By: Jesse Ward
Volume X – Issue II – Spring 2025
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 28th, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court decision that most legal professionals were talking about was Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a landmark dismantling of the Chevron doctrine, under which courts defer to federal agencies when faced with statutory ambiguity. It was easy to miss another administrative law decision made just a day earlier, and one which is an equally significant marker of the Court’s trend of weakening the regulatory power of the administrative state. In Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), decided on June 27th, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of the petitioners, granting a stay on enforcement of the EPA’s Good Neighbor Plan. [1] The case involved a portion of the Clean Air Act called the “Good Neighbor” provision, which prevents harmful transboundary air pollution between states. [2] In March 2023, the EPA finalized and promulgated its Good Neighbor Plan, a set of emissions reduction rules forcing twenty-three upwind states to meet 2015 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone pollution affecting downwind states. [3] After rejecting the reduction rules created by these states, known as State Implementation Plans (SIPs), the EPA instead mandated its own Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). Many of the rejected states appealed, and SIP disapprovals were quickly stayed in twelve of the twenty-three states by circuit courts, leading to the EPA temporarily exempting them from the FIP. [4] Of the eleven states remaining under the Plan, petitioners from three, alongside several industry groups, sought a stay on any enforcement of the reduction requirements in the D.C. Circuit. They argued the decision to continue applying the FIP without including twelve of the original states was arbitrary and capricious. When the circuit court denied them, they requested an emergency stay from the Supreme Court. [5] The Court’s decision to ultimately grant the stay, which was based on the specifics of how the EPA responded to public comments, could be immensely impactful, and not just because of possible effects on air quality enforcement. The Court’s holding in Ohio goes beyond judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutes like that of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo or West Virginia v. EPA. It poses a threat to agency authority in a different way. As a rigorous examination of and “hard-look” at internal agency processes, it explicitly reflects the desire within the Court to debilitate agency decision-making and weaken environmental governance. [6]
II. BACKGROUND
A deeper look at this case first requires clarification on relevant statutes and legal precedent, starting with the Clean Air Act which was enacted in 1970 to regulate air emissions from stationary and mobile sources. The primary method for regulation is through the promulgation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) by the EPA. These NAAQS, which are set individually for each pollutant, are periodically reviewed and tightened based on the technology available. [7] States are then required to submit their SIPs within 3 years, which outline the rules and technology they will apply to industrial sources to follow these updated standards. [8] These plans must be enforceable, have methods of monitoring, and contain adequate provisions for preventing nonattainment of NAAQS. [9] Most notable of these provisions is the aptly-nicknamed “Good Neighbor” provision, which says SIPs must prevent significant contributions to nonattainment in another state, or interference with another state’s plan. Since air pollutants do not follow state boundaries, this keeps upwind states from laying waste to the air quality of downwind states. [10]
This provision is precisely what led to disputes between the EPA and petitioners in Ohio v. EPA. The 2015 Ozone NAAQS update led the EPA to propose its Good Neighbor Plan in February 2022, in which twenty-six upwind states would have an opportunity to submit a SIP due to their sources of ozone pollution impacting downwind states. [11] According to the Clean Air Act, if a state fails to make a submission or satisfy minimum criteria in its SIP, then the EPA’s Administrator must promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to replace it within two years unless the deficiency is corrected. [12] This regulatory responsibility applies to transboundary air pollution as well, as clarified in the important Supreme Court precedent Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation. In this case, a 2011 FIP regulating nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide across states, called the Transport Rule, was determined to be reasonably explained and justified under the Clean Air Act. [13] The 2014 ruling in favor of the EPA held that the Clean Air Act mandates the agency enforce a FIP on upwind states, even without designating different reductions for each state or providing a second opportunity for states to respond. This case also established that the EPA must avoid over-control, and while in this case the FIP was approved, FIPs cannot require states to reduce output by more than is necessary.
