreme cases. [13] For example, Hope v. Harris (861 F. App'x 571 (5th Cir. 2021)) concerned Dennis Wayne Hope's confinement placement, which he received after he attempted an escape from prison in 1994. [14] Hope resided in administrative segregation for over twenty years before he petitioned the court, claiming Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause violations. The majority opinion from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the due process claim, citing that the government's interests outweighed Hope's “low”' liberty interest, even though his offense occurred decades ago and he was no longer considered a risk. [15] Furthermore, the courts did not question whether prolonged confinement could violate the Eighth Amendment, as noted by Fifth Circuit Court Judge Haynes in the dissent. [16] Despite the controversy, the Supreme Court refused to review it.
III. A PUNISHMENT THAT MATCHES THE OFFENSE: EVALUATING PROPORTIONALITY
Generally, constitutional challenges to solitary confinement are brought under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, these challenges are rarely successful. I propose a reassessment of how these cruel and unusual claims are presented in court. Rather than repeatedly applying the same Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments in the hope that a particular case is extreme enough that it succeeds, future claims should analyze the rationale behind past rejections and incorporate successful strategies from other law precedents. This approach would help ensure new challenges align with current legal philosophy.
One of the major successes using the cruel and unusual punishment clause was Hutto v. Finney, (437 U.S. 678 (1978)), which imposed a thirty-day limit on punitive isolation in the Arkansas prison system. [17] However, this was not a limit on the practice; rather, it looked at the total circumstances of the environment, including overcrowding, insufficient meal plans, and unsanitary environments. The difficulty in using the Eighth Amendment is that claims must operate within the framework of the “deliberate indifference” standard in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). [18,19] Under this rule, it's not sufficient to prove that prison conditions posed serious harm to one’s life. Plaintiffs must also provide evidence that the wardens or correctional officers in the prison acted with a conscious disregard of this threat. [20] Proving intent is one of the most difficult challenges in many proceedings because it relies primarily on inferences about the mental state of the accused rather than physical evidence. [21]
Furthermore, few guidelines outline what constitutes seriously harmful behavior within these solitary cells. The courts have not decided whether the duration, the physical space, or the tendency of these facilities to worsen mental health collectively meets the burden of an Eighth Amendment claim. Without standards delineating improper prison practices, some may argue that prison officials cannot be found liable under deliberate indifference standards because there are no prevailing legal or institutional guidelines to inform them of their misconduct. Consequently, the lack of definitive judicial guidance regarding the limitations of the practice has allowed the practice to exist with minimum accountability and unsuccessful claims. [22]
Some lower courts have ruled on the merits of an Eighth Amendment challenge, but the support is split. The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts have stated that long-term solitary confinement cannot violate the Eighth Amendment. However, the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts have ruled that elements of the practice can violate the Eighth Amendment. [23] Despite the inconsistent application, the Supreme Court has been uninterested in resolving these cases or laying the groundwork for solitary challenges. However, with the right framing, context, and controversy, cruel and unusual challenges can strategically be forced onto the court's agenda.
In light of previous unsuccessful challenges, I recommend examining the proportionality doctrine as a potential pathway for future claims. The concept of proportionality was officially laid out in Weems v. United States (217 U.S. 349 (1910)) which states that sentences that were “grossly disproportionate” to the offense, are considered Eighth Amendment violations. [24] The courts would later clarify the grossly disproportionate standard in Enmund v. Florida (458 U.S. 782 (1982)), which ruled that it was unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on a defendant who he did not intentionally or directly kill, or attempt to kill a person. [25] The concept would gain greater clarity in a series of cases in the next few years. [26] The fundamental principle of proportionality underscores that a punishment must be at least proportional or consistent with the nature of the crime, or it is considered a cruel and unusual punishment. It is a difficult, and sometimes demanding, task to ascertain whether the level of punishment fits the crime. However, there is a strict requirement that forbids capital punishment for non-homicide offenses. For example, Coker v. Georgia (433 U.S. 584 (1977)) held that the state cannot impose the death penalty for sexual assault, since an offense that did not also result in the death of another person. [27]
The proportionality principle has only applied to criminal cases of the capital variety. [28] However, the courts considered whether the proportionality principle could extend to other areas particularly noncapital cases as well. In Harmelin v. Michigan (501 U.S. 957 (1991)) the six justices, across ideological lines, agreed that the non-capital cases bore some form of the proportionality principle, but could not agree to the specifics of the analysis. [29] Ultimately, in the plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Eighth Amendment did not contain a proportionality guarantee. [30] Although the case is binding, it does not have the same precedential weight as a majority opinion. [31] In Lockyer v. Andrade (538 U.S. 63 (2003)), the court acknowledged that the specific measurements of the proportionality principle are undetermined. [32] They later affirmed that the principle should only be applied to the most “extraordinary” cases. [33] However, given the absence of definitive case law, the future court may decide to reconsider proportionality arguments made by the other justices or decide on a new principle altogether.
