By: Tayten Han ’28
Volume XI – Issue I – Fall 2025
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2024, the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (603 U.S. 369 (2024)) overturned Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (467 U.S. 837 (1984)), ending four decades of judicial deference to federal agencies on ambiguous statutes. [1] Under Chevron, federal courts were required to defer to agency interpretations in cases where congressional intent in a statute was unclear, reflecting a belief in the necessity of specialized expertise and autonomy in the pragmatic application of complex regulatory laws. [2] For this reason, Chevron had become foundational in regulatory cases, being cited over 18,000 times in both the lower courts and the Supreme Court. [3] It served as a cornerstone separation of powers framework by explicitly defining the extent of federal agency power relative to judicial authority. Over the past decade, however, the Chevron deferral doctrine had significantly waned in influence, with Supreme Court litigators even growing reluctant to invoke its principles. [4] Loper Bright marked the culmination of this long decline, formally shifting interpretive authority of statutes primarily to the judicial system, signaling a shift in authority from specialized federal agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the judicial branch.
The Loper Bright ruling emerges amongst a broader series of Supreme Court cases over the past five years that may signal a philosophical shift in the Court’s approach to agency authority. Recent decisions such as Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy (603 US _ (2024)), West Virginia v. EPA (597 US _ (2022)), and Seil Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (591 US _ (2020)) demonstrates a growing trend of judicial skepticism towards agency authority. These cases have each substantially weakened federal agencies by questioning their structural independence and policymaking discretion—a stark contrast to the Chevron ruling, which required courts to defer to agency interpretations of statutes. Collectively, these cases reflect a modern Supreme Court increasingly intent on reasserting judicial supremacy, even if agencies may be better equipped for the practical application of an ambiguous statute. As Justice Kagan writes in her dissenting opinion, “this very Term presents yet another example of the Court’s resolve to roll back agency authority, despite congressional direction to the contrary.” [5]
Yet the implications of this shift extend beyond administrative law. The Court’s emerging philosophy in distrusting technocratic governance suggests an increasing realignment to a judiciary-centered approach. Such a rollback of administrative power may risk a reconfiguration of a delicate separation of powers among the branches of government in the United States, substantially limiting the enforcement power of federal agencies. With recent upward trends of environmental crimes, financial crimes, and other federally regulated offenses, this tension between agency expertise and judicial control may carry high stakes in the future functionality of federal regulation.
This paper traces the judicial evolution of the growing constraints on administrative authority in recent years and its implications for the modern regulatory state. The following sections analyze the historical precedent and upbringing of Chevron and Loper Bright, modern decisions regarding the constraints on agency autonomy, and consider the broader implications for the branches of government and agency regulation. Loper Bright represents not merely a retreat from agency deference but a reassertion of judicial control that risks destabilizing regulatory governance.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
As Loper Bright shifts away from the administrative state, it is imperative to understand its development and the rise of both the number of agencies and their political autonomy. The administrative state saw its most significant expansion from the 1930s to 1940s amidst the Great Depression when New Deal legislation created new agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement socioeconomic reform. [6] As the administrative state grew, the Court faced new questions about the limitations of presidential oversight and the expanded autonomy of new federal agencies. Among significant cases are Humphrey's Executor v. United States (295 U.S. 602 (1935)), wherein, writing for a unanimous court, Justice Sutherland held that the president did not possess the powers to remove federal agency members because the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) “acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.” [7] Because of this hybrid role that federal agencies serve, Justice Sutherland reasoned that the FTC “must be free from executive control.” [8] This ruling in Humphrey’s Executor reflects an early judicial understanding that federal agencies serve a role as a distinct fourth branch in the federal government. By legitimizing agency autonomy, Humphrey’s Executor established a constitutional foundation for the modern administrative state while also marking the beginning of the Court’s ongoing efforts to define the extent of federal agency power.
Where Humphrey’s Executor addressed agency structural independence, in 1944, the Court further clarified its view on agency interpretive authority in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (323 U.S. 134 (1944)). Skidmore recognized the degree of respect that courts hold on agency interpretations, with Justice Robert Jackson writing, “the Administrator's policies are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case.” [9] He also held that the judicial weight of an interpretation is dependent on its “power to persuade,” [10] as opposed to its mere existence, signaling an early pragmatic recognition of agency expertise in applying complex statutes.