In Ohio, however, the situation was more complicated. In February 2022, the EPA announced its disapproval of nineteen state actions or SIPs based on the 2015 ozone NAAQs, due to violations of the Good Neighbor provision. They then proposed disapproval of four more, issuing the disapproval of each for public comment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. [14] During this comment period, the agency followed up with a single FIP, binding all twenty-three states under one umbrella, requiring them to establish stricter limitations on industrial sources of pollution such as internal combustion engines and furnaces. [15] Although the EPA’s calculations for emissions reductions used national data and were not tailored to specific states, the FIP was designed under the assumption that it would eventually apply to all twenty-three states. It was based on which emissions-control measures were most cost-effective, focusing on the “knee in the curve,” or the point where more expenditure would produce little in further emissions reductions. [16] Both the SIP disapprovals and the new FIP faced considerable opposition from affected states and industry groups, with public comments and litigation causing immediate chaos. Many questioned the choice of issuing a FIP before allowing SIP disapprovals to be finalized. Several public comments on the FIP also worried that ongoing lawsuits against the EPA for disapproving of state plans could mean that states would drop out of the federal plan, and not all twenty-three states would end up being included. [17] The EPA responded by asserting that the plan was severable. Since its methodology was not based on costs or technology of a specific state, it could be applied the same way regardless of if any jurisdiction dropped out. Just as commenters expected, regional courts stayed the rejection of twelve SIPs, and the EPA had to issue two final rules temporarily exempting those twelve states which comprised over 70% of intended emissions reductions. [18] The remaining groups affected by the FIP jumped at the opportunity to respond by requesting an emergency stay in the D.C. Circuit. Ohio, Indiana, and West Virginia, alongside dozens of petitioners such as industry groups, argued that the failure of the EPA to reevaluate the FIP, and its choice to continue applying it were “arbitrary” and “capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act. [19] When the D.C. Circuit denied relief, petitioners then requested an emergency stay on the FIP by the Supreme Court while SIP disapprovals proceeded in their respective courts. In sum, the petitioners wanted the Supreme Court to temporarily block the EPA from enforcing the Good Neighbor Plan while other litigation continued regarding validity of the SIPs and FIP. [20]
In order to grant a stay, the Supreme Court applies a four-factor test, established in the 2009 case Nken v. Holder. First, this standard entails a likelihood of success on the merits, or a strong possibility that the petitioner will succeed in their ongoing appeal based on substantive issues. Second, there must be actual and imminent irreparable injury to the relevant party if the stay is not granted. The third factor involves balancing of equities or harm to the opposing party; if the stay is to be granted, then there must not be even greater harm on the other party. Finally, the fourth factor is consideration of the public interest. [21] In the case of Ohio v. EPA, while it was not the only consideration, the Court focused most on likelihood of success on the merits, or whether Ohio et al. had a possibility of successfully appealing the disapproval of their state plans. This is because both the petitioners and the EPA had a solid argument for the latter three factors. As outlined in each party’s case brief, the states and industries risked competitive disadvantages, costs of implementing compliant technology during litigation, and the possible breaching of sovereign state interests recognized by the Clean Air Act. If the stay were to be granted, on the other hand, the effects on air quality also would harm the public interest, as well as the interests of downwind states. [22]
III. SCOTUS CASE AND DECISION
The question at stake in this case was whether the Supreme Court should stay the Good Neighbor Plan, and if these emissions controls were arbitrary and capricious given the EPA’s decision to go forward after 12 states dropped out. [23] Oral arguments, which are atypical for a case on the Supreme Court’s so-called “emergency docket,” took place on February 21, 2024 and provide concise insight into each side’s argument. State and industry applicants reiterated their claim that the EPA had an obligation to consider how the federal plan might change if states dropped out. They asserted that the addition of the severability clause by the agency as a response to concerned public comments was ill-explained and unsatisfactory. [24] Mathura Sridharan, representing the state applicants, discussed the threat of power shortages, heating shortages, and potential for the Federal rule to be associated with grid unreliability. She argued that the plan was unreasonable, as