Confinement cases should exploit the weakness of the plurality decisions and reframe the Eighth Amendment, cruel and unusual claims to adapt to Justice Kennedy’s test. Currently, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin, would become the prevailing opinion of the courts as demonstrated by its use in the most recent Supreme Court case Graham v. Florida (560 U.S. 48 (2010)). In Graham, using the proportionality principle set by Kennedy, the court held that the state cannot sentence juveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense. [34] Categorically, juvenile and prison disciplinary procedures are considered non-criminal. For instance, according to In re Gault (387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967)), juvenile courts are not criminal, civil, or adversarial proceedings. [35] Similarly, in Wolff v. McDonnell (418 U.S. 539 (1974)), a Nebraska state prison class action lawsuit related to due process protections for the incarcerated in solitary confinement, the courts also contend that prison disciplinary proceedings are not “criminal” nor are these proceedings adversarial. [36]
Since, the courts applied the proportionality principle to Graham, a non-criminal case, it is possible that later solitary claims, which are also non-criminal, can utilize this strategy. Justice Kennedy in Harmelin asserted that courts need to consider only the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty required to make a proportionality argument. [37] Under this principle, satisfying the requirements for cruel and unusual challenges has become easier. This method would not eliminate the practice of solitary confinement. Nonetheless, it could benefit certain groups, particularly those held for extended periods for minor offenses or those in protective custody.
The strongest cruel and unusual claims are likely to come from individuals in protective custody. These individuals have not violated any rules, yet they are forced into the same solitary cells as individuals who have committed disciplinary violations, for reasons beyond their control. Consequently, they still face punitive treatment, even if under the guise of being for their safety. It would be challenging for prison officials to argue that solitary confinement is a proportional placement for individuals who did not commit any violation. Similarly, individuals with minor infractions, like disobeying orders, could argue that their punishment is not proportional to their offense if they spend months or years in the SHU. Some proponents of the practice may justify its use by noting that it is a tool to maintain institutional order and to preserve the safety of vulnerable groups. Admittedly, determining whether a punishment is proportional to an offense is difficult. However, even in cases where the offense is violent, there are alternatives available to mitigate harm without disproportionately inflicting the punishment of solitary which include facility transfers or limited durations in solitary. [38] Prisoners can adhere to the proportional principle. The fundamental concept is pervasive in law and has been the basis of many cruel and unusual claims. The deep-rooted history of the doctrine would enable the cruel and unusual claims to have more nuance rooted in existing case law, some of which have been successful.
IV. THE ILLUSION OF FAIRNESS: INCONSISTENCY IN THE APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS
In solitary confinement, the incarcerated are entitled to few due process rights. Currently, the strongest protections incarcerated individuals have stemmed from Wolff v. McDonnell, which affirmed that incarcerated individuals maintained minimum due process rights, which includes a written notice to the defendant of charges, a written state of evidence, and an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, especially when the punishment can cause a deprivation of liberty such as the reduction of good-time credits. [39] In the majority opinion, Justice White declared that “There is no iron curtain drawn between the constitution and the prisons of this country.” However, in granting these rights, the courts also decided that prisons could balance their “institutional needs and objectives” in this process.
The Court did find that prisons had an interest in maintaining general welfare and order, and these due process rights are only insofar that it is conducive to those goals. Consequently, prisons maintain broad jurisdiction in their disciplinary procedures and practices, with little to no oversight from the court. Since Wolff, the courts have limited due process rights for the incarcerated. [40] For example, the incarcerated are not entitled to retroactive due process (Cox v. Cook (420 U.S. 734 (1975))), to legal counsel (Baxter v. Palmigiano (425 U.S. 308 (1976)), United States v. Gouveia (467 U.S. 180 (1984))), and they are not entitled to confront (Baxter). The Due Process Clause establishes that the government cannot deprive an individual's life, liberty, or property. However, incarcerated individuals forgo some of these liberties, as a result of their conviction. Their rights are heavily restricted and largely subject to the facility's discretion.
