By: Siddharth (Sid) Bajaj ‘29
Volume XI – Issue I – Fall 2025
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1954, the CIA facilitated a covert operation to overthrow the democratically elected government of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala. [1] The mission, Operation PBSUCCESS, was framed as a defense against communism, which relied on U.S. supplied arms that ultimately installed a military dictatorship amenable to U.S. interests. [2] This regime change violated core principles of the United Nations Charter, including the prohibitions on the use of force and intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. [3] Yet no international tribunal adjudicated the matter, and no sanctions were imposed.
What happened was not an anomaly. In the wake of World War II, the U.S. repeatedly subverted unfriendly governments abroad through the belief that covert force would carry fewer legal and reputational consequences than open military invasion. [4] Over decades, this pattern of clandestine intervention effectively rewrote how international law operated. The norms against aggression were not formally abrogated, but they were bent and blunted through constant circumvention. As one scholar observed in 1970, the “high-minded resolve of Article 2(4) mocks us from its grave.” [5] Today, U.S. exceptionalism continues to shape global norms: if one of the world’s most prominent powers treats the rules as optional, can those rules truly command universal respect?
This article examines how U.S. covert actions during the Cold War and beyond redefined the application of international law. Part II provides the legal framework of the U.N. Charter’s use-of-force and non-intervention principles. Part III analyzes case studies, from Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) to Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (1980s), where American operations contradicted legal norms. Part IV offers a legal analysis, discussing how these actions were judged under international law (like in Nicaragua v. United States) and how the United States sought to justify them. Part V considers the broader implications: the erosion of U.N. Charter norms, the expansion of self-defense claims, and the precedent set for other states. I conclude that while the rules against force remain in writing, U.S. conduct substantially weakened their authority in practice, redefining the post-war international legal order in the process.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: USE OF FORCE AND NON-INTERVENTION
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter requires all members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” [6] This prohibition, for the first time, outlawed war as an instrument of national policy for all nations. In tandem, Article 2(7) bars the U.N. member states from intervening in matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of states, reinforcing the sovereign equality of nations. [7] The Charter recognizes only a few narrow exceptions to these rules. First, Chapter VII allows the Security Council to authorize collective action in response to threats to peace. [8] Second, Article 51 preserves an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs” against a member state. [9] Beyond those circumstances, cross-border uses of force are categorically illegal. [10] These provisions put in writing that unprovoked intervention is an international crime.
Similar to the Charter’s ban on force, a broader principle of non-intervention in sovereign affairs took hold. For example, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948 declared that “no State has the right to intervene… in the internal or external affairs of another”—a direct response to decades of U.S. meddling in Central America and the Caribbean. [11] The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) later elaborated the norm in its 1965 declaration, prohibiting not only armed attack but also any form of indirect interference, such as organizing subversive forces or assisting insurgencies in another state. [12] However, because UNGA resolutions are not legally binding, their effectiveness is sometimes questioned.
The only Charter-based justification available for unilateral force is self-defense under Article 51. However, that right is conditioned on the occurrence of an “armed attack” and exists only “until the Security Council has taken measures” to maintain peace. [13] During the Cold War, contentious debates arose over the scope of self-defense, allowing the U.S. and its allies to promote expansive theories. For instance, supporting armed retaliation against indirect “aggression” or supporting force that could be used to protect nationals in peril. [14] Yet, strictly speaking, such arguments found little support in law.
Notably, the weak strength of the international law after 1945 induced new methods of evasion. Great powers resorted to covert action or proxy warfare rather than overt force. Policymakers felt the need to reframe interventions in legalistic terms or hide them altogether. [15] The result was a pattern of secret wars that, while circumventing the form of Charter violations, shattered the essence of international law. The following case studies illustrate how this played out in practice.
III. COLD WAR COVERT INTERVENTIONS: FROM TEHRAN TO MANAGUA
During the Cold War, U.S. policymakers viewed the spread of communism as an existential threat and often chose covert action as a tool to counter real or perceived Soviet influence. Perhaps the most jarring early example occurred in Iran in 1953. In that year, the CIA orchestrated a secret operation (TPAJAX) to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, and restore the Shah’s autocratic rule. [16] Working with Britain’s MI6, the CIA bankrolled street protests and plotted the coup d’état. The motives were a mix of Cold War geopolitics and protecting Western oil interests, but the result was a covert use of force inside a sovereign state. [17] The U.S. government, of course, never sought Security Council approval for this operation and for decades denied involvement. [18] Nonetheless, the 1953 Iran coup set the stage for high-stakes intervention from the U.S.