its methodology failed to include the important aspect of interdependence of states, and there was little consideration of the possibility of judicial intervention. [25] Justices Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor, and Ketanji Brown Jackson Jackson were justifiably critical of this argument. For example, Justice Jackson felt the decision of the states to delay merits briefing from the D.C. circuit indicated that they were not immediately suffering. In her view, the states thought, “we have a meritorious claim and we don’t want to have to follow the law while we’re challenging it.” [26] Catherine Stetson, representing the industry applicants, argued that the rule ignored the cost-effectiveness framework established in EME Homer, leaving out the parts of the precedent in which feasibility must be balanced with emissions reduction. [27] She also pushed back on Justice Jackson’s idea that the Court’s emergency docket is not an alternative for challenging parties refusing to comply, arguing that all a stay requires is the four factors established in Nken v. Holder. [28]
Malcolm Stewart, representing the EPA, reiterated the agency knew that the plan would change, as demonstrated by its preamble and severability provision. This meant their decision to push forward was not arbitrary or capricious. Similarly to the applicants, he argued that the four factors of Nken v. Holder swung in the EPA and downwind states’ favor; staying the rule based on the possibility that the rule would be different if the EPA anticipated every judicial action would be unfair to downwind states. It would also be impossible for the EPA to see the future, and seeing as the plan’s methodology was not devised based on each state, there was nothing at the time of promulgation warranting a change. [29] Justice Roberts questioned whether the EPA responded to the “severability issue” adequately, and Justice Gorsuch similarly felt the APA’s central goal was providing an opportunity to be heard, which the EPA did not do by failing to explain its added severability provision. [30] Finally, Judith Vale representing the downwind states argued that staying the Good Neighbor Plan would betray the statutory goals of the Clean Air Act by irreparably harming these states. She also asserted that the plan still had value in its current state, with 40% of Wisconsin’s ozone still coming from remaining upwind states, and that states entering and exiting was a mutually understood aspect of the Good Neighbor Plan. [31]
The opinion of the Court was announced June 27th, 2024, in a 5-4 decision which granted the applicants an emergency stay on enforcement of the EPA’s federal plan. [32] Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court, writing that it came down to likelihood on the success of the merits. More specifically, the Court decided the applicants would be likely to succeed in challenging stay disapprovals, as the EPA’s plan and methodology rested on an assumption that all twenty-three upwind states would adopt its emissions control tools. By offering no “reasoned” response to concerns about possible judicial challenges other than a surface-level provision saying each state’s reductions were severable, the EPA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. [33] As for whether the situation warranted judicial review or emergency relief, Justice Gorsuch referenced a section of the Clean Air Act which states that objections raised with “reasonable specificity” but refused by the EPA may be reviewed by the courts. [34] Any argument by the EPA that the objection was not specific enough or arose after the public comment period was invalidated by the inclusion of the severability provision. The agency’s unsatisfactory response, the Court decided, was proof that the EPA recognized there might be enough of an issue with states dropping out to warrant a new provision in the rule. [35] In other words, the EPA’s response to public comment with a clarifying provision in its Good Neighbor Plan became a critical factor in granting the emergency stay, despite it arguably being a good-faith attempt to abide by the APA. The majority opinion sided with applicants in nearly every aspect of their argument.
The dissent breached ideological lines as Justice Barrett, joined by the three liberal judges, laying out an argument that challenged several issues within the majority opinion. Immediately, Justice Barrett felt the case was not reviewable. She interpreted the same section of the Clean Air Act on judicial review differently, using it to argue none of the objections raised were “reasonably specific” enough to bypass reconsideration proceedings. [36] One comment that was referenced repeatedly by petitioners and the majority opinion, titled “Comments of Air Stewardship Coalition,” did not even relate to costeffectiveness or the possibility of states dropping out: it was concerning the speed with which the Good Neighbor Plan was produced. [37] Another glaring error in the majority opinion was the Court’s effort to downplay the statutory role explicitly required of the EPA by the Clean Air Act. In particular, the agency has the