By: Stella Kozielec ‘27
Volume XI – Issue I – Fall 2025
I. INTRODUCTION AND DECISION
On June 26, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court deliberated over the scope of 42 U.S. Code Section 1983 in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic (606 U.S. 357 (2025)). [1] Section 1983 is a federal statute granting individuals the ability to take judicial action against local or state government officials when their enumerated rights are infringed upon. [2] This right provides an essential legal pathway to citizens when they feel that government officials have violated proper procedures. The case at hand concerns the conditions set by Congress for states to access funding for medical assistance. Planned Parenthood and Julie Edwards, a recipient of Medicaid, had sued South Carolina’s State Department of Health and Human Services because they believed that the exclusion of Planned Parenthood from Medicaid coverage violated the “any-qualified-provider” provision inscribed within the Medicaid Act. [3] This provision mandates that an individual is allowed to choose their preferred provider as long as the provider is qualified to perform the services. [4] The central issue debated in this case is whether the “any-qualified-provider” provision, Section 1396a(a)(23)(A), bestows upon an individual access to sue via Section 1983. [5]
Though there are a variety of previous rulings that could have served as precedent for determining whether a Section 1983 right was created, the Court decides to rely on a test outlined in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe (536 U.S. 273 (2002)). [6] This test states that the statute must establish “an unmistakable focus on individuals” and utilize “clear” and “unambiguous” “rights-creating” language. [7] The Court argues that the Gonzaga test is cemented as the standard test after its application onto a provision in Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion City. v. Talevski (599 U.S. 166 (2023)), identifying Talevski as the case where precedent is officially established. [8]
Applying the Gonzaga test in Medina v. Planned Parenthood, the majority opinion of the Court rules that the “any-qualified-provider” provision does not confer an individual right that permitted legal action under Section 1983 because it does not utilize “clear” and “unambiguous” “rights-creating” language. [9] This decision means that Julie Edwards does not have the right to sue the South Carolina state government officials for exclusion of Planned Parenthood, effectively reneging Planned Parenthood’s status as a Medicaid provider.
II. ARGUMENTS
While this Gonzaga test serves as a relevant precedent for the Court, its vague criteria led to an issue of contention between the majority opinion and the dissent: whether the statute should explicitly include the word “right.” While the majority decree that the word “right” must be included within the statute in order to ensure the legislation was enacted to confer a right, the dissent criticizes this, instead focusing on the tone of the legislation to determine whether it grants a right.
The majority opinion emphasizes that only in “atypical cases” can private parties be granted the right to take legal action against government officials when their federal statutory rights are violated, as stated in Talevski. [10] The Court infers a demanding standard from the word “atypical” and subsequently establishes more burdensome criteria to pass the Gonzaga test. [11] The majority argue that, regardless of a confusing history of narrow and broad rules regarding the intersection of federal statutory rights and Section 1983, the Gonzaga test remains valid. However, beyond simply accepting the Gonzaga test as precedent, the Court bases its reasoning on the specific provision in Talevski. The Court references that in Talevski, an individual right results from the examined provision because it uses the word “right” repeatedly. [12] This serves as the key to the Court’s argument in Medina against the “any-qualified-provider” provision conferring rights, as this provision does not include the word “right” explicitly. [13] The majority does not discuss the anticipated impact of their decision and instead discusses the history of Section 1983 for most of the Opinion. [14]
On the other hand, the dissent denounces the majority’s application of the Gonzaga test because Gonzaga never stated that the provision must explicitly utilize certain terminology to fulfill the criteria of “clear” and “unambiguous.” [15] The dissent further argues that it is not merely the actual language of the law that confers a right, but also the legislative intent behind it. This idea is completely dismissed in the majority opinion. To exemplify how the intent behind the “any-qualified-provider” provision was to establish a right, the dissent points to the obligatory tone of language in the statute. [16] The dissent concludes by noting a concerning consequence of the majority opinion: Medicaid recipients are deprived of a legal pathway to enforce their rights.
It is important to note that both the majority opinion and the dissent accept that the “any-qualified-provider” provision is addressed to individuals; their area of disagreement rests on whether “rights-creating” language is evident within this statute. [17] Additionally, there is a concurrence delivered by Justice Thomas; however, this Article serves to scrutinize the logic offered in the majority opinion, so it will not be evaluated in this piece.
