By: Allison Wong
Volume X – Issue II – Spring 2025
I. BACKGROUND
U.S. law enforcement agencies engage in asset forfeiture to confiscate ill-gotten gains or tools of criminal behavior. By seizing valuable items such as cash, cars, and property used or purchased in violation of the law, asset forfeiture intends to intervene, dismantle, and punish individual or organizational schemes. [1] The U.S. government engages in three forms of asset forfeiture. Criminal asset forfeiture is initiated when the government brings criminal charges against a party (“in personam” action). [2] Assets become an element of criminal prosecution, indicted in conjunction with the defendant and acting as a negotiable item within plea agreements. Contesting criminal seizure requires a trial proceeding against the government; otherwise, the court utilizes ancillary asset hearings upon conviction to carry out forfeitures via court order. [3] Civil asset forfeiture is initiated when the government files a civil complaint against property (“in rem” action). [4] Seizure can occur in the absence of criminal charge or conviction because the property acts as the defendant, e.g., United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues (1978), but trial proceedings against the government are still required for property owners to contest. [5] If a property owner fails to do so, the asset is forfeited administratively. Administrative asset forfeiture occurs when a seizure is uncontested and nobody files a claim of ownership. [6] While criminal and civil asset forfeiture are both judicial processes, administrative asset forfeiture constitutes nonjudicial, “in rem” action. Assets eligible for administrative forfeiture include import prohibitions, tools for trafficking controlled substances, monetary instruments, and property valued below $500,000. [7] If the seizure is eventually contested, the U.S. government reverts to either criminal or civil avenues instead.
The use of civil asset forfeiture has proliferated in the last few decades at local, state, and federal levels. Combined, these jurisdictions forfeited a total value of 68.8 billion dollars from 2000 to 2020. [8] In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, forty-two states, and the District of Columbia together engaged in forfeiture valued over three billion dollars in the span of only one year. [9] Ideally, civil asset forfeiture dismantles criminal schemes while adhering to constitutional principles and funding victim compensation or community investment. In reality, however, the practice is at most a means to an end for the U.S. justice system. The absence of strong regulation in the legal landscape has allowed civil asset forfeiture to circumvent federalism, drive for-profit policing, and violate due process principles for property owners. As the use of civil asset forfeiture expands, future reform must assess its applicability, effectiveness, and relevance in the presence of viable alternatives, limiting asset forfeiture to criminal and administrative means.
II. LEGAL LANDSCAPE
British maritime law established the earliest legal foundations for U.S. civil asset forfeiture. Under the seventeenth century British Navigation Acts, the government seized ships, cargo, and other property at sea used or obtained in violation of British trade regulations. [10] Based on the intention of targeting property rather than property owners, “in rem” action, the government operated without the burden of proof to demonstrate guilt. Early U.S. maritime law applied the same practice towards combating piracy. The government was granted the right to seize contraband, tradable goods, currency, and ship vessels during confrontations at sea. [11] During the Prohibition era (1920-1933), civil asset forfeiture was used to enforce the 1919 National Prohibition Act (“Volstead Act”). [12] The Volstead Act aimed to implement the Eighteenth Amendment by banning the production, distribution, and selling of alcohol. [13] The government engaged in civil asset forfeiture by seizing the property, alcohol, and ill-gotten profit from bootleggers until the repeal of Prohibition by the 21st Amendment in 1933. [14]
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act. [15] RICO applied the English common law practice of imposing civil penalties for criminal involvement by broadening the scope of law enforcement authority. Individuals and organizations acting in furtherance of organized crime (within the “pattern of racketeering”) could face civil penalties, in the form of civil asset forfeiture, in addition to criminal prosecution. [16] In the same year, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (“Controlled Substance Act”) was also enacted, applying this approach to the classification and control of illicit substances. [17] The Controlled Substance Act created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) which relies heavily upon civil asset forfeiture to enforce federal drug regulations. In the 2021 fiscal year alone, the DEA seized over 13,000 assets valued at over 807 million dollars. [18] Throughout the War on Drugs, civil asset forfeiture was used to seize substances and tools involved in the trafficking, selling, and disposing of drugs in order to weaken and dismantle the drug trade. In 1984, Congress expanded this practice by enacting the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (“Title III”) as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. [19] Title III established the presumption of forfeitability, allowing the U.S. government to seize property first and justify the seizure later in court. [20]