Humphrey’s Executor established that agencies could operate independently of executive control, while Skidmore suggested that agency interpretations could carry persuasive weight in judicial review due to specialized expertise. By recognizing both agency independence and the persuasiveness of agency reasoning, the Court laid the groundwork for the Chevron doctrine, transforming the aforementioned principles into a formal doctrine of judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretation. The case centers around the Clean Air Act of 1977, which established a limitation on modification of pollution-producing sources by requiring a permit if any modification to a “stationary source” increased total emissions. [11] The definition of “stationary source” was not adequately clarified in the statute. [12] The EPA elected to interpret “stationary source” to mean an entire industrial grouping (eg. an entire industrial factory), as if all components could be “bubbled.” [13] Several parties, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, challenged this “bubbling” policy by the EPA, giving rise to the question of whether the Clean Air Act permitted the EPA to interpret “stationary source” to mean whole industrial plants. [14] The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the EPA.
The Court’s reasoning was heavily predicated on the existing frameworks established by Skidmore and SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I, 1943 & Chenery II, 1947). Skidmore established a judicial respect for agency interpretation, where Chenery provided agencies the authority to create policy through adjudication. [15] Chevron relies on the assumption that ambiguity in Congressional statutes is inevitable in complex regulatory legislation and that, as per Skidmore, regulatory agencies with specialized expertise are best suited to handle such ambiguities. As such, in a unanimous decision, the Court held that courts must defer to agency interpretation on ambiguous statutes provided the case passes a two-prong test. [16] First, the statute must be ambiguous, and second, the agency’s interpretation of the statute must be reasonable. [17] This decision formally institutionalized judicial deference to administrative expertise, giving rise to what became referred to as the Chevron deferral doctrine. It reinforced the Court’s view that policymaking discretion should rest with agency expertise and not generalist judges, and reflected a certain level of trust and respect for the technical and complex knowledge that agencies like the EPA or SEC held. In fact, agencies become significantly more likely to succeed in court when the Chevron doctrine is applied by the court, even if the court ultimately decides that the statute was unambiguous. [18]
Of note, in 1946, in response to the rapid expansion of the administrative state and the rising power of federal agencies during the New Deal, Congress implemented the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to ensure agencies were still subject to judicial review. The APA wrote that courts may find agency actions unlawful under a number of circumstances, including if an agency’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” [19] Crucially, under § 706, the APA established that a “reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law.” [20] For decades, this statute lay largely dormant, as its authority was overshadowed by the functionalist rationale of Chevron deference, even if it contradicted the APA’s plain text.
However, Chevron, despite being considered a “foundational” case that recognized the functionalist need for agency authority, has declined significantly in influence in recent years, with Justice Alito even writing in 2018 that Chevron was an “increasingly maligned precedent” that the Court felt comfortable “simply ignoring.” [21] In fact, the Court “had not deferred to an agency interpretation of federal law since 2016.” [22] Commentators argued that Chevron's “step two violates separation of powers and due process principles,” [23] criticisms that reflected a broader skepticism of the expanding autonomy of federal agencies in recent years. Throughout the past decade, Court decisions have increasingly echoed this sentiment, gradually reducing agency power, a doctrinal evolution that not only signals a retreat from Chevron deference but potentially a reconceptualization of the United States federal government structure.