authority under EME Homer to determine whether SIPs are adequate or not. [38] This is undermined by the Court’s decision to attack procedural errors, missteps, and complex substantive decisions, such as by staying an entire FIP due to the possibility that a comment was not adequately addressed or explained. To make this oversight by the Court even more clear, the dissent explained that under the Clean Air Act’s stringent harmless-error rule, a court may only invalidate an EPA FIP if its errors are “so serious and related to matters of such central relevance” that the rule would need to be changed significantly. [39] In this case, the addition of the severability provision, combined with the irrelevance of comments to the issue of states dropping out or judicial review, meant the EPA response was hardly a failure at the time to address an important problem. [40] The most striking part of the dissent was Justice Barrett’s disdain toward her peers’ decision to ignore both blatant parts of statute and a lack of petitioner evidence, as she calls aspects of the majority opinion “feeble” and “cherry-picked.” [41] For example, a core part of the dissent was Justice Barrett’s disagreement that the petitioners would succeed on the merits of their argument in lower courts. She undertook an in-depth analysis of the Good Neighbor Plan’s methodology, and found that the EPA’s use of national, industry-wide data meant the FIP was unlikely to change depending on the amount of states included. The Court found zero concrete evidence that emissions limits changed depending on the number of states; similarly, applicants did not outline how the “knee in the curve” used by the EPA might change if states dropped out. [42] Justice Barrett took great issue with the “failure-to-explain” principle the Court decided to apply in this case. Instead of rendering the EPA’s actions while promulgating the Good Neighbor Plan as unreasonable, the Court frustratingly concluded that the EPA’s failure to explain its response was enough to make the entire rule arbitrary and capricious. [43]
IV. DISCUSSION
The wide disparity between the majority and minority opinions in Ohio v. EPA is a powerful example of a situation in which justices fundamentally disagree on the role of a federal agency under relevant statutes. Evidently, the majority felt the EPA was overreaching, ignoring the crucial autonomy the Clean Air Act gives states through SIPs. By focusing on comment periods and expecting detailed foresight of judicial challenges from the EPA, the Court’s majority found a novel way to check administrative authority—“fly-specking.” [44] On the other hand, the dissent applied the Clean Air Act in the school of a more traditional understanding of environmental regulation. The statute mandates that the EPA issue a Federal Implementation Plan to achieve emissions reductions at any time within two years once it disapproves of a state plan. [45] Similarly, the text of the Clean Air Act is clear about the fact that federal implementation rules should only be invalidated if they would be significantly changed when freed of errors. [46] Initially enacted with bipartisan support, the Clean Air Act was intended by Congress to protect the public health by gradually strengthening emissions controls. [47] Narrow interpretations that disqualify key provisions of the Good Neighbor Plan on a technicality are a waste of resources and a betrayal of the core of the statute. In a similar vein, the argument that the Nken v. Holder four-factor test for a stay favored applicants in this case is weak. To start with, the likelihood that applicants will succeed in invalidating the disapproval of their SIPs is nowhere close to a guarantee, despite the Court’s opinion. Prior to the Good Neighbor Plan, twenty-one upwind states proposed to change nothing to adjust for the 2015 ozone NAAQS, and two states submitted no SIP at all. Arguments that the EPA overstepped its statutory requirements by disapproving SIPs may face serious challenges in court. [48] Aside from this discussion on the likelihood of applicant success on the merits, the other three factors were also debatable, despite the Court majority’s depiction of them as a “wash.” Furthermore, any claim that the state and industry applicants also had the public interest on their side, or would face immediate disruption, is seriously contentious. Additionally, hundreds of millions of dollars of costs spent on adjusting to a federal rule may be irreparable, but it is arguably not disruptive when considering American oil and gas industries alone had a 2023 revenue of over 244 billion dollars. [49] In her oral rebuttal, Catherine Stetson, the representative for industry applicants, argued the equities were not balanced. Comparing hundreds of millions of dollars to 10 percent of a .66 average part per billion pollutant contribution, she argued the case was over a “miniscule problem.” [50] Yet, the Good Neighbor Plan in its entirety had the potential to prevent 1,300 premature deaths by 2026, which is hardly miniscule. [51] These considerations all significantly muddle the results of the Nken test in Ohio v. EPA by the Court.