The following year, Guatemala faced a similar situation. In June 1954, the CIA launched Operation PBSuccess to topple Guatemala’s president, Jacobo Árbenz, who had implemented land reforms that the U.S. perceived as communist-leaning. U.S. intelligence armed and funded a rebel force of around 480 men led by Carlos Castillo Armas, and coordinated an invasion from neighboring countries. Backed by U.S.-run propaganda broadcasts and intimidation, the rebel army crossed into Guatemala on June 18, 1954, spreading chaos. Under this pressure, Árbenz resigned and a U.S.-friendly military regime took power. As with Iran, no armed attack had occurred against the United States or an ally. [19] This was a regime change engineered to protect U.S. strategic and economic interests (specifically those of the United Fruit Company) under the pretext of fighting communism. [20] In legal terms, it constituted an obvious breach of the non-intervention norm. Washington justified its involvement by portraying Árbenz as a communist puppet, but such arguments found no authority in international law. The covert Guatemalan coup demonstrated how easily Article 2(4) could be brushed aside by a determined superpower, and how the language of anti-communism provided cover for illegal actions.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, this pattern repeated across continents. The United States covertly intervened in Congo (1960), Dominican Republic (1961), and Brazil (1964), among others, often supporting coups or paramilitary forces to install anti-communist leaders. Then, at the cusp of the 1970s, U.S. clandestine interference found its way to Chile. Salvador Allende, a Marxist, had been democratically elected Chile’s president in 1970; a development that was deeply unwelcome to the Nixon administration. Declassified records and U.S. Senate investigations later revealed that the CIA spent over $8 million between 1970 and 1973 to “destabilize” Allende’s government. [21] American operatives funded opposition media and strikes, spread propaganda, and maintained close contact with Chilean military plotters. [22] Even a 1975 Church Committee report confirmed that U.S. agencies had considered plans to provoke a military coup to prevent Allende from taking office. [23] Although the extent of the direct U.S. role in General Augusto Pinochet’s coup on September 11, 1973, remains debated, it is beyond doubt that U.S. covert action laid the foundation for the violent overthrow. The outcome showed the world the cynical reality that the United States was willing to violate international norms and subvert popular sovereignty in the name of ideology. No claim of self-defense could be plausibly invoked: Chile had not attacked or threatened the United States. By every objective measure, U.S. activities in Chile constituted unlawful intervention in internal affairs.
This era of covert operations culminated in a legal battle at the World Court. In the 1980s, Nicaragua became the target of U.S. anti-communist policy. The left-wing Sandinista government of Nicaragua faced a counterrevolutionary insurgency (the “Contras”) covertly organized and financed by the United States. The Reagan Administration, adamant on rolling back a Marxist government in Central America, mined Nicaragua’s harbors and supplied the Contra rebels with weapons, training, and funds. [24] Unlike earlier coups, these actions were not entirely hidden in the shadows, and Nicaragua decided to fight back with law. It sued the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming the U.S. violated international law. In 1986, the ICJ issued its landmark judgment in Nicaragua v. United States, in agreement with Nicaragua’s claims. The World Court held that the United States had violated Nicaragua’s sovereignty and breached its obligation not to intervene by supporting armed Contras and by laying mines in Nicaraguan waters. Specifically, the ICJ found the U.S. in breach of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, reaffirming that military pressure against another state, whether open or covert, is illegal. The court also noted that no valid self-defense justification existed. [25] The legal victory for Nicaragua was clear on paper. In practice, however, it only showed the uselessness of law against a superpower’s will. The United States refused to comply with the ICJ’s decision, rejected the court’s jurisdiction going forward, and vetoed the U.N. Security Council enforcement of the judgment. [26] No reparations were ever paid. [27] Ultimately, the Nicaragua case stands as a paradox; it was an affirmation of the international rule of law, but at the same time a demonstration of its fragility. The U.S.’s pattern of covert intervention had finally been pronounced illegal by the highest judicial authority, yet the absence of any consequence only proved how easily the norm could be defied.