The legal landscape shifted in 2000, when Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (“CAFRA”) to begin regulating law enforcement and provide citizens with better protections. [21] CAFRA amended 18 U.S. Code § 983 General Rules for Civil Forfeiture Proceedings. [22] Reforms included standardizing government notices and complaints, establishing guidelines for innocent owner defense, and strengthening avenues for judicial review. Court evaluation of forfeiture constitutionality largely centers around the 8th Amendment. The 8th Amendment states, “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” [23] Principles underlying the Excessive Fines Clause were established as early as 1215 by the Magna Carta, with the idea that punishment should not be grossly disproportionate to the severity of harm created by the crime. [24]
In Austin v. United States (1993) and United States v. Bajakajian (1998), the Court held that federal forfeiture could be classified as an excessive fine under the 8th Amendment. [25] In order for federal forfeiture to meet constitutional thresholds, it must be proportional to the gravity of the offense. In Timbs v. Indiana (2019), the Court expanded the application of federal guidelines, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause also applied to state and local government action under incorporation by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. [26] In Timbs, Indiana state prosecutors seized petitioner’s vehicle with a forfeiture value of $42,000 based on allegations of a minor drug violation. [27] The Court developed a more specific framework for constitutional analysis, focused on instrumentality and proportionality. In deciding Timbs in favor of the petitioner, the Court considered how the vehicle was used in furtherance of the crime, the gravity of the drug violation, the value of the vehicle, and the potential costs imposed on the petitioner by confiscating the property. [28]
III. IDEAL USAGE
Civil asset forfeiture has the potential to achieve positive goals, from dismantling criminal schemes to investing funds into those bearing the burdens of illegal activity. First, the U.S. government may direct forfeiture proceeds to victim compensation. The Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program states this as their top priority. Through remission petitions or court fund transfers, the U.S. victim compensation program has amassed over twelve billion dollars since 2000 to provide victim restoration. [29] Second, the U.S. government may invest forfeiture proceeds into community protection at the local, state, federal, and tribal levels. For example, the DEA uses asset forfeiture to fund investments into drug and alcohol treatment facilities, naloxone tool kits, youth prevention programs, school resource officers, occupation development community organizations, and more. [30] In some communities, asset forfeiture is relied upon to support public service projects, public land maintenance, and youth summer camps. [31] Stated goals for victim compensation and community investment, however, are limited in effectiveness and scope of impact. The money the DOJ directs to victim compensation represents less than one-third of the total proceeds the agency gains from civil asset forfeiture. [32] In 2018, data from civil asset forfeiture in thirteen states suggests a negligible investment into victim compensation and community support. Out of these thirteen states, agencies spent an average of nine percent of civil asset forfeiture proceeds on community support and almost zero percent on victim compensation. [33]
IV. CIRCUMVENTING FEDERALISM
Under the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Congress established the federal equitable sharing program. [34] Civil asset seizure is concentrated at the state and local levels while forfeiture is done at the federal level, with proceeds distributed via equitable sharing between the different jurisdictions. If the activity being targeted by civil asset forfeiture violates federal law, law enforcement agencies can participate in equitable sharing through joint investigative forfeitures or adoptive forfeitures. [35] Joint investigative forfeitures occur when there is multijurisdictional effort in executing civil asset seizure. [36] For example, the federal government may cooperate with state and local task forces or multiple states may combine law enforcement agencies into a larger team. These large-scale collaborations are most common in organizational criminal schemes involving drug trafficking and gang activity. Because there may be discrepancies between participator state statutes surrounding civil asset forfeiture, the federal government forfeits the asset under federal law and assigns percentages of proceeds based on level of contribution. [37] Equitable sharing via joint investigative forfeitures therefore creates a more uniform standard for splitting proceeds from multijurisdictional seizures. Adoptive forfeitures, in contrast, involve seizures carried out solely by state and local law enforcement that are subsequently transferred to or adopted by federal agencies to be forfeited under federal law. [38] Upon forfeiture, eighty percent of proceeds are returned to state and local agencies and twenty percent is retained by the federal government. [39] For an individual state or locality, therefore, adoptive forfeiture allows law enforcement to decide between forfeiture under state or federal frameworks.