III. THE COURT’S NARROW APPLICATION LACKS JUSTIFICATION
Dissecting the majority’s argument, the inclusion of the word “right” within a federal statute is a pivotal determinant of whether the provision confers a right. Beyond this factor, the Court presents no other substantial reason for concluding that the “any-qualified-provider” provision does not grant individual access to the right to sue. [18] This is incredibly intriguing as the majority implements such a narrow application of the Gonzaga test without thorough reasoning. The majority is vague in justifying their selection of the Talevski provision as the sole framework for “rights-creating” language. [19] Rather, the majority attempts to deflect attention by explaining why previous Court decisions were mistaken in assuming an overly broad understanding of what creates a right. In short, the majority simply asserts that because the provision in Talevski includes the word “right,” we should expect this of every subsequent provision.
In Talevski, the provision states that the facility “must protect and promote the rights of each resident, including….‘The right to choose a personal attending physician.’” [20] The Court provides the written language of this provision to show its utilization of “rights-creating language” and establish it as a model for statutes that would fulfill the Gonzaga test. [21] However, if the Court is heavily emphasizing inclusion of the word “right,” why should they not demand the use of the word “individual” as well? Perhaps the word "individual" should also be a prerequisite, as this is, per the Court’s Opinion, “a ‘stringent’ test.” [22] However, this is not discussed by the majority; therefore, I fail to pinpoint a rational basis for the haphazard application of the test to necessitate the word “right” but not “individual.” The Court could argue that it is more important to explicitly include the word “right” because Section 1983 regards the protection of rights. However, Section 1983 specifically protects an individual’s rights. In fact, as expressed by the majority, the “rights-creating language” must appeal to the “individual” by maintaining “an ‘unmistakable focus’ on individuals.” [23]
To fully understand the error committed by this line of reasoning, I will extend this faulty application back onto the provisions in Talevski, focusing on the word “individual.” If one were to adopt the Court’s belief that the intent of the law is irrelevant, they may not see how Talevski focuses on the individual. The idea that “each resident” is entitled to this right may signal that the law intended to refer to the “individual”; however, according to the majority in Medina, “statutory interpretation focuses on what Congress enacted, not speculated intentions.” [24] If this argument seems flawed or weak to you, then I urge you to look back to the majority opinion, as it does just this. Even though the “any-qualified-provider” provision states that “any individual…may obtain such assistance any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service,” the Court argues that this does not clearly establish that each recipient of Medicaid is entitled to choose their provider simply because it lacks the word “right.” [25]
Additionally, if I were to indulge this idea that intent behind legislation is inconsequential, I would still argue that the “any-qualified-provider” provision does enact a right. [26] An important element missing from the majority opinion is consideration of Section 1396a(a)(23)(A), the “any-qualified-provider” provision, within the context of the rest of the provision, specifically Section 1396a(a)(23)(B). [27] Section 1396a(a)(23)(B) outlines that an “entity shall not restrict the choice of the qualified person from whom the individual may receive services.” [28] Between these two provisions, it is clear that freedom to choose a provider was not merely intended but explicitly enacted as Section 1396a(a)(23)(B) plainly prohibits encroachment on this freedom.
Circling back to my above comments regarding the Talevski provision, the Court does not also demand the word “individual” be explicitly stated within a provision because it could not based on its precedent; the word "individual" is not included in Talevski. The Court wants to establish a precedent that corroborates a narrow test, which it achieves by looking at the application of the Gonzaga test within the Talevski case.
Why was the Court desperate to validate a narrow test for assessing this specific provision, as opposed to its history of broader tests? It is unclear. As The Federalist Society highlights in its blog, this case is extremely relevant to the current political discussion regarding access to reproductive care, specifically abortion rights. [29] It may be valuable to consider whether the justices allowed their personal and political beliefs to infiltrate their decision-making process.
IV. THE COURT’S TASK REMAINS UNFULFILLED
In the same vein as the previous section, it is clear that the Court is fairly stringent in which provisions can be understood as mandating an individual right. To reiterate, the majority opinion focuses on the fact that the “any-qualified-provider” provision lacks the word “right,” and therefore, it does not use "rights-creating language.” [30] While this serves as the Court’s primary motivation for denying individuals the legal right to sue in this circumstance, it fails to clarify anything for the lower courts’ deliberations, beyond demanding the inclusion of “right” in any evaluated provisions. The rationalization is incomplete at best. Thus, I question how this Opinion successfully advises further legislation on this same issue.
