By: Robert Farbman
Volume X – Issue II – Spring 2025
I. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice recently decided to abandon its request for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (“the Court”) to force Google’s divestiture from AI, while sticking with its demand that Google sell Google Chrome (“Chrome”). This contrast in holdings highlights the tension in the modern antitrust climate around curbing monopoly power in an era of technological change. [1] The strategic retreat from an originally aggressive approach to the question of AI reflects concerns about global competition. It seems that the Trump administration has decided that restricting Google’s ability to invest in AI may put the United States at a disadvantage in the global race for dominance in AI. In comparison, the decision by the Trump administration to stick with the Biden-era standard regarding Chrome is reflective of the bipartisan awareness of the need for structural remedies in the effective regulation of tech giants. [2] In United States v. Google LLC (2024), the D.C. District Court ruled that Google’s exclusive agreements with device manufacturers including Apple and Samsung were anticompetitive and illegal, as they foreclosed competition on a staggering 90% of searches, with even more control over mobile search. [3] The court found that Chrome’s dominance, which essentially locked out rivals from data revenue, was an essential feature of Google’s anti-competitive strategy. [4] Despite the DOJ’s newly narrowed demands, structural remedies like divesting from Chrome remain essential for reeling in big tech companies.
II. GOOGLE’S SEARCH MONOPOLY
Google’s dominance in search is not purely the result of a superior product, but part of a calculated strategy to utilize exclusionary contracts to stifle competition and corner the market. As a part of this strategy, Google signed exclusionary contracts paying device manufacturers tens of billions of dollars annually in revenue sharing to keep Google as the default search engine, which the court ruled foreclosed a significant share of the market and was anti-competitive. [5] Under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts of 1890 and 1914 respectively, practices that unfairly foreclose on competition, such as predatory pricing, exclusionary dealing contracts, and price fixing are deemed illegally anticompetitive. [6] These contracts include having Chrome as the default on Safari and having Chrome preloaded on Android, effectively cutting off most of the market from competitors. [7] Research from the National Bureau of Economic Research has found that while most users still chose Google when forced to choose a search engine, many users continued using alternatives when exposed to them for longer periods of time, demonstrating how the default status of Chrome on many devices and browsers inflates Google’s market share artificially. [8] It’s not just that users aren’t paying attention—the default settings are driving a lack of exposure to competitors that has resulted in this monopoly. [9] As this article will explore further, this reality points to the importance of a remedy that exposes customers to alternatives, while highlighting the potential ineffectiveness of weaker remedies.
III. THE FAILURE OF BEHAVIORAL REMEDIES
Generally, behavioral remedies are meant to change a company’s behavior to enforce compliance with law and disincentivize illegal conduct. However, behavioral remedies including fines or compulsory changes to business practices have been ineffective in changing monopolistic architectures similar to Google’s, and have generally failed to influence Google’s behavior on a variety of issues. Analyzing these failures can help us understand why these remedies haven’t worked, and why structural remedies are essential.
Fines and Noncompliance in the European Union
Looking at the European Union, a reliance on fines to alter Google’s conduct has failed to create substantial change. Despite repeatedly upheld rulings that Google’s advertising practices were anticompetitive, Google did not change its practices. [10] Google has a history of violating commitments to regulatory authorities, including repeatedly failing to bring its AI training into compliance with regulations issued by France’s Autorité de la Concurrence (Competition Authority), even in the face of escalating fines. [11] Behavioral mandates, such as requiring Google to display rival shopping services, led to no significant increase in traffic for competitors, as Google found ways around the order and gave competitors less visible placements. [12] The EU’s failure in significantly influencing Google’s behavior highlights the inability of behavioral remedies to dismantle the structural advantages of dominant tech firms.