State statutes on civil asset forfeiture exhibit considerable variation. North Carolina, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Maine decided to completely abolish the practice, relying on criminal forfeiture instead. [40] Some states have enacted conviction requirements for judicial proceedings contesting civil asset seizures in court and some shift the burden of proof to the government under innocent-owner claims. States generally have different requirements for reporting, seizing, and forfeiting civil assets, as well as how civil asset forfeiture proceeds are distributed. In forty-three states, law enforcement agencies are entitled to keep at least fifty percent, if not all of the proceeds from civil asset forfeiture. [41] In others, proceeds must be put towards victim compensation or community investment. New Mexico forbids law enforcement from pocketing any of these funds, even from criminal and administrative forfeiture, mandating instead that all proceeds be invested into a state general fund. [42]
Efforts at the state level to reform civil asset forfeiture practices, however, can be circumvented by the federal equitable sharing program. Under adoptive forfeiture, law enforcement agencies are financially incentivized to bypass state and local frameworks. Once the federal government adopts seized assets, federal law is applied to how the seizure is justified in court, how the asset is forfeited, and how the proceeds are distributed. [43] In court, the federal standard for justifying forfeitability is preponderance of the evidence, a much lower burden of proof than state statutes that either require convictions or more restrictive guidelines. For forfeiture proceeds, federal equitable sharing mandates that all funds be given to law enforcement agencies to support their activities and officer salaries. [44] If these funds are found to be distributed away from law enforcement, the federal government reserves the right to terminate the adoption agreement. [45] Even if adoptive forfeiture returns eighty percent of proceeds to state and local law enforcement, this distribution of proceeds is still favorable to state statutes prohibiting or restricting law enforcement from receiving these funds at all.
New York, California, Florida, Texas, and Illinois generally amass the most revenue from civil asset forfeiture, with Tennessee and Rhode Island joining the list based on revenue per capita. [46] The states participating most in federal equitable sharing are New York, California, Rhode Island, Texas, and Massachusetts, suggesting some incentive for states engaging in civil asset seizure to follow federal law for forfeiture and distribution of proceeds. [47] From 2000 to 2019, the federal equitable sharing program granted state and local law enforcement agencies over 8.8 billion dollars. [48] In 2013 alone, this amounted to over 779 million dollars. Between 2000 and 2013, asset forfeiture funds from the DOJ and Department of the Treasury alone accounted for an average of 400 million dollars per year of equitable sharing proceeds to state and local law enforcement. [49]
As federal equitable sharing continues to expand, debates over the legitimacy of adoptive forfeiture practices center around federalism. The 10th Amendment states, “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” [50] This division of powers originated in the Framers’ concern about an overpowering national government, ensuring that the Bill of Rights would protect individual liberties and states’ rights. [51] The ability of state and local law enforcement agencies to elect whether they want to abide by state or federal level frameworks, choosing what burden of proof is used to justify seizure and what distribution of proceeds is granted to agency activity and salary, challenges this notion of state sovereignty in exercising power over civil asset forfeiture activities. Whereas joint investigative forfeiture may adhere to federal authority due to multi-jurisdictional involvement, adoptive forfeiture addresses civil asset forfeiture that targets individuals or organizations within a singular state, with no discrepancies in statutory requirements that necessitate a higher governing body to make decisions.
V. PROFIT-DRIVEN POLICY
Ideally, civil asset forfeiture invests in effective community policing while fiscally disincentivizing the rise of criminal enterprises. Law enforcement agencies may use civil asset forfeiture proceeds for key expenses like investigation technology, forensic training, sexual assault kits, and more. [52] Funds can equip police departments with resources for better training, more specialized task forces, and compliance with constitutional standards. [53] In practice, however, the current legal landscape allows law enforcement to use civil asset forfeiture funds for a wide range of purposes, sometimes only tangentially beneficial to serving the community. Proceeds have been used to purchase an office zamboni, margarita machine, five million dollar helicopter, $227,000 armored carrier, luxury travel and food, coffee makers, and even an entertainment clown. [54] Nearly forty percent of police executives state that profit from civil asset forfeiture practices is not only incorporated into their agencies’ budgets, but crucial for general operations.[55] Even if these funds were being used for legitimate purposes, the strong financial rewards of civil asset forfeiture leads to profit-driven policing.