However, Sandin v. Conner (515 U.S. 472 (1995)) has raised the criterion necessary to trigger due process claims. [41] Sandin focused on whether Conner, who was sentenced to thirty days in the SHU after a misconduct violation, had a protected liberty interest that would enable him to call witnesses in his case. The Court decided he did not, instead upholding that only punishment that was “atypical, significant deprivation” would trigger liberty interests. [42] The courts did not provide details regarding the extent of the deprivation needed to meet this requirement, only that a thirty-day sentence fails. However, “atypical and significant hardship” implies that the punishment must create conditions that go beyond what a prisoner would ordinarily expect to endure, during his time in prison. [43]
As anticipated, due process claims rarely succeed, primarily, because it is difficult to prove that the conditions of solitary confinement are so unique that other inmates have never experienced them. [44] Historically, solitary confinement has been used as a punishment in the United States since the 1800s. [45] In more recent history, one in five incarcerated individuals will spend time in solitary. [46] As a result, many inmates are familiar with the mental and physical toll it can take on the body. Additionally, the duration of confinement varies widely depending on the circumstances. There have been cases, such as Hope, where individuals spent over twenty years in solitary for serious offenses. Others have remained in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) for a decade simply due to concerns about safety or security, not because of any rule violation. [47] Therefore, the practice of solitary confinement or the conditions of solitary are often not considered “atypical” since others have likely been in similar circumstances. It is also difficult to prove that the deprivation caused by solitary is more severe than the general prison experience. [48] Incarceration alone can result in many of the same harms associated with solitary confinement, including violence, self-harm, and mental health issues. [49] Therefore, merely being in solitary and enduring hardship is not enough to produce a successful due process claim under Sandin.
Instead, I propose a challenge based on the inadequacies of the due process infrastructure within prisons. States tailor their disciplinary procedures to individual facilities. These proceedings typically begin with a disciplinary report, followed by pre-hearing segregation, an investigation, a hearing, and a written disposition. [50] In Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill (472 U.S. 445 (1985)), the Supreme Court held that “some evidence” is required to affirm a disciplinary conviction after Hill and Crawford were placed in solitary and lost good-time credits despite a lack of corroborating evidence. [51] The core issue, however, is that many disciplinary procedures are entirely internal. [52] The individuals responsible for adjudicating the case and conducting the investigation often are colleagues with the officers who filed the initial report. This creates a structural bias, which primes decision-makers to accept the reporting officer’s account and dismiss the accused's version of events. Despite this clear conflict of interest, such hearings continue to be permitted and, as expected, result in high conviction rates. [53] Without adequate procedural safeguards, state actors within prisons hold absolute power and authority over the incarcerated. Although due process is intended to limit government encroachment on individual liberty, the courts have largely failed to address these practices, in part because incarcerated individuals have a limited set of rights.
Wolff defined rights for the incarcerated, but in practice, the disciplinary system is more of a performance than a legitimate legal system. The term “kangaroo court” refers to a court in which the proceedings deviate from acceptable norms to an extent in which it is biased toward one party. [54] Research related to disciplinary hearings is scarce since most penal facilities lack transparency regarding their internal procedures and oversight. [55] However, the incarcerated have presented negative views of the disciplinary proceedings because of the unfairness and bias of the board. However, some may argue that these proceedings are not supposed to afford a plethora of rights and safeguard, because they are primarily created to retain order, not recreate the adversarial process of a trial. [56] However, there are several examples of non-criminal tribunals or courts that adapt to their restrictions to effectively afford additional due process rights without recreating a criminal trial. As mentioned previously, juvenile and adult disciplinary proceedings share similar features, particularly the fact that they are non-criminal. Another feature is that the arrangement of these courts is similar. For juveniles, they also have delinquency petitions or disciplinary reports, per-detention hearing, investigations, adjudicatory hearings, and a deposition. [57] Furthermore, similar to the incarcerated, juveniles are not entitled to full due process rights present in a criminal trial. [58]
However, juveniles are granted additional safeguards in the absence of these formal legal procedures. Juveniles retain rights such as the ability to confront witnesses, conduct cross-examination, and receive legal counsel during hearings. [59] Although in both In re Gault and Wolff, the Justices expressed concern about replicating the adversarial nature of criminal trials, these rights were ultimately granted to juveniles but denied to incarcerated adults. Some justify these protections because juveniles, as a class, have a reduced capacity for culpability and a greater potential for rehabilitation and growth. [60] Disciplinary proceedings do prioritize order over other considerations. However, juveniles and incarcerated adults share a unique status as they have a deprivation at stake, they are vulnerable to mistreatment due to limited due process protections, and they face legal constraints when attempting to challenge these limitations. Therefore, the integrity of these hearings is of utmost importance, to ensure these procedures are not arbitrary. Claims do not need to assert that disciplinary proceedings should replicate juvenile proceedings. However, presenting on a comparative level, to establish appropriate conduct from prison officials.