On October 29th, 2024 the EPA issued a third interim final rule, amending the Good Neighbor Plan to stay enforcement in the remaining eleven states. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit granted a voluntary partial remand of the Good Neighbor Plan, so that the EPA could fully respond to the public comments referenced in the Supreme Court decision. [52] Challenges to the EPA’s disapprovals of the state plans, which would dictate the length of the emergency stay, continue to work their way through lower courts. However, the outcomes of these recent developments are unlikely to be relevant in the near future. The EPA, under the Trump Administration, announced massive deregulation actions, aiming to “unleash American energy” and give more autonomy to states on environmental issues. This includes plans to end the Good Neighbor Plan entirely, which, according to the incorrect announcement, led to the rejection of nearly all State Implementation Plans, despite the FIP following SIP disapprovals. [53]
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Regardless of the future of the Good Neighbor Plan, the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. EPA will have reverberating effects on mutually understood aspects of administrative law and environmental regulation. Some scholars believe that together, the case and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo present an opportunity to overturn many agency actions due to their undermining of agency authority. Loper Bright shut down the notion that courts should defer to agency interpretation of unclear statutes, as established in the Chevron doctrine. [54] Ohio, on the other hand, is not about ambiguous statutory language. It instead disputes the ability of the EPA to make substantive decisions about its own regulations. [55] The case represents a shift to more stringent hard look review, in which judicial review of agency actions as arbitrary and capricious may now require examination of internal agency decisions.[56] As a future precedent, Ohio v. EPA involves changes to both procedural and substantive authority of agencies. Agencies not only have to be more cautious in addressing public comments and carrying out procedural tasks, but they must also have satisfactory explanations ready for their substantive decisions. Aside from these changes, Ohio reflects an obvious shift in the ability of the EPA to regulate air pollution. Despite the influential role provided to the EPA in the Clean Air Act, an expanded role of state autonomy in regulating air pollution could have negative effects on air quality, especially in downwind states that are protected under the Good Neighbor provision.
Only time will tell whether the Court will continue its conservative streak and find new ways of checking the EPA and other agencies. An upcoming case to be decided by the Supreme Court, Oklahoma v. EPA, involves many of the same administrative issues and actors. It revolves around the EPA’s disapproval of Oklahoma and Utah’s ozone SIPs, as the EPA moved legal challenges to the D.C. Circuit rather than addressing states in regional courts. [57] If the states succeed and cases move back to regional courts, there is a higher likelihood that their SIPs will not be disapproved. This suggests that the EPA has more to lose in terms of authority, including where to transfer petitions.
Ohio v. EPA was a warning bell for environmental regulation, with Loper Bright acting as the death knell. Progressives, prior to the decision, worried about the outcome of Ohio providing challengers to environmental regulation with an “unmistakable green light.” [58] Few could predict that within two backto-back cases, the Supreme Court would reduce agency ability to both interpret ambiguous statutes through regulation and to enforce that regulation. Ohio v. EPA demands more attention than it has received since it was decided last year. What appears to be a decision about an agency failing its administrative duties by not reasonably responding to public comments goes much deeper. The case marks the burial of the Good Neighbor Plan and the weakening of EPA responsibilities under the Clean Air Act. It is an example of an emboldened, conservative Supreme Court holding the federal government to a higher standard of clarity, scrutinizing agency actions at an unprecedented granular level. [59]
Endnotes
[1] Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency, 603 U.S. ___ (2024), No. 23A349 (U.S. Supreme Court, June 27, 2024).
[2] “Clean Air Act, State Implementation Plans for National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards,” 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1970), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7410.
[3] OAR U.S. EPA, “Good Neighbor Plan for 2015 Ozone NAAQS,” Other Policies and Guidance, February 10, 2022, https://www.epa.gov/Cross-State-Air-Pollution/good-neighbor-plan-2015-ozone-naaqs.
[4] “Federal ‘Good Neighbor Plan’ for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards; Response to Judicial Stays of SIP Disapproval Action for Certain States,” Federal Register, Environmental Protection Agency, July 31, 2023, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/07/31/2023-14180/federal-good-neighbor-plan-for-the-2015-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards-response-to.sip.
[5] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. ___.
[6] Christina Karem and Laurie Beyranevand, “Is Loper Bright a Red Herring? Why Ohio v. EPA Could Be Dangerous for Environmental Federal Agencies,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law (blog), 2024, https://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/top-ten/2025-top-ten/2024/12/is-loper-bright-a-red-herring-why-ohio-v-epa-could-be-dangerous-for-environmental-federal-agencies/.