IV. HOW PRACTICE REDEFINED THE FUNCTION OF LAW
The application of international law does not evolve solely through treaties and courts, but also through the consistent practices (and misdeeds) of states. The U.N. Charter’s drafters in 1945 likely did not imagine that one of the victors of World War II would routinely disregard Article 2(4). However, by the late 20th century, the accumulated effect of U.S. actions was unmistakable. Legal scholars began to ask bleak questions, most famously Thomas Franck’s essay titled, “Who Killed Article 2(4)?” [28] In the case of the U.S.’s covert interventions, other nations (especially U.S. allies) tended to look the other way, or even secretly applaud the anti-communist outcomes. [29] Over time, this acquiescence eroded the norm’s authority. As one analysis points out, repeated violations that are met with silence or tacit acceptance can “accumulate to the point of erosion” of a legal norm. [30]
By the end of the Cold War, it appeared that the norm against intervention had lost its deterrent bite. International law had not changed on paper, but in practice, a culture of exception was taking hold. The United States, in particular, asserted an effective exemption from rules that inconvenienced its policy goals. This attitude was mirrored in the doctrine of the “unipolar moment,” when some in Washington argued that U.S. global leadership after 1991 allowed it more freedom to use force to maintain order. [31] True to that, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, when the U.S. resorted to force without U.N. approval (Iraq in 1998 airstrikes, Kosovo in 1999, Iraq again in 2003), it faced criticism but no real penalty. The U.N. Security Council was often paralyzed or sidestepped.
The transformation can also be seen in how other states responded and adapted. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union mirrored many U.S. behaviors (crushing uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and invading Afghanistan in 1979), undermining the non-use of force principle. [32] More recently, Russia explicitly pointed to Western interventions as precedent for its own. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin argued that NATO’s action in Kosovo (conducted without U.N. approval) set examples that Russia could follow in its sphere. [33] While the merits of these analogies are widely rejected by most countries, the very fact that such arguments are made proves how U.S. precedent has muddied the waters.
Importantly, the United States did not openly refuse to accept the rule; instead, it offered legal justifications (however strained) to fit its actions under the rule. This has an intriguing effect. The ICJ in Nicaragua observed that when states feel compelled to justify their use of force as within exceptions to a rule, it actually confirms the rule’s validity in a paradoxical way. [34] In paragraph 186 of its judgment, the Court noted that if a state’s conduct seems prima facie illegal but the state defends it by citing self-defense or other legal exceptions, it “is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.” [35] In theory, then, the United States continuously citing concepts like “self-defense” and “humanitarian intervention” could be seen as affirming that some law must apply, even as it stretched that law’s meaning.
In short, the moral high ground the United States enjoyed as a champion of a “rules-based international order” was compromised by its own departures from the rules. This has made it easier for cynical leaders to claim tu quoque ( “you do it too”) and confuse the narrative when they violate international law. In short, the foundational norm that wars of aggression and foreign political interference are unequivocally outlawed has been chipped away, justification by justification.
V. CONCLUSION
“We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war….” begins the U.N. Charter, heralding an era of legal constraints on power. [36] But the admirable ideals of 1945 have clashed against the hard reality of state behavior. To be clear, however, the Charter’s rules are not dead. A vast majority of states, especially smaller ones, continue to view the prohibition on force as a cornerstone of international order, and flagrant aggression still meets with near-universal criticism. [37] But simultaneously, through decades of covert action and selective compliance, the United States has demonstrated how a powerful nation can effectively rewrite the rules without formally amending them. By consistently operating outside the lines in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Nicaragua, and many other theaters, the U.S. normalized a pattern of permitting what international law had prohibited. The cumulative impact was the weakening of the authority of international law. Courts and the U.N. have condemned many of these actions as illegal, yet the absence of enforcement or consequences made the force of those condemnations tenuous. [38] In the process, the normative framework governing world peace has been fundamentally challenged. Today, when nations ponder the legality of using force, they do so in the shadow of American-set precedents.
For the international community and for the United States itself, this history presents a critical challenge. Can the damage be undone and the norms be restored to full strength? Or will the precedents of exceptionalism permanently diminish the restraint that international law can offer? These questions have profound implications. As new powers rise and geopolitical tensions return, a robust respect for the rule of law could be the difference between peace and chaos. The story of how U.S. covert action reshaped the rules reminds us that international law is only as effective as the willingness of states to abide by it. When those who once championed the law choose to exempt themselves, the entire structure falters. Ultimately, reaffirming the integrity of the U.N. Charter’s principles may require a recommitment by nations, above all by the most powerful ones, that law, not power, should rule in international relations.