III. MODERN CONSTRAINTS ON AGENCIES
i. Structural Limitations
The decision in Loper Bright does not stand in isolation. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy and Seila Law v. CFPB emerge as key examples of modern instances in which the Court has effectively restructured long-standing practices of key federal agencies. In SEC v. Jarkesy, George Jarkesy, a hedge fund manager, ran two investment funds. [24] The SEC launched an investigation into Jarkesy under suspicion of defrauding investors and discovered instances of misrepresenting fund investment strategies, inflated asset values, and other forms of fraud. Under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the SEC had the choice to prosecute in the federal courts or an in-house Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The SEC proceeded with an in-house prosecution, to which Jarkesy raised a constitutional challenge to the structure of in-house proceedings under the 7th Amendment. [25]
The Court ruled in favor of Jarkesy, holding that the SEC cannot use an in-house ALJ to impose civil penalties. While the function of in-house prosecution was deemed constitutional, the requirement of all civil penalty cases to proceed in federal court significantly limits the enforcement power of not just the SEC, but a majority of federal agencies. Civil penalties act as the primary enforcement mechanism of federal agencies, and the decision in Jarkesy threatens to constrain the practical application of prosecution by federal agencies. As noted by Justice Sotomayor in her dissent, “more than 200 statutes authorizing dozens of agencies to impose civil penalties for violations of statutory obligations” may be challenged as a result of Jarkesy. [26]
Similarly, in Seila Law, the Court’s ruling substantially weakened long-standing practices of federal agencies, in turn restructuring the federal balance of power. In Seila Law, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau launched an investigation into Seila Law LLC, a law firm providing debt-relief services. [27] Seila Law refused and petitioned that CFPB’s structure of a single director that cannot be removed by the president violated the separation of powers established by the Constitution. [28] The Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing Humphrey’s Executor. [29]
The Court granted certiorari and overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that while Humphrey held that “Congress could create expert agencies led by a group of principal officers removable by the President only for good cause,” an independent agency that “wields significant executive power and is run by a single individual” is fundamentally different from the holding in Humphrey’s Executor. [30] The Court declined to overturn Humphrey’s Executor, but sharply limited the decision’s reach. By distinguishing multi-member committees from single-director agencies, the Court effectively narrowed the scope of Humphrey’s Executor, framing it as a historical exception as opposed to a broad authorization of the autonomy of federal agencies. It departed substantially from Humphrey’s Executor’s conceptualization of a “fourth branch” of government.
ii. Interpretive Limitations
Loper Bright, as aforementioned, acted as the culmination of growing dissent amongst judges and legal scholars. In 1976, Congress passed the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), intended to prevent overfishing in international waters. [31] The MSA gave broad authority to the EPA to enforce this policy. [32] However, when the EPA required an EPA representative to board the fishing boat of Loper Bright Enterprises and that Loper Bright must reimburse the cost of $710.00 for each day of fishing, Loper Bright challenged the legality of this practice, arguing that the MSA did not grant the EPA the power to impose this practice. [33]
The lower courts, bound by the Chevron deference doctrine, affirmed the EPA’s actions, as they were required to defer to the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous doctrine. [34] To find otherwise would be contradictory to the Chevron doctrine, meaning that only the Supreme Court holds the authority to decide in favor of Loper Bright Enterprises by overturning Chevron. The Court, however, granted certiorari and overturned Chevron. The Court reasoned that Chevron contradicted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, which stated that courts must decide “all relevant questions of law.” [35] By removing legallybinding agency statute interpretations, the Court effectively reallocated interpretive authority from agencies to the judiciary branch, constraining the power of the modern administrative state.
With the decline of the Chevron doctrine, the Court has increasingly relied on the “Major Questions” doctrine to invalidate agency actions. The “Major Questions” doctrine states that in “‘extraordinary cases' where an agency claims authority of 'vast economic and political significance,' it must identify clear congressional authorization for its actions.” [36] Ambiguity, under this framework, no longer signals permission for agency authority. This doctrine was most clearly formalized in West Virginia v. EPA (2022), when the EPA was challenged on its authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for power plants under the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule. [37] The ACE Rule replaced the strictly established guidelines under the 2015 Clean Power Plan. [38] The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the Trump administration’s decision to rescind the Clean Power Plan and vacated ACE, and several petitioners, including West Virginia, challenged this ruling and the EPA’s authority to broadly regulate emissions. [39]
The Court upheld the Clean Power Plan, but denied the EPA the interpretive authority to regulate power plants. The Court reasoned that the “major questions” doctrine applied and that the EPA required specific congressional approval to regulate power plants. [40]
iii. Doctrinal Nuance
The Court’s recent decisions on administrative power also include a category of rulings that do not entail sweeping, broad shifts away from Chevron, but still narrow agency authority in minute, targeted ways. In FCC v. Consumers’ Research (2025), Consumers’ Research, a nonprofit organization, challenged the constitutionality of the FCC’s “universal service fund.” [41] The “universal service fund” was authorized by Congress and required major telecommunications companies to contribute quarterly. Consumers’ Research argued that the FCC’s delegation of authority to set contribution requirements violated the nondelegation doctrine and that the agency’s funding mechanism lacked adequate congressional control.