V. CONCLUSION
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims challenging solitary confinement are difficult to pursue, primarily because existing precedent has significantly limited the rights of incarcerated individuals. Additionally, courts have largely avoided addressing the ambiguous areas of the case law and cannot be compelled to resolve these questions. However, reports of the abuse of prisoners in solitary have gained more visibility and recognition among legislators, even as courts remain reluctant to intervene. [61] In New York, for instance, correctional officers have gone on strike to protest the ban on solitary confinement. While the failure of past claims may have immediate negative consequences for the individuals involved, they also expose weak or inconsistent areas in the doctrine, creating opportunities to present new arguments and perspectives to the courts.
Endnotes
[1] German, Lopez. “You Could Fit 19 Solitary Confinement Cells in a Typical 1-Bedroom Apartment.” Vox.com, June 11, 2015. https://www.vox.com/2015/6/11/8765977/solitary-confinement-cells-small.
[2] Leann Bertsch, Wayne Choinski, Kevin Kempf, John Baldwin, et al. TIME-IN-CELL 2019: A SNAPSHOT OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING Based on a Nationwide Survey of U.S. Prison Systems, September 2020. https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/time-in-cell_2019.pdf.
[3] Andreea Matei, Solitary Confinement in US Prisons. Urban Institute, August 2022. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/Solitary%20Confinement%20in%20the%20US.pdf. 72
[4] David H. Cloud, Craig Haney, Dallas Augustine, Cyrus Ahalt, et al. “The Resource Team: A Case Study of a Solitary Confinement Reform in Oregon.” PLOS ONE 18, no. 7 (July 26, 2023). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0288187
[5] Justin D. Strong, Keramet Reiter, Gabriela Gonzalez, Rebecca Tublitz, et al. “The Body in Isolation: The Physical Health Impacts of Incarceration in Solitary Confinement.” PLOS ONE 15, no. 10 (October 9, 2020). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238510.
[6] Bertsch, Time-In-Cell, 2.
[7] Benjamin Steiner, “Disciplinary Segregation in Prison.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology. 24 Jan. 2018, https://oxfordre.com/criminology/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780190264079- e-464.
[8] “Why Are People Sent to Solitary Confinement? The Reasons Might Surprise You,” Vera Institute of Justice, March 2021, https://vera-institute.files.svdcdn.com/production/downloads/publications/why-are-people-sent-tosolitary-confinement.pdf, 3.
[9] Matei, “Solitary Confinement.”
[10] In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/134/160/
[11] Medley, 134 U.S. at 165.
[12] Notable Cases include Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
[13] Examples of denied petition for Writ of Certiorari: Smith v. Ryan, 581 U.S. 954 (2017), Apodaca v. Raemisch, 586 U.S. 931(2018), Johnson v. Prentice, 144 S. Ct. 11 (2023).
[14] Hope v. Harris, et al, No. 20-40379 (5th Cir. 2021), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/20- 40379/20-40379-2021-06-18.html.
[15] Medley, 134 U.S. at 165.
[16] Medley, 134 U.S. at 165
[17] Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/437/678/
[18] Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/501/294/
[19] The deliberate difference standard was first established in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976). Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) expands its application to other prison conditions, not just medical. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) further clarified the standard to include a “subjectively reckless” component.
[20] Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
[21] Neibel, John B. “WHAT DOES INTENT MEAN?” HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 38, no. 1059 (2010): 1060–61. https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss4/2.
[22] Cases that failed or narrowly interpreted the deliberate indifference standard include Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); and Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
[23] Hope v. Harris, 143 S. Ct. 1746 (2023). https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21- 1065/211680/20220128133827282_PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf. 9-16 The Fifth Circuit would find that solitary cannot be considered solitary under Hope v. Harris, 861 F. App'x 571 (5th Cir. 2021)
[24] Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/217/349/.
[25] Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/782/.
[26] Notable cases include Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), Gregg v. Georgia (1976), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), Edmund v. Florida (1982), Solem v. Helm (1983), Tison v. Arizona (1987).
[27] Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/433/584/.
[28] Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) and Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) upheld California’s three strikes law, and ruled that it was not a cruel and unusual punishment.
[29] Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/501/957/.
[30] Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957.
[31] Corley, Pamela C., Udi Sommer, Amy Steigerwalt, and Artemus Ward. “Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States Supreme Court.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1433742. 182
[32] Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/63/.
[33] Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63.
[34] Nilsen, Eva S. “From Harmelin to Graham - Justice Kennedy Stakes out a Path to From Harmelin to Graham - Justice Kennedy Stakes out a Path to Proportional Punishment Proportional Punishment.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 23, no. 1 (October 1, 2010): 67–71. https://doi.org/10.1525/fsr.2010.23.1.67.
