By: Tayten Han
Volume X – Issue II – Spring 2025
I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern global economy, it has become increasingly common for Americans to invest in foreign companies. Yet, Congress’s ability to tax gains from such investments remains a contested issue, especially when investors have not directly received income. This issue was central to Moore v. United States, where on June 20, 2024, the Supreme Court ruled in a 7–2 decision in favor of the federal government. [1] In 2005, Charles and Kathleen Moore invested $40,000 into the American-controlled foreign corporation KisanKraft. [2] From 2006-2017, KisanKraft reinvested all earnings, meaning the Moores did not receive any distributions, dividends, or payments. [3] As a result, neither the corporation nor its shareholders were taxed on those earnings. [4] However, in 2017, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which included a one-time, retroactive tax known as the Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) under Section 965. [5] The MRT taxed unrealized, undistributed income from a rate ranging from 8 to 15.5 percent, resulting in the Moores owing $14,729 based on their shares in KisanKraft. [6] In response, the Moores paid the tax and filed a lawsuit against the United States, claiming that the MRT violated the 16th Amendment of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [7] The District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the case on both grounds, and the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision. [8] The Moores subsequently appealed the case to the Supreme Court, focusing solely on their claim that the MRT violated the Direct Tax Clause, where the Court ruled against the Moores. [9]
The impact of the decision in Moore v. United States extends far beyond the $14,729 the Moores owed—it borders on the broader constitutional issue of whether Congress can tax unrealized gains from unsold or undistributed assets under the 16th Amendment. With a growing number of corporations retaining profits offshore as a tax deferral strategy, the decision in Moore v. United States modernizes a critical framework for future foreign tax policy, laying a foundation for reducing inequities created by companies exploiting loopholes in the Internal Revenue Code. By upholding the MRT, the Court effectively addresses the limits of federal taxation power, seeking to address whether Congress can tax unrealized capital gains and impose retroactive taxes. This decision is imperative in determining if Congress can close tax loopholes with offshore subsidiaries and accounts used by wealthy individuals to evade U.S. taxes. By extension, this may shape the future of potential federal taxation on wealth.
II. BACKGROUND
Business entities based in the United States are taxed in one of two ways: they may either be taxed on a “pass-through” basis, where taxes are levied directly on the entity’s owners, or they may be taxed directly at the entity level, where the business itself is taxed. [10] This tax policy, however, differs for foreign companies owned by U.S. citizens. Controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) are foreign corporations where more than 50 percent of the stock is held by stockholders who individually own at least 10 percent of the company. [11] CFCs, as defined in Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, are treated similarly to a domestic “pass-through” entity in that a portion of the foreign corporation’s income is taxed to individual shareholders. [12] However, unlike traditional pass-through entities, CFCs do not “pass” the entirety of their income to shareholders for taxation. Rather, a majority of taxation on CFC income can be deferred until the income is distributed to its American shareholders, at which point the shareholders will repatriate, or pay back, the taxes they owe. [13] As a result, CFC investors who do not realize their gains would functionally face a lower tax burden than those investing in comparable domestic corporations, as they may continue to defer U.S. taxation. Thus, American entities have used Subpart F’s loophole to minimize tax burdens. For example, by transferring the ownership of intangible assets, including economic and intellectual property rights, to offshore subsidiaries in Ireland, Apple minimized U.S. tax liabilities while only being subject to a sub-two percent corporate tax rate after negotiation with the Irish government. [14] Until Apple realizes the income from its foreign subsidiaries, it can continue deferring taxation and reinvesting offshore earnings while facing minimal corporate tax.
In 2017, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, a major overhaul of the U.S. tax system that notably dropped the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent. [15] In addition, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act introduced the MRT to incentivize the repatriation of foreign earnings and discourage the use of offshore subsidiaries in tax havens. [16] Aiming to recoup prior unpaid taxes, the MRT imposed a one-time tax on previously accumulated CFC income, resulting in an eight percent effective tax rate on cash accumulated by CFCs and a 15.5 percent effective tax rate on non-cash assets. [17] This effectively required foreign investors to repatriate taxes on foreign income, even if it was unrealized. In the Moores’ case, the income generated by KisanKraft from 2006 to 2017, despite not being distributed to its shareholders, was taxed under the MRT, resulting in its $14,729 tax liability. After repatriating this tax, the Moores filed suit with the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, [18] contending that the Mandatory Repatriation Tax conflicted with the 16th Amendment and Fifth Amendment.