The Court ruled against Consumers’ Research, holding that Congress had the authorization to delegate contribution-setting power to the FCC. Justice Kagan argues in the majority opinion that language contained in Congress’s initial statute that allows for the FCC’s policies to “evolve” provided “near-inevitable” technological change is sufficient authority for the FCC to create new policies under the statute limitations. [42] This effectively offers insight into the Court’s perspective of a minimum level of authority provided for agencies, where a certain level of autonomy is maintained under the conditions Congress expressly authorizes such autonomy. This reflects that despite previous rulings limiting agency structure and interpretive power, the Court maintains, to a degree, the principle of a “fourth branch.” FCC v. Consumers’ Research effectively reflects the Court’s philosophy that agency power should be lessened, but agencies should retain a level of autonomy in creating policy.
IV. MODERN ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Modern decisions reflect a doctrinal shift from the “fourth branch” philosophy expressed in Humphrey’s Executor. As opposed to relying on the specialized expertise of agency committees, a philosophy born from Skidmore, the Court currently reflects a reallocation of power to judicial control and executive oversight, a significant shift in philosophy from the expansion of federal agencies during the New Deal Era. The New Deal administrative state modeled a conceptualization of a functional separation of powers that allowed agencies, a quasi-fourth branch, to pragmatically govern. That is, Congress would set broad goals, and agencies would translate those broad goals into actionable, specific mandates. Agencies protected this legitimacy on the premise that a modern, industrialized economy necessitated nuanced, evolving, expert-advised policymaking. Even as recently as 2010, the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau via the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 included funding from the Federal Reserve, not Congress, limiting legislative oversight. [43] Chevron’s deference principle codified this functionalist view, emphasizing the importance of agency interpretation and formalizing the view that ambiguity in Congressional statutes was intended to provide agencies flexibility in policy enforcement.
The current Court, however, has rejected this functionalist perspective in favor of a formalistic, judiciary-centered interpretation of the Constitution. While the New Deal era administrative state found agency freedom to be necessary with the evolving nature of the economy, sociopolitical factors, and the practical nature need for expert-advised actions, the conservative-majority Roberts Court views such delegations with skepticism. The major questions doctrine, the rulings reverting structural overhauls in Seila Law and Jarkesy, and the overturning of the Chevron doctrine reveals a modern emerging philosophy that seeks a return to an originalist Constitutional interpretation that tethers federal agencies tightly to the judiciary or Congressional oversight. In this formalistic view, agencies no longer operate as a quasi-fourth branch that acts as independent policymaking bodies and are reduced to entities that carry out precise legislative instructions. While the Court has shown nuance on this stance, as with FCC v. Consumers’ Research, recent decisions have ultimately severely reduced the power of federal agencies, potentially risking a regulatory destabilization.
Of note, the Trump administration has made significant efforts to weaken or even eliminate certain federal agencies. Most significantly, in February of 2025, President Donald Trump appointed Scott Bessent as acting director of the CFPB after firing former director Rohit Chopra, immediately after which Bessent “halted virtually all CFPB activities” such as “investigations, litigation, rulemaking, and public communications.” [44] The firing of Chopra was justified by the ruling in Seila Law, which held that a president may fire the director of an agency without cause. Four days after this appointment, Trump replaced Bessent with Russell Vought as acting director, who expanded the freeze and closed the CFPB headquarters and ordered employees not “perform any work tasks.” [45] Effectively, this immediately halted ongoing investigations into financial crimes. As of November 2025, the Trump administration has nominated a new permanent head of the CFPB amidst the 210-day limit of Vought’s acting role, and also submitted a court filing that predicts the CFPB will be out of money by the beginning of next year, and that any form of additional funding is illegal. [46] This effort to independently eliminate an entire federal agency demonstrates how the Court’s doctrinal shift has materially impacted the erosion of the modern administrative state’s autonomy.