[7] “Clean Air Act, National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards,” 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1970), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7409.
[8] OP U.S. EPA, “Summary of the Clean Air Act,” Overviews and Factsheets, February 22, 2013, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act.
[9] “Clean Air Act, State Implementation Plans for National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards,” 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Garry Blum and Griffin Perrault, “Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency,” Legal Information Institute, accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.law.cornell.edu/index.
[12] Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
[13] Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014), No. 12-1182 (U.S. Supreme Court, April 29, 2014).
[14] Blum and Perrault, “Ohio v. EPA.”
[15] “Federal Implementation Plan Addressing Regional Ozone Transport for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard,” 40 C.F.R. Parts 52, 75, 78, 97 (2022), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/04/06/2022-04551/federal-implementation-plan-addressing-regional-ozone-transport-for-the-2015-ozone-national-ambient.
[16] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. ___.
[17] Ibid.
[18] “Response to Judicial Stays of SIP Disapproval,” Federal Register, July 31, 2023.
[19] Ohio et al., “On Application for Stay of Administrative Action to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,” October 2023, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23A349/284940/20231013090543221_SCOTUS%20Stay%20Application.pdf.
[20] Blum and Perrault, “Ohio v. EPA.”
[21] Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), No. 08-681 (U.S. Supreme Court, April 22, 2009).
[22] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. ___.
[23] “Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency,” Oyez, accessed March 15, 2025, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2023/23A349.
[24] Ohio v. EPA Oral Argument, Audio, Docket No. 23A349 (2024), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2023/23A349.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] “Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency,” Oyez.
[33] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. ___.
[34] “Clean Air Act, Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review,” 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1970), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7607.
[35] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. ___.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607.
[40] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. ___.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Needham, “5Qs: Bagley on Ohio v. EPA, SCOTUS Citation, and the Future of the Administrative State,” University of Michigan Law School, July 9, 2024, https://michigan.law.umich.edu/news/5qs-bagley-ohio-v-epa-scotus-citation-and-future-administrative-state.
[45] “Clean Air Act, State Implementation Plans,” 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
[46] “Clean Air Act, Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review,” 42 U.S.C. § 7607.
[47] “Clean Air Act (CAA),” Legal Information Institute, accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clean_air_act_(caa).
[48] Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. ___.
[49] “Gas and Oil Industry Revenue U.S. 2023,” Statista, accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.statista.com/statistics/294614/revenue-of-the-gas-and-oil-industry-in-the-us/.
[50] Oral Argument, Ohio v. EPA, Docket No. 23A349.
[51] U.S. EPA, “EPA’s ‘Good Neighbor’ Plan Cuts Ozone Pollution – Overview Fact Sheet,” March 15, 2023, https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-03/Final%20Good%20Neighbor%20Rule%20Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf.
[52] OAR U.S. EPA, “EPA Response to Judicial Stay Orders,” Other Policies and Guidance, June 1, 2023, https://www.epa.gov/Cross-State-Air-Pollution/epa-response-judicial-stay-orders.
[53] OAR U.S. EPA, “EPA Launches Biggest Deregulatory Action in U.S. History,” News Release, March 12, 2025, https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-launches-biggest-deregulatory-action-us-history.
[54] “Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,” Oyez, accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2023/22-451.
[55] Karem and Beyranevand, “Is Loper Bright a Red Herring?”
[56] “Hard-Look Doctrine Definition,” LSData, accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.lsd.law/define/hard-look-doctrine.
[57] “Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency,” Oyez, accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2024/23-1067.
[58] Jeevna Sheth, Chris Martinez, and Devon Ombres, “Ohio v. EPA Threatens the EPA’s Ability To Regulate Air Pollution Nationwide,” Center for American Progress (blog), February 13, 2024, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/ohio-v-epa-threatens-the-epas-ability-to-regulate-air-pollution-nationwide/.
[59] Daniel Deacon, “Ohio v. EPA and the Future of APA Arbitrariness Review,” Yale Journal on Regulation (blog), June 27, 2024, https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/ohio-v-epa-and-the-future-of-apa-arbitrariness-review/.