III. RELEVANT CONSTITIUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Under the Articles of Confederation from 1781 to 1789, the U.S. federal government relied entirely on state contributions to fund its activities. [19] The federal government could not impose direct federal taxes on citizens. This provision proved insufficient to fund the federal government, particularly in times of crisis. Even before the Declaration of Independence, George Washington recognized that relying entirely on state contributions was an ineffective means of garnering resources in times of war with the British. [20] In Federalist Papers: No. 30, Alexander Hamilton critiqued the Articles’ restriction on federal government taxation, contending that the inability to enact a federal tax can become a threat to national security. [21] For example, in times of war, the United States may need to quickly gather revenue to fund wartime measures and support military measures, and relying solely on state contributions, which could be delayed or insufficient, may leave the nation vulnerable. [22] Among other criticisms of the Articles of Confederation, the lack of a federal tax was a central concern among the Founding Fathers.
When the Constitution was written in 1787, the framers included Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1, providing Congress the power to impose direct and indirect taxes. [23] Direct taxes are generally those imposed directly on “persons or property,” [24] which may include taxes on real estate. [25] However, Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4 stated that to levy direct taxes, Congress must tax proportionally to the population of each of the states. [26] Due to the practical difficulty of enacting proportionally representative taxes, Congress has generally avoided enacting direct taxes. [27] This is in contrast to indirect taxes; indirect taxes are those levied on transactions and goods, and include duty, impost, and excise taxes. [28] Congress is permitted to enact indirect taxation without apportionment, so long as the tax structure is “uniform throughout the United States.” [29] Effectively, so long as the tax structure is consistent for all citizens, Congress may enact indirect taxation. This simplified the taxation process and historically allowed Congress to generate tax revenue efficiently. [30]
Article I, however, came into question in 1895 after the Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) ruling. Charles Pollock, a shareholder in the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, challenged a federal income tax on earnings from both real estate and personal property, including investments such as stocks and bonds. [31] The Court ruled in favor of Pollock, stating that federal taxes on income derived from the ownership of property were taxes on the property itself, and thus, constituted a direct tax. [32] By extension, all federal taxes on income derived from property that were not apportioned to the state population were unconstitutional. [33] To rectify this limitation, the 16th Amendment was ratified to allow for a federal tax on income derived from property [34] The 16th Amendment essentially created an exception to Article 1’s apportionment rule, allowing Congress to impose direct federal taxes on income derived from any source without the need for apportionment among the states. [35] It is important to note that the 16th Amendment only addresses taxation on income, and Article 1 still prevents Congress from levying other forms of direct taxation, such as taxation on property itself, without apportionment. This distinction raises the question of what constitutes “income” under the 16th Amendment, a crucial point of contention in Moore.
The petitioners in Moore pointed towards Eisen v. Macomber (1920) as a key case in distinguishing taxable income from untaxable property. [36] Macomber centered around whether a stock dividend, wherein a shareholder receives more shares proportionate to their existing number of shares, constituted taxable income under the 16th Amendment. [37] The Court found that for a return on capital to be considered taxable income, or for it to be “realized,” “something of exchangeable value” must be “severed from the capital” and received by the taxpayer for “separate use. [38] Thus, without this “realization,” a gain, like a stock dividend, is not taxable under the 16th Amendment. Macomber clarifies that the mere appreciation in the value of one’s property does not constitute income until the property is liquidated for separate use.
In Heiner v. Mellon (1938), the Court examined a case of unrealized income, wherein Congress taxed business partners for the undistributed income in their partnership. [39] The Court upheld Congress’s ability to tax individual partners on undistributed partnership income, and that Congress had the authority to effectively choose whether it treats the partnership as a pass-through entity or directly taxes the partnership itself, finding it immaterial that the partners themselves did not receive the income. [40] In essence, because the partnership itself had realized the income, the partners, on a pass-through basis, had realized that income. This precedent would appear to directly contradict the Moores’ argument based on Eisen, as Heiner essentially granted Congress the power to tax undistributed income to individuals, so long as the corporation had realized income.