When law enforcement agencies are permitted to pocket the proceeds, they will expand the exercise of civil asset forfeiture. For example, Pennsylvania allows law enforcement agencies to retain one hundred percent of civil asset forfeiture proceeds. Over a ten-year period, Philadelphia seized over one thousand houses, three thousand vehicles, and forty-four million dollars in cash, making a total revenue of sixty-four million dollars.[56] Zero percent of proceeds were put towards community investment initiatives when law enforcement was entitled full discretion. Police departments also may broaden guidelines on what property is eligible for seizure in order to expand the scope of revenue. For example, in Detroit, driving a vehicle in an area where any illicit alcohol selling takes place was a sufficient threshold for law enforcement to seize the vehicle itself. [57] Law enforcement may also increasingly target vulnerable situations, focusing policing on the highest probability of gaining proceeds. Civil asset forfeiture relies highly upon cash, with sixty-eight percent of forfeited property being currency. [58] Especially during traffic stops, police officers have resorted to a standardized question on whether there is cash in the vehicle. Under the presumption of forfeitability, law enforcement simply has to raise suspicion that the individual is engaged in some kind of illicit activity making the cash ill-gotten profit or tools of criminality. Individuals who do not have bank accounts and are carrying income or savings in cash, therefore, are at a higher risk of civil asset seizure because cash is a readily available target. [59]
Traffic stops like these also raise broader concerns on how closely intertwined civil asset seizures are with who the policy stops, questions, and categorizes as suspicious of engaging in criminal activity. Lower-income individuals and racial or ethnic minorities are systematically targeted more often by civil asset forfeiture practices. [60] Black men especially face a disproportionately large threat; in times of financial uncertainty or stress, studies of law enforcement agencies find increased arrest rates for communities of color, specifically Blacks and Hispanics. [61] By bolstering these inequities with financial incentives, civil asset forfeiture has the potential to exacerbate negative interactions between vulnerable communities and law enforcement agencies.
VI. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
Once law enforcement engages in civil asset seizure, the agency mails a letter within sixty days to adhere to the property owner’s right to notice. From there, the property owner must file a claim to begin the judicial process of reclaiming the asset. [62] Here, many jurisdictions have a mandated filing fee to even contest a seizure in the first place. For example, in some New Jersey localities, a seizure by law enforcement of cash amounts as low as eleven dollars requires that the owner pay a $175 filing fee. [63] If a property owner is able to file a claim and initiate a lawsuit, prosecutors exercise discretion on whether the claim can be addressed in court. Because the seizing party is deciding permissibility, prosecutors often use highly-technical reasons to invalidate claims simply to avoid judicial proceedings. For example, a Washington couple seeking to challenge their civil asset forfeiture case was initially denied judicial proceedings for failing to write “under the penalty of perjury” in their agency petition. [64] If the prosecutors permit the judicial proceeding, the property owners’ litigation fees may exceed the value of the property itself. In simple and straightforward civil asset forfeiture cases at the state level from 2015 to 2019, the average cost of hiring legal representation was three thousand dollars. [65] The median forfeiture value for over twenty states is $1,276 with some states as low as three hundred dollars. [66]
Together, filing fees, prosecutorial discretion, and litigation fees mean that the burdens of civil asset seizure are placed disproportionately on individuals who cannot afford quality legal counsel. Even for those who can, these obstacles disincentivize or exclude individuals from the judicial processes required to have their assets returned. Under the presumption of forfeitability, the government retains the asset if nobody successfully contests the seizure, allowing the government to forfeit the property and pocket the proceeds. In fact, only fifteen to twenty percent of seizures are contested through court proceedings by property owners who have filed a claim against the government. [67] The remaining eighty to eighty-five percent eventually cede ownership to the government to be forfeited administratively, regardless of innocence or whether the property was wrongfully seized. The avenue to administrative forfeiture, therefore, may not be the government’s legitimacy in executing the seizure nor the lack of ownership to an individual, but rather the obstacles that stand in the way of property owners filing a claim, being granted a judicial proceeding, and having legal representation.