The main reason that I call this to attention is that the Court repeatedly cites the confusion of the lower courts as an explanation for their deliberation on this case. [31] Of note are the prior decisions of the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court, which both came to the conclusion that this provision did establish an individual right to sue. If the confusion amongst the lower courts is truly the reason for overriding all the previous courts’ decisions, then I would advise the Court to be more specific in its application of the test. What should a statute include to ensure it maintains “an unmistakable focus on individuals?” [32]
While the Court outlines the necessary criteria for the Gonzaga test, it does not provide proper guidelines on how to appropriately meet those criteria. I do not deny the requests for clarification from the lower courts, but I do doubt that this opinion gives proper clarity. Thus, the Court allows similar matters in future cases to be decided again at the discretion of the lower courts. Because the majority opinion serves as the standard for lower courts, the majority’s meager justification will be applied to each subsequent case regarding a similar legal issue. This is an issue because we cannot permit the Court to set unjustified precedents for the entire U.S. court system. This is especially pertinent in Medina as it has far-reaching societal implications, including access to proper healthcare. This decision will affect millions of individuals across the country who deserve more than legislation founded on a fragmented rationale.
V. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CONTRARY VIEWPOINTS
A blog post published by The Federalist Society, referenced briefly above, serves to reinforce and expand upon the majority opinion. Because the post reframes and endorses the viewpoints of the Majority, it further clarifies the conclusions of the Opinion and provides an additional perspective to assess. When analyzing the opinions of the Court, the author of this blog focuses on how the majority provides guidelines of the “correct test” to apply in this situation. [33] I do not question the validity of the Gonzaga guidelines for conferring an individual right; rather, I question the manner with which this test is applied to the “any-qualified-provider” provision. [34]
Proceeding with the same line of thought, the author of this blog discusses the application and pinpoints a large issue of concern: the “any-qualified-provider” provision is deemed insufficient to establish an enforceable right because it is not “similar to the statutory provision at issue in Talevski, the key precedent.” [35] This was specifically outlined in the majority opinion and reiterated by this blog post as an attempt to showcase a determining factor for this case: whether the language of provision in Medina mirrors the language of the provision in Talevski. This is where Justice Gorsuch and the blog post's authors err in their reasoning: they misinterpret the legal precedent established in Talevski. The precedent created by Talevski is that it is valid to apply the Gonzaga test to confer a Section 1983 right. However, the majority opinion and the blog post go beyond this, demanding that the statutory provision in Talevski and the “any-qualified-provider” provision must employ the same language. [36] Based on the definition of “precedent,” per Cornell’s Legal Information Institute, it “requires courts to apply the law in the same manner” to cases with “similar legal issues.” [37] Following this definition, it is simply the test outlined in Gonzaga and applied in Talevski that should be applied to this provision in this case. Therefore, the judges overstepped their authority to interpret precedent when they cast aside the provision itself because the verbiage is not identical. I agree with the author of the blog post that Talevski did create a precedent, but I stand firm in my belief that this precedent is not properly applied.
VI. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES
After analyzing the questionable deliberation behind this decision, I wanted to shift to the impact of the decision. As stated in the facts of the case above, this case regards whether Julie Edwards can sue South Carolina’s Director of Health and Human Services for excluding Planned Parenthood from Medicaid coverage. [38] While the majority opinion does not address the impact of their decision, it is important to recognize the message this case sends: limitations on the right to choose regarding healthcare access are permitted. This message is not unfamiliar in these political times, as it reflects a trend of returning control over certain medical decisions to the states. Because the Court’s decision permits the exclusion of Planned Parenthood from Medicaid, one cannot ignore its affiliation with women’s reproductive rights.
To show how this case is a part of a greater initiative that limits individual healthcare options, I want to call attention to the recent passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which cut the majority of federal funding dedicated to Medicaid. [39] This was signed into law on July 4, 2025, a mere week after Medina v. Planned Parenthood officially excluded Planned Parenthood from Medicaid coverage in South Carolina. [40] To be clear, this Act defunds Planned Parenthood completely, harming all its patients and adversely impacting low-income individuals who rely on the subsidy for basic healthcare. [41] Planned Parenthood, in its response to this Act, emphasized that the Act not only restricts access to abortion, which is a heavily polarized topic across political parties, but also works to deny access to birth control and STI treatment options. [42] These are just some of the many examples of essential healthcare that are now denied to those who need it.
Although the One Big Beautiful Bill Act exemplifies the recent legislation that restricts access to proper subsidized healthcare, a pivotal moment within this larger trend of government involvement in reproductive rights issues can be traced back to 2022, in Dobbs v. Jackson’s Women Health Organization (597 U.S. 215 (2022). [43] In summary, this case overturned the “constitutional right to abortion.” [44] This is a landmark case that marked the moment where the U.S. Supreme Court completely turned the tables. This constitutional right to abortion was more than just legislation that permitted abortion access nationwide; it also symbolized the right to choose for women on matters of their reproductive health. Reversing this transferred this freedom to choose to state governments, conveying that reproductive rights can be governed by those who are not affected by the legislation.