Once the Court dismantled the constitutional principles that protect agencies, such as removal protections, it allowed for political actors like the president to nullify agencies not through Congressional legislation, but through at-will firings and brute displays of power. The collapse of the CFPB in 2025 is a direct outcome of the Court’s new formalistic philosophy expressed in Seila Law v. CFPB.
However, the extremity of the CFPB’s dismantling may not be consistent with the broader trend of this recent doctrinal departure. Provided the recency of many of the aforementioned modern decisions like Jarkesy or Loper Bright, it remains to be seen the exact extent to which agencies may be harmed. Looking forward, such a combination of agency constraints and agency vulnerabilities suggests a potentially profound weakening of the administrative state’s ability to act. Financial crimes, environmental protection violations, public health risks, and more issues traditionally governed by agencies may go unchecked as agencies hesitate to enforce as a result of stricter constraints. The EPA, for example, influenced by the ruling in Jarkesy, may hesitate in prosecuting a corporation committing various violations due to the collapse of in-house tribunals for civil penalties, or potentially fear that their interpretation of vague Congressional statutes does not allow them to classify the corporation’s action as a violation as a result of Loper Bright. Additionally, in the near future, the Court is expected to rule in Trump v. Slaughter on whether the president possesses the ability to remove a Federal Trade Commission director, potentially overturning the longstanding doctrine of Humphrey’s Executor. [47] In the future, the true impact of this shifting administrative state will likely reveal the true extent to which the formalistic view of the Court will impact the administrative state.
Endnotes
[1] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. (2024)
[2] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
[3] “Chevron Deference in the Courts of Appeals.” 2025. Congress.gov. 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crsproduct/LSB10976.
[4] Congress.gov, “Chevron Deference in the Courts of Appeals.”
[5] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. (2024)
[6] Hugh Rockoff, 1998. “Chapter Title: By Way of Analogy: The Expansion of the Federal Government in the 1930s.” https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c6891/c6891.pdf.
[7] Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
[8] Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602.
[9] Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
[10] Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134.
[11] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
[12] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837.
[13] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837.
[14] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837.
[15] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837.
[16] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837.
[17] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837.
[18] “Chevron Deference in the Courts of Appeals.” 2025. Congress.gov. 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crsproduct/LSB10976.
[19] 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
[20] 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
[21] “Chevron Deference: A Primer.” 2025. Congress.gov. 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44954.
[22] Congress.gov, “Chevron Deference: A Primer.”
[23] Congress.gov, “Chevron Deference: A Primer.”
[24] SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024).
[25] SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109
[26] SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109
[27] Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197 (2020)
[28] Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197
[29] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Seila Law LLC, No. 17-56324 (9th Cir. 2021).
[30] Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197.
[31] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
[32] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
[33] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
[34] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
[35] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
[36] West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. 697 (2022).
[37] West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. 697.
[38] West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. 697.
[39] West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. 697.
[40] West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. 697.
[41] FCC v. Consumers' Research, 606 U.S. (2025)
[42] FCC v. Consumers' Research, 606 U.S.
[43] Congressional Research Service, Overview of X Act (CRS Reportrevealudiciary-centered No. IF10031) (2025), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF10031.pdf.
[44] Douglas Gillison, “US Treasury Chief Takes over Consumer Watchdog, Freezes All Activity.” Reuters. February 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-treasury-chief-takes-over-consumer-watchdog-freezes-all-activity2025-02-03/
[45] “New CFPB Chief Closes Headquarters, Tells All Staff They Must Not Do ‘Any Work Tasks.’” 2025. NPR. February 8, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/02/08/nx-s1-5290914/russell-vought-cfpb-doge-access-musk.
[46] Michael Stratford, “Trump Picks New CFPB Director amid Efforts to Close Agency.” POLITICO. November 19, 2025. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/19/trump-cfpb-nomination-levenbach-vought-00659032.
[47] Amy Howe, Trump v. Slaughter: an explainer, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 3, 2025, 9:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/12/trump-v-slaughter-an-explainer/