If property owners reach the litigation stage, the burden of proof for the government to justify forfeiture is an easily-met standard. Unlike criminal asset forfeiture, the government in civil asset forfeiture carries out the seizure even in the absence of criminal charge. Federal law sets the burden of proof at preponderance of the evidence, requiring only that the property more likely than not be associated with illegal activity. [68] In eleven states, the burden of proof is raised to clear and convincing evidence and, in sixteen states, beyond a reasonable doubt. [69] Massachusetts, however, has the lowest standard of proof, allowing the government to justify forfeiture under probable cause. [70] Even if states raise the burden of proof to reasonable doubt like in criminal asset forfeiture, the federal equitable sharing program provides an avenue for state and local law enforcement agencies to use federal law instead. In response, the property owner must prove a lack of association with illegal activity. They must demonstrate that the property was neither ill-gotten gain nor instrumental in the furtherance of a crime. [71] However, because civil asset forfeiture does not require a criminal conviction, the fact that an individual is not guilty of a crime is not enough to win back property. Under 18 U.S. Code § 983 General Rules for Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, the innocent owner defense requires that the property owner engaged in all reasonable actions to remove association of the property with illegal activity. [72] The property owner must demonstrate either a lack of knowledge or that they attempted to terminate connection once they became aware by informing law enforcement, restricting access to the property, or other proactive measures.
VII. MOVING FORWARD
The current reality of the civil asset forfeiture legal landscape suggests the practice may be at most a means to an end for the U.S. justice system—failing to provide value or importance within the process itself, but useful in achieving a broader aim of deterrence and dismantlement of crime, the core of why asset forfeiture exists in the first place. Examination of state-level legal landscapes on civil asset forfeiture, however, challenge the attainability of this goal. In 2015, New Mexico enacted House Bill 560 which eliminated civil asset forfeiture. [73] Under this legislation, New Mexico restricted asset forfeiture to criminal prosecutions, mandated that asset forfeiture proceeds be invested into a state general fund rather than law enforcement budgets, and strictly limited participation in the federal equitable sharing program. The state went from receiving three million dollars of annual revenue from federal equitable sharing to stopping participation. [74] Through this transition, a nine-year panel study of monthly crime rates found no significant change in deterrence and dismantlement of crime before and after the elimination of civil asset forfeiture in New Mexico. [75] Compared to control states who retained the same legal landscape during this time period, New Mexico’s legal reforms did not compromise public safety nor the ability of law enforcement to address crime.
A starting point for effectively reforming civil asset forfeiture lies in the removal of federal equitable sharing initiatives which allow law enforcement agencies to circumvent federalism. In doing so, the practice of civil asset forfeiture will follow the state-level lead in raising burdens of proof and regulating law enforcement use of proceeds. More uniformly, a shift or complete transition from civil asset forfeiture to criminal asset forfeiture would concentrate law enforcement seizures on cases of proven criminal activity. Unlike civil asset forfeiture, which may have standards of proof as low as preponderance of the evidence or probable cause, criminal asset forfeiture requires the government to prove that the property owner is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the property was involved in the established criminal activity. The incentive for property seizure is reduced because law enforcement agencies would no longer be permitted to seize, keep, and resell property simply based on allegation or suspicion of illegal involvement. Removing the convenience of asset forfeiture also reduces the risk of due process violations, by filtering potential cases on a stricter standard while offering property owners the higher levels of protection for defendants under criminal law versus civil law. Additionally, increased transparency towards how law enforcement agencies utilize asset forfeiture proceeds, or whether they have access to these funds in the first place, combats corruptive spending patterns and holds law enforcement accountable for their relations with citizens and the community at large.
When the current legal landscape enables circumventing federalism, profit-driven policing, and due process concerns, the practice of civil asset forfeiture may extend beyond lack of value or importance and create tangible, systemic harm. Without the adoption of stricter guidelines in the legal landscape, the practice of civil asset forfeiture will continue to expand, along with its economic incentives and farreaching consequences. In maintaining the status quo, the reality of civil asset forfeiture will increasingly impact how citizens and communities perceive guarantees of individual liberties, adherence to constitutional principles, rights to procedural justice, and the legitimacy of law enforcement as an institution—eroding at the foundations upon which the U.S. justice system rests.
Endnotes
[1] “Asset Forfeiture,” Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 2024, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime/asset-forfeiture.
[2] “Criminal Forfeiture,” Legal Information Institute, 2021, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/criminal_forfeiture.
[3] Ibid.
[4] “Civil Forfeiture,” Legal Information Institute, 2022, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/civil_forfeiture.
[5] Ibid.