However, this trend is not just impacting women anymore. Ultimately, Dobbs, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and this case, Medina v. Planned Parenthood, all force individuals to relinquish their access to necessary healthcare services and limit the legal pathways available to individuals when seeking to challenge their government. This disproportionately harms low-income communities that cannot afford healthcare without Medicaid.
VII. CONCLUSION: A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
Another impact of this ruling is the concerning precedent it sets: a narrow test that limits those who can attain the legal right to sue. While I recognize that this test is applied strictly to federal statutes that determine the spending power of federal funding, examining how the Court’s rationale would apply to other enumerated constitutional rights reveals the flawed reasoning behind this decision. The majority opinion includes a response to the dissent, stating that the intent behind this legislation is irrelevant; it is simply the written language itself that engenders a right. Even if I were to concede to this claim, the argument is invalid as the language of the provision does “clearly” and "unambiguously" create an individual right. [45] I want to conclude by presenting two Constitutional Amendments that do not explicitly utilize the word “right,” yet one would be wary of arguing that they do not establish a right.
Section 1 of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment both confer a constitutional right while never explicitly including that verbiage. In Section 1 of the First Amendment, the right to freedom of speech is established solely through this phrase: “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.” [46] Though the Constitution does not, in fine print, say individuals have a right to free speech, it is clear that both the intent behind the law and the law itself establish this right. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that every individual has a right to due process before their property is taken from them through this phrase: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” [47] To reiterate my point, I doubt many people would claim that an individual right to due process is invalid because the Fourteenth Amendment excludes the word “right.” As our government clearly believes the First and Fourteenth Amendments confer, respectively, a right to free speech and a right to due process, the logic applied by the majority is presumably flawed.
Based on a brief logical analysis, it becomes apparent that the Majority’s application of the Gonzaga test is irrational. Medina v. Planned Parenthood arbitrarily mandates a new precedent of an extremely narrow interpretation of the statutory right to sue under Section 1983 and removes viable legal procedures for individuals to challenge government decisions. This case will restrict access to healthcare and operate to disempower many U.S. citizens. The justices who made this decision do so from a position of privilege as they will be essentially unaffected by the case’s adverse implications.
Endnotes
[1] Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357 (2025). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23- 1275_e2pg.pdf.
[2] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
[3] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 3-4.
[4] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 20.
[5] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 2.; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A).
[6] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 11.
[7] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 11.
[8] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 18.
[9] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 21.
[10] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 18.
[11] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 18.
[12] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 21.
[13] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 24.
[14] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 11-28.
[15] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 47.
[16] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 54.
[17] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 56.
[18] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 24.
[19] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 20.
[20] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 21.
[21] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 21.
[22] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 11.
[23] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 11.
[24] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 24.
[25] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 23-24.; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A).
[26] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 23.
[27] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 23.
[28] 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(B).
[29] Jennie Bradley Lichter and Grace Cala, “Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic: Benefits are not Rights,” July 24, 2025, https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/medina-v-planned-parenthood-south-atlantic-benefits-arenot-rights.
[30] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 24.
[31] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 18.
[32] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 11.
[33] Lichter and Cala, “Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic: Benefits are not Rights.”
[34] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 20-21.
[35] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 20-21.; Lichter and Cala, “Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic: Benefits are not Rights.”
[36] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 20-21.
[37] “Precedent,” Legal Information Institute, accessed November 5, 2025, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/precedent.
[38] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 8.
[39] “One Big Beautiful Bill Act: Report of the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives (to Accompany H.R. 1) Together with Minority Views” (2025).; Planned Parenthood, “Planned Parenthood is Defunded,” Community Action Fund of Planned Parenthood of Orange and San Bernardino Counties, accessed November 5, 2025, https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/community-action-fund-planned-parenthood-orange-and-sanbernardi/get-involved/defunding.
[40] “One Big Beautiful Bill Act: Report of the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives (to Accompany H.R. 1) Together with Minority Views” (2025).
[41] Planned Parenthood, “Planned Parenthood is Defunded.”
[42] Planned Parenthood, “Planned Parenthood is Defunded.”
[43] Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022).
[44] “Explaining Scotus’s Abortion Decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,” League of Women Voters, July 22, 2022, https://www.lwv.org/blog/explaining-scotuss-abortion-decision-dobbs-v-jackson-womenshealth-organization.
[45] Medina, 606 U.S. 357, at 17.
[46] U.S. Const. amend.14 § 1.
[47] U.S. Const. amend.1 § 1.