IV. US COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
After the District Court dismissed the Moores’ petition, the Moores brought the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the case. [41] The Court first found that the MRT did not violate the Direct Tax Clause of Article 1 of the Constitution. [42] Traditionally, the Direct Tax Clause applied to the taxation of property, such as the taxation of land, until the ruling in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co (1895), which found that income derived from property could be protected by the Direct Tax Clause. [43] The 16th Amendment negated this ruling, holding that direct taxation on income derived from any source is not subject to the Direct Tax Clause and thus did not need to be apportioned to the state population. [44]
However, the Court noted the difficulty of defining what “income” is and recognized that whether something constitutes income must be defined on a case-by-case basis. [45] However, the Court reasoned that historically, courts have ruled that taxes similar to the MRT are constitutional. [46] For example, in Eder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a decision made before the enactment of Subpart F of the Revenue Code, the Second District found that foreign income was taxable. [47] The Court highlights that, as per Heiner v. Mellon, a tax can be constitutional even if an individual does not realize the income. Based on these main principles, the Court found that the MRT abides by the Direct Tax Clause and Sixteenth Amendment. [48] Nothing restricts Congress from attributing income from business entities to individual shareholders, regardless of whether or not the income is realized.
In response to the petitioners citing Eisen v. Macomber as a definition of income, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Macomber’s holding that income is realized before being taxed is non-binding. [49] While Macomber provides one possible definition of income, the Supreme Court emphasized that it does not provide a “universal definition of income” and that the realization requirement in Macomber is not absolute. [50] Thus, the Court found that the MRT’s taxation on unrealized income from foreign corporations remained constitutional, as the Moores realized KisanKraft’s income on a pass-through basis.
The Moores had also argued that the MRT violated the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. They claimed that enacting a retroactive tax without prior notice was inherently unconstitutional, as no due process was undergone before the enactment of these taxes. [51] In response to the petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeals pointed to the “deferential” standard established in United States v. Carlton (1994) to determine if the MRT’s retroactive tax was constitutional. [52] The “deferential” standard states that a retroactive tax remains constitutional if “it serves a legitimate purpose by rational means.” [53] The Court ruled that the MRT met this broad standard—the MRT eliminated various taxes on CFC before 2018, meaning that if it did not tax undistributed earnings, CFC shareholders would effectively never have to pay taxation on pre-2018 offshore earnings. [54] Based on this holding, Charles and Kathleen Moore decided to appeal the Court’s decision to the Supreme Court, but only based on their first claim that the MRT violated the Direct Tax Clause. [55]
V. SUPREME COURT DECISION
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion, which affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that the Mandatory Repatriation Tax did not exceed Congress’s authority to tax income under the 16th Amendment. [56] Justice Kavanaugh was joined by Justices John Roberts, Samuel Alito Jr., Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Amy Coney Barrett, and Ketanji Brown Jackson, with Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch dissenting. [57] Justices Jackson and Barrett authored concurring opinions, and Justice Thomas authored the dissenting opinion. [58]
Justice Kavanaugh first identified the central issue as whether the MRT was a tax on income or a tax on property. [59] He affirmed the Court of Appeals’s holding that the Moores’ income from KisanKraft would be considered realized, as the income was realized by the corporation. [60] That is, while Charles and Kathleen Moore did not receive any dividends from KisanKraft’s earnings, the MRT effectively attributes the income of the corporation to shareholders as a pass-through entity. [61] Thus, the income is considered realized. The constitutionality of this practice is affirmed by two cases: Burk-Waggoner Oil Assn. v. Hopkins and Burnet v. Leininger. [62] In the former, the Court established that Congress could effectively choose either to tax a business entity itself or treat it as a pass-through entity and directly tax shareholders. [63] Burnet v. Leininger reiterated this principle. [64] Like the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court compared the MRT to the taxation in Heiner v. Mellon, where it was held that Congress could levy taxes on income shareholders did not directly receive. [65] The Supreme Court held that these cases have created a clear precedent that contradicts the petitioners’ argument. [66]
The majority opinion addresses the Moores’ reliance on Eisen v. Macomber by clarifying that in Macomber, the value of assets did not rise. [67] The Court states that the Moores incorrectly interpreted Macomber to mean that any undistributed income is untaxable when in reality, the case only held that a stock dividend, where there was no actual realized gain or appreciation of value, cannot be taxed as income. [68] The Court found that Burk-Waggoner Oil Assn. v. Hopkins, Burnet v. Leininger, and Heiner v. Mellon, which all contradicted the Moores’ interpretation of Macomber, provided more applicable precedent for determining the constitutionality of undistributed income. [69]
The petitioner also attempted to differentiate the MRT from these cases by presenting three ad hoc distinctions. [70] First, the cited precedent cases of Burk-Waggoner Oil Assn., Burnet, and Heiner involved partnerships, where individuals are the same entity as the business. [71] Second, the petitioners argued that investors in non-C-corporations such as KisanKraft do not consent to pass-through level taxation. [72] Third, the petitioners argued that the MRT is not established on the doctrine of constructive realization, or the doctrine that income may be taxed even if not distributed as cash, so long as the individual retains control over the income. [73] The majority opinion criticizes these distinctions as the “Moores’ effort to thread that needle” and that they were “unavailing.” [74] The Court argued that these claims were immaterial, as they do not undermine the central precedent that Congress retains the power to choose to tax at the entity level or the pass-through level. [75]
Curiously, the majority opinion declined to opine whether realization is required for an income tax, with Justice Kavanaugh writing, “we do not decide that question today.” [76] The majority opinion establishes that the decision in Moore applies to a narrow scope, only when Congress treats an entity as a pass-through. [77]
The Moores’ central argument can be summarized as the following: the MRT taxed unrealized income, and unrealized income constitutes a direct tax that requires apportionment. However, the majority opinion undermines the credibility of this argument because the Moores’ income, though undistributed, was realized on a pass-through basis. Thus, the question of whether income must be realized to qualify as a direct tax requiring apportionment does not have to be answered.