[6] “Administrative Forfeiture,” Legal Information Institute, 2022, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_forfeiture.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Justin Wilson, “New Report Finds Civil Forfeiture Rakes in Billions Each Year, Does Not Fight Crime,” Institute for Justice, December 15, 2020, https://ij.org/press-release/new-report-finds-civil-forfeiture-rakes-in-billions-each-year-does-not-fight-crime-2/.
[9] Lisa Knepper, Jennifer McDonald, Kathy Sanchez, and Elyse Pohl, Policing for Profit: 3rd Edition, Institute for Justice, December 2020, https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/policing-for-profit-3-web.pdf.
[10] J. D. Ho, “Civil Asset Forfeiture: Overview,” EBSCO, 2024, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/law/civil-asset-forfeiture-overview.
[11] “Asset Forfeiture,” FBI.
[12] Ken Drexler, “18th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Introduction,” Library of Congress, January 14, 2020, https://guides.loc.gov/18th-amendment.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Kathryn Vincent, “Organized Crime Control Act,” EBSCO, 2022, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/law/organized-crime-control-act.
[16] “Primer on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Offenses,” United States Sentencing Commission, August 2024, https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/primers/rico.
[17] “The Controlled Substances Act (CSA): A Legal Overview for the 119th Congress,” Congress.gov, April 11, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45948.
[18] “DEA Asset Forfeiture Statistics: Seizure Summary Report for FY20–FY23,” United States Drug Enforcement Administration, May 5, 2023, https://www.dea.gov/operations/asset-forfeiture.
[19] “S.1762 - Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,” Congress.gov, September 25, 1984, https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/senate-bill/1762.
[20] “Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,” Congress.gov.
[21] “H.R.1658 - Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000,” Congress.gov, April 25, 2000, https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/1658.
[22] “18 U.S. Code § 983 - General Rules for Civil Forfeiture Proceedings,” Legal Information Institute, February 18, 2016, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/983.
[23] Bryan Stevenson and John Stinneford, “Interpretation and Debate: The Eighth Amendment,” National Constitution Center, https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments/amendment-viii/clauses/103.
[24] “The Excessive Fines Clause,” Institute for Justice, 2025, https://ij.org/issues/private-property/fines-and-fees/the-excessive-fines-clause/.
[25] “Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993),” Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/509/602/#tab-opinion-1959329; “United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998),” Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/524/321/.
[26] “14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,” National Archives, March 6, 2024, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/14th-amendment.
[27] “Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. ___ (2019),” Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/586/17-1091/#tab-opinion-4054117.
[28] Ibid.
[29] “Victim Compensation Program,” U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division, August 5, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-mlars/victims.
[30] “Asset Forfeiture,” FBI.
[31] Ibid.
[32] “Victim Compensation, Community Programs Gain Little,” Institute for Justice, https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/pfp3content/evidence-suggests-forfeiture-doesnt-work/victim-compensation-community-programs-gain-little/.
[33] Brian Kelly, “Does Forfeiture Work?,” Institute for Justice, February 10, 2021, https://ij.org/report/does-forfeiture-work/.
[34] “Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,” Congress.gov.
[35] Jefferson E. Holcomb, Tomislav V. Kovandzic, and Marian R. Williams, “Civil Asset Forfeiture, Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States,” Journal of Criminal Justice 39, no. 3 (2011): 273–285, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2011.02.010.
[36] “Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,” U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, April 2009, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-afmls/legacy/2014/07/31/04-2009guide-equit.pdf.
[37] “Civil Asset Forfeiture,” Journal of Criminal Justice.
[38] “Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,” U.S. Department of Justice.
[39] “Civil Asset Forfeiture,” Journal of Criminal Justice.
[40] “Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level,” Institute for Justice, https://ij.org/legislative-advocacy/civil-forfeiture-legislative-highlights/.
[41] Dick Carpenter, Lisa Knepper, Angela Erickson, and Jennifer McDonald, Policing for Profit: 2nd Edition, Institute for Justice, November 2015, https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf.
[42] Jennifer McDonald, Harrison Weeks, and Dick Carpenter, “Does Civil Forfeiture Fight Crime? Evidence From New Mexico,” Criminal Justice Review, November 3, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1177/07340168241285569.