Endnotes
[1] Robert J. Kane, “Operation PBSUCCESS: U.S. Covert Action in Guatemala,” Military Strategy Magazine, January 21, 2019, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/operation-pbsuccess-u-s-covert-action-in-guatemala/. 2 Kane, “Operation PBSUCCESS,” 2019.
[2] Kane, “Operation PBSUCCESS,” 2019.
[3] United Nations, “United Nations Charter (Full Text),” United Nations, Accessed November 18, 2025, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
[4] Robert A. Best, “Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy?” EveryCRSReport.com, October 21, 1996, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/96-844.html.
[5] Thomas M. Franck, “Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States,” The American Journal of International Law 64, no. 5 (1970): 809–37, https://doi.org/10.2307/2198919.
[6] U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
[7] U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
[8] U.N. Charter ch. VII.
[9] U.N. Charter art. 51.
[10] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 209.
[11] Organization of American States Charter, pt. C, ¶ 16, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 1609.
[12] G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), ¶ 2 (Dec. 21, 1965).
[13] U.N. Charter art. 51.
[14] Tom Ruys, “Guest Post: Self-Defence and Non-State Actors in the Cold War Era – a Response to Marty Lederman,” Opinio Juris, August 29, 2018, https://opiniojuris.org/2015/03/12/guest-post-self-defence-and-nonstate-actors-in-the-cold-war-era-a-response-to-marty-lederman/.
[15] Michael Poznansky, “Feigning Compliance: Covert Action and International Law,” International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 1 (2019): 72–84, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48619930.
[16] Malcom Byrne, “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup,” The National Security Archive, August 19, 2013, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/#:~:text=Recently%2C%20the%20CIA%20has%20declassified, There%20is%20also%20evidence.
[17] Scott Koch, “(U) “ZENDEBAD, SHAH! ’ ’: THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE FALL OF IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMED MOSSADEQ, AUGUST 1953,” CIA Reading Room, Accessed November 19, 2025, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/home.
[18] Frud Bezhan, “Aftershocks of Iran’s 1953 Coup Still Felt around the World, 60 Years Later,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, August 15, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-coup-mossadegh-cia-60thanniversary/25076552.html.
[19] “Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,” U.S. Department of State, May 12, 1975, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d287.
[20] “June 27, 1954: Elected Guatemalan Leader Overthrown in CIA-Backed Coup,” Zinn Education Project, Accessed November 19, 2025, https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/jacobo-arbenz-guzman-deposed/.
[21] “The Allende Years and the Pinochet Coup, 1969–1973,” Office of the History, Accessed November 19, 2025, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969- 1976/allende#:~:text=Pinochet%E2%80%99s%20coup,convened%20in%201975%20to%20investigate.
[22] “The Allende Years.”
[23] S. Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1975).
[24] “History of US Invasions of Nicaragua,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 12, 2023, https://mid.ru/es/foreign_policy/historical_materials/1920437/?lang=en.
[25] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 238.
[26] Sean D. Murphy, “The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies,” George Washington University Law School, 2008, https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1902&context=faculty_publications
[27] Ben Norton, “US Legally Owes Nicaragua Reparations, but Still Refuses to Honor 1986 Int’l Court of Justice Ruling,” Geopolitical Economy Report, June 29, 2023, https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2023/06/28/us-owesnicaragua-reparations-1986- icj/#:~:text=Decides%20that%20the%20United%20States%20of%20America%2C%20by%20the%20attacks,on%2 02%201%20January%201956.
[28] Franck, “Who Killed Article 2(4)?” 1970.
[29] David F. Rudgers, “The Origins of Covert Action,” Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 2 (2000): 249–62, http://www.jstor.org/stable/261206.
[30] Tom Ginsburg, “Article 2(4) and Authoritarian International Law,” Chicago Unbound, 2022, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/.
[31] Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, July 9, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1990-01-01/unipolar-moment.
[32] Marcelo Kohen, “Is the U.S. Practice of Using Force Changing International Law?” World Editorial and International Law, January 2003, https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/sites/internet/files/2020-11/us_practice.pdf.
[33] Grigor Atanesian, “Trump thinks like Putin,” BBC News Russia, February 28, 2025, https://bbcrussian.substack.com/p/trump-thinks-like-putin
[34] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
[35] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186.
[36] U.N. Charter pmbl.
[37] Oona Hathawat and Stewart Patrick, “Is the Prohibition on the Use of Force Collapsing?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 26, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/is-the-prohibition-onthe-use-of-force-collapsing?lang=en.
[38] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.