However, the concurring and dissenting opinions provide substantial insight into a split view of the realization requirement. Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion emphasizes that the Sixteenth Amendment does not explicitly require income to be realized to be taxed as an indirect tax, and historical interpretations have generally only considered land taxes and capitation (head) taxes. [78] Justice Jackson foreshadows a potential future controversy over the constitutionality of potential wealth taxes. [79] Justice Barrett concurred with the majority opinion, but in her concurring opinion, contrasted Justice Jackson’s view on the realization requirement. She emphasized the usage of “derived” in the Sixteenth Amendment’s language, arguing that it implies a realization requirement. [80] Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that the Moores had never actually realized the income in the first place, distinguishing corporate income from that of income distributed to individuals. [81]
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE TAXATION
While the majority opinion does not definitively define whether or not the realization of income is required to be taxed, it offers a modern interpretation of the principles in Heiner that the realization of income by a corporation may be attributed directly to shareholders on a pass-through basis. As such, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Moore still holds substantial implications for the future of taxation in the United States, particularly regarding foreign income and unrealized assets. By affirming the Congressional power to levy taxes on undistributed earnings, this decision provides a foundation for future legislative efforts to close tax loopholes for the wealthy within subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code. With large corporations like Apple commonly transferring assets to offshore subsidiaries to minimize corporate tax rates, taxes like the MRT become imperative to close loopholes and allow for a level playing field that ensures fairness in the taxation system.
While the majority declined to definitively resolve whether the 16th Amendment requires realization for income taxation, this decision weakens Eisen v. Macomber’s “realization” principle in practice. By continuing to allow Congress to attribute foreign corporate earnings directly to shareholders, even if the earnings are not distributed, this effectively signals to Congress that they may tax economic gains without requiring apportionment. While Article 1 of the Constitution prohibits a direct property tax, the reasoning in Moore could legitimize a future federal wealth tax.
Moore reiterates a flexible definition of income, wherein it does not need to be directly paid in cash to taxpayers. Rather, an increase in the income of an entity, like KisanKraft, could be attributed to an individual stockholder on a pass-through basis. Though the precedent has existed since Heiner, the modernization of its principles has become essential today in the context of discussions of a wealth tax. If Congress can levy taxes on such gains in CFCs on a pass-through basis, a similar reasoning may be used to justify taxing other forms of gains on a pass-through basis. For example, the appreciation of wealth, such as stock holdings, real estate, or other assets, could be realized in a pass-through manner.
In 2014, economist Thomas Piketty published a theory arguing that a capitalistic society inherently creates wealth disparities, and that a feasible means to address them would be a global wealth tax. [82] In 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Pramila Jayapal, and Brendan Boyle reintroduced the UltraMillionaire Tax for Congressional debate, a tax aiming to address wealth hoarding and economic inequalities by directly taxing wealth. [83] This created debate among legal scholars regarding its constitutionality, with critics arguing that a tax on wealth would constitute a direct tax requiring apportionment. [84]
If the Court had ruled in Moore that income is not required to be realized before taxation, proponents of a wealth tax may largely circumvent the aforementioned constitutional criticisms. Taxes on the appreciation of stocks or offshore subsidiaries, for example, would be constitutional and effectively open a path for a true wealth tax as Piketty recommends. If the Court had ruled in Moore that income is required to be realized, however, it would have reinforced Macomber’s nonbinding definition of income and affirmed that unrealized gains, such as the appreciation of stocks, cannot be taxed. This would effectively block Elizabeth Warren’s proposals for a wealth tax and potentially encourage corporations to further invest in offshore subsidiaries.