[43] “Justice Manual: Title 9: Criminal: 9-116.000 - Equitable Sharing and Federal Adoption,” U.S. Department of Justice, May 2010, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-116000-equitable-sharing-and-federal-adoption.
[44] Jefferson E. Holcomb et al., “Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws and Equitable Sharing Activity by the Police,” Criminology and Public Policy 17, no. 1 (2018): 101–128, https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12341.
[45] Ibid.
[46] “Policing for Profit: 3rd Edition,” Institute for Justice.
[47] Ibid.
[48] “Trends in Equitable Sharing Revenues and Payments,” Institute for Justice, 2020, https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/pfp3content/equitable-sharing-creates-a-giant-loophole/trends-in-equitable-sharing-revenues-and-payments/.
[49] “Policing for Profit: 2nd Edition,” Institute for Justice.
[50] Gary Lawson and Robert Schapiro, “Interpretation and Debate: The Tenth Amendment,” National Constitution Center, https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments/amendment-x/interpretations/129.
[51] “Interpretation and Debate: The Tenth Amendment,” National Constitution Center.
[52] “Asset Forfeiture,” FBI.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Robert O’Harrow, Steven Rich, and Shelly Tan, “Asset Seizures Fuel Police Spending,” The Washington Post, October 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-police-spending/; Renee Lee, “Montgomery DA Says Funds Used for Liquor at Cook-off,” Chron, March 18, 2008, https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/humble-news/article/montgomery-da-says-funds-used-for-liquor-at-1757341.php; “Official Audit Report of Worcester County District Attorney’s Office,” Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the State Auditor, February 15, 2013, https://www.mass.gov/doc/worcester-county-district-attorneys-office-middle-district/download.
[55] John L. Worrall, “Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Budgetary Necessity in Contemporary Law Enforcement,” Journal of Criminal Justice 29, no. 3 (2001): 171–187, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2352(01)00082-4.
[56] “Policing for Profit: 3rd Edition,” Institute for Justice.
[57] “Mobley et al. v. Detroit et al., No. 2:2010cv10675 - Document 115 (E.D. Mich. 2012),” Justia U.S. Law, https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/michigan/miedce/2:2010cv10675/246489/115/.
[58] “What Do States Forfeit? Cash Is King,” Institute for Justice, 2020, https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/pfp3content/forfeiture-is-lucrative-for-governments-nationwide/what-do-states-forfeit-cash-is-king/.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Dick Carpenter, Jennifer McDonald, and Zachary Popovich, “The Complex Process of Civil Forfeiture,” CrimRxiv, 2022, https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.3f24fe38.
[61] Michael Markowsky, Thomas Stratmann, and Alex Tabarrok, “To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement,” Journal of Legal Studies 48, no. 1 (2019): 189–216, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2745000.
[62] “18 U.S. Code § 983 - General Rules for Civil Forfeiture Proceedings,” Legal Information Institute.
[63] “Big-Time Criminals or Small-Time Forfeitures?,” Institute for Justice, 2020, https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/pfp3content/forfeiture-is-lucrative-for-governments-nationwide/big-time-criminals-or-small-time-forfeitures/.
[64] Mitch Ryals, “Null and Void: How a Prosser, Washington, Couple Became Ensnared in Arizona’s Civil Forfeiture Law,” Inlander, October 20, 2016, https://www.inlander.com/news/null-and-void-2925843.
[65] “Big-Time Criminals or Small-Time Forfeitures?,” Institute for Justice.
[66] “Policing for Profit: 3rd Edition,” Institute for Justice.
[67] Stefan D. Cassella and David B. Smith, “The Role of Civil Forfeiture: Are Forfeiture-of-Assets Proceedings Fair or in Need of Reform?,” Judicature 100, no. 4 (2016), https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/the-role-of-civil-forfeiture-are-forfeiture-of-assets-proceedings-fair-or-in-need-of-reform/.
[68] “Civil Forfeiture,” Legal Information Institute.
[69] “Policing for Profit: 3rd Edition,” Institute for Justice.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Cassella and Smith, “The Role of Civil Forfeiture.”
[72] “18 U.S. Code § 983 - General Rules for Civil Forfeiture Proceedings,” Legal Information Institute.
[73] “Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level,” Institute for Justice.
[74] McDonald, Weeks, and Carpenter, “Does Civil Forfeiture Fight Crime? Evidence From New Mexico.”
[75] Ibid.