[35] In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967), the Court asserted that juvenile court proceedings are neither criminal, civil, nor adversarial; rather, they occupy a unique status because the process intends to promote the rehabilitation of juveniles. Although the courts stated that prison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal, their status as civil is undetermined. However, the nature of the deprivations at stake, such as the loss of good-time credits, extended incarceration, or placement in solitary confinement, differs significantly from traditional civil law penalties.
[36] Wolff, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/418/539/.
[37] In Harmelin v. Michigan, Justice Kennedy’s opinion argued against the test set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), specifically rejecting the consideration of the second and third prongs of the Solem proportionality analysis, which examine sentences imposed on other inmates in the same jurisdiction and sentences imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.
[38] Cyrus Ahalt, Craig Haney, Sarah Rios, Matthew P. Fox, et al. “Reducing the Use and Impact of Solitary Confinement in Corrections.” International Journal of Prisoner Health 13, no. 1 (March 13, 2017): 41–48. https://doi.org/10.1108/ijph-08-2016-0040.
[39] Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), recognized that good-time credits, which reduce the length of a criminal sentence based on an inmate’s conduct and compliance with prison rules, constitute a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Generally the application of good-time credits will vary by state.
[40] Examples of limited due process Cox v. Cook, 601 F.2d 26 5th Cir. (1975) argued that due process is not retroactive; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) held that the transfer of inmates to another facility does not implicate a liberty interest, and therefore no due process required); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 held that administrative segregation pending investigation does not invoke Sixth Amendment rights.
[41] Philip W. Sbaratta, “Sandin v. Conner: The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of Prisoners’ Due Process and the Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty.” Cornell Law Review 81, no. 3 (March 24, 1996): 763–65. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2598&context=clr.
[42] Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The courts moved away from the statutes of the state or prison regulations that create liberty interest for the incarcerated.
[43] Michael Z. Goldman “Sandin v. Conner and Intra-prison Confinement: Ten Years of Confusion and Harm in Prisoner Litigation.” Boston College Law Review 45 (2004): 423-466. https://doi.org/https://bclawreview.bc.edu/articles/1085.
[44] Failed Due Process Solitary Cases Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 930 P.2d 603 (1996), Lamons v. Williamson, No. 96-15861, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29388 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 1996)
[45] Laura Sullivan. “Timeline: Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons.” NPR, July 26, 2006. https://www.npr.org/2006/07/26/5579901/timeline-solitary-confinement-in-u-s-prisons.
[46] Allen J. Beck, Use of Restrictive Housing in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 2011–12. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics, October 2015. https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/urhuspj1112.pdf.
[47] Ian Manuel, “Opinion | I Survived 18 Years in Solitary Confinement (Published 2021).” New York Times, March 25, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/opinion/solitary-confinement-reform.html.
[48] Goldman, “Sandin v. Conner.”
[49] Olga Cunha, Andreia de Castro Rodrigues, Sónia Caridade, Ana Rita Dias, et al. “The Impact of Imprisonment on Individuals’ Mental Health and Society Reintegration: Study Protocol.” BMC Psychology 11, no. 1 (July 25, 2023). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40359-023-01252-w.
[50] Brian Nam-Sonenstein and Nell Haney. “Bad Behavior: How Prison Disciplinary Policies Manufacture Misconduct.” Prison Policy Initiative, January 2025. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/discipline.html.
[51] Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985)
[52] Nam-Sonenstein and Haney, “Bad Behavior”
[53] Initiative, Prison Policy. “Prison Disciplinary Fines Only Further Impoverish Incarcerated People and Families.” Prison Policy Initiative. Accessed April 25, 2025. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2024/02/07/disciplinary-fines/.
[54] “Kangaroo Court.” Legal Information Institute. Accessed April 25, 2025. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/kangaroo_court.
[55] Andrea C. Armstrong, “No Prisoner Left behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal Institutions.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2324387.
[56] Basis of the decision in Wolff, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
[57] Snyder, Sickmund M. Rep. Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), 1995. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/juvenile-offenders-andvictims-national-report. 76-79
[58] Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
[59] Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
[60] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551(2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Miller v. Alabama (2012), Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)
[61] Maria Cramer. “N.Y. Prisons Loosen Solitary Confinement Rules as Wildcat Strikes Spread - The New York Times.” N.Y. Prisons Loosen Solitary Confinement Rules as Wildcat Strikes Spread, February 20, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/20/nyregion/new-york-prison-strikes-solitary-confinement.html.