The constitutionality of a pure wealth tax ultimately remains unanswered in Moore. Justice Jackson and Justice Barrett’s contrasting views on the Sixteenth Amendment’s criteria of a taxable form of income reveal a split in the Court’s views of whether unrealized income is a direct or indirect tax. However, the decision in Moore acts as a modern interpretation of Heiner’s principles that prevents wealthy individuals and corporations from shielding income indefinitely through foreign subsidiaries. The pass-through basis of realization allows for foreign subsidiaries to be taxed with repatriation taxes like the MRT, and allows Congress to further tax offshore subsidiaries that attempt to utilize Subpart F loopholes.
With wealth inequality constantly rising in the United States, a seeming plutocracy with wealthy individuals in the current U.S. government, and more issues concerning the wealthy getting wealthier, the implementation of a tax targeting wealth could prove to alleviate growing disparities in the United States. The decision in Moore leaves this path of a potential tax on wealth open, providing a constitutional basis on which a tax on unrealized assets can be created.
Endnotes
[1] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[2] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[3] Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Smith, No. 22-800 (U.S. filed Feb. 21, 2023)
[4] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[5] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[6] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[7] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[8] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[9] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[10] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[11] 26 U.S. Code § 957 - Controlled foreign corporations; United States persons, LII / Legal Information Institute (2017).
[12] 26 U.S. Code § 951 - Amounts included in gross income of United States shareholders, LII / Legal Information Institute (2017).
[13] What is the TCJA repatriation tax and how does it work?, Tax Policy Center (2017)
[14] Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 113th Cong. 1 (2013).
[15] Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
[16] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[17] I.R.C. § 965(c) (2025).
[18] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[19] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[20] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[21] The Federalist No. 30 (Alexander Hamilton).
[22] The Federalist No. 30 (Alexander Hamilton).
[23] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
[24] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[25] Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
[26] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
[27] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[28] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1
[29] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1
[30] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1
[31] Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
[32] Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
[33] Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
[34] Overview of Sixteenth Amendment, Income Tax, U.S. Constitution Annotated, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-16/overview-of-sixteenth-amendment-income-tax
[35] Overview of Sixteenth Amendment, Income Tax, U.S. Constitution Annotated, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-16/overview-of-sixteenth-amendment-income-tax
[36] Brief for Petitioners at 15–16, Moore v. United States, No. 22-800 (U.S. argued Oct. 2024).
[37] Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
[38] Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
[39] Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938).
[40] Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938).
[41] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[42] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[43] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[44] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[45] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[46] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[47] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[48] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[49] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[50] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[51] Brief for Appellants, Moore v. United States, No. 20-36122 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2021).
[52] Moore v. United States, 20-36122, 2022 WL 2069644 (9th Cir. June 7, 2022).
[53] Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).
[54] Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938).
[55] Brief for Petitioners at 15–16, Moore v. United States, No. 22-800 (U.S. argued Oct. 2024).
[56] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[57] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[58] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[59] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[60] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[61] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[62] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[63] Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925).
[64] Brief for Petitioners at 15–16, Moore v. United States, No. 22-800 (U.S. argued Oct. 2024).
[65] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[66] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[67] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[68] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[69] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[70] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[71] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[72] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[73] Moore v. United States, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/22-800
[74] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[75] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[76] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[77] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. (2024).
[78] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S.(2024) (Jackson, J., concurring)
[79] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S.(2024) (Jackson, J., concurring)
[80] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S.(2024) (Barrett, A., concurring).
[81] Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. 572, (2024) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[82] Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2014).
[83] Elizabeth Warren, Press Release, Warren, Jayapal, Boyle Reintroduce Ultra-Millionaire Tax on Fortunes Over $50 Million (Mar. 1, 2023), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-jayapal-boylereintroduce-ultra-millionaire-tax-on-fortunes-over-50-million.
[84] Isobel Asher Hamilton, Is Elizabeth Warren's Wealth Tax Constitutional? Law Professors Weigh In (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/is-elizabeth-warrens-wealth-tax-constitutional-law-professors-billionairesinequality-2021-3.