Regulatory Burden Circumvention
A major issue with behavioral remedies is that they impose significant burdens on regulatory bodies while leaving ample loopholes for companies. [13] This is seen not only in the ability of Google to skirt responsibilities set out by the EU, but also in its continued reversion on promises made to the FTC, such as those regarding their 2007 acquisition of DoubleClick. [14] In order to convince the FTC to allow the purchase to go through, Google said that it would not combine user data from the platform with data gathered from other sources such as GPS and email—and then decided to do it anyway, literally removing that line from their privacy agreement in 2016. As seen from this case, the FTC has already begun to struggle with funding cuts under the new Trump administration, and it is becoming increasingly evident that a remedy relying on this sort of enforcement is doomed to fail. [15] Therefore, if the goal is to significantly disrupt the self-reinforcing cycle of dominance that Google’s exclusionary contracts have created, behavioral remedies are unlikely to be the tool to do it.
The EU’s Digital Markets Act
Looking at the most recent attempt in Europe to impose significant restrictions on the anticompetitive behaviors of big tech companies, the failure of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) highlights the continued struggle to influence how tech giants such as Google conduct business. Passed in 2023, the DMA sets regulations for “gatekeepers”, a group of six large tech companies that includes Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, and Microsoft. [16] The DMA includes a long list of regulations, including restricting the ability of gatekeepers to treat their own products and services more favorably than similar ones from third parties on their own platforms. [17] However, even with the more targeted approach of directly singling out large tech companies, the DMA has generally failed to reign in anticompetitive activity by some of the largest names, including Alphabet, Google’s parent company. On March 18, 2025, the European Commission notified Alphabet that its continued self preferencing in search is in violation of the DMA. [18] While an official non-compliance decision has yet to be released, this finding points to the continued failure of behavioral measures to effectively influence Google’s anticompetitive behavior.
IV. AT&T, Boeing, and The European Union
The Success of Breaking Up AT&T
In considering structural remedies, the case of AT&T offers a compelling success story, and a potential blueprint. AT&T has been on the receiving end of two landmark antitrust actions, both of which showcase the effectiveness of structural remedies. In the first case, a settlement with the DOJ led AT&T to completely stay out of computing and to license its patents for free, opening up competition which was essential for driving the general purpose computing and semiconductor industries. [19] In the second case, in 1984, AT&T was forced to break up its Bell system, spurring the transformation of the telecommunication industry. [20] In both cases, aggressive remedies allowed for the birth of entirely new industries, and the existence of better products. [21] Considering the current dominance that Google holds over search, a similar solution holds the potential not only of increasing competition and delivering better search products, but also of generating larger industry-wide changes.
Boeing: A Missed Opportunity
On the other end of the spectrum, Boeing provides a clear picture of what happens when the government opts not to push against a company’s desire to monopolize. In 1996, the Clinton administration moved to allow Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to merge. [22] This merger is seen by many as a clear inflection point, putting Boeing on the path to its repeated struggles and mishaps with safety, finances, and public image . [23] Many of these issues have stemmed from a desire to maximize earnings, which took hold of Boeing after the merger. [24] As we evaluate whether breaking up Google is necessary, Boeing shows us the downside of letting companies get too big, especially when we have the opportunity to stop it.
V. The Case for Chrome Divestiture
If structural remedies are the current best strategy, then forcing Google to sell Chrome is likely the most effective structural remedy available. Chrome is at the center of Google’s monopoly power with around 3.4 billion global users. [25] According to the DOJ, selling Chrome would stop Google’s control over these access points. [26] Doing so has the potential to disrupt a system in which consumers and competitors alike are powerless against the tech giant. [27] Behavioral remedies alone can not address these concerns, a position reinforced by the fact that the DOJ, even amidst the turmoil of a new administration, continues to recognize this. [28] Forcing Google to divest from Chrome would fundamentally change the competitive landscape in the browser and search markets. Google’s search advertising revenue relies in large part on Chrome being the default, and separating Chrome from google would disrupt this pipeline of revenue while allowing competitors to truly compete. That being said, divesting from Chrome would not put Google into financial ruin, as it represents only a small share of its market value. Additionally, a divested Chrome is likely to be financially viable even without the monopoly search revenue, all while allowing for competition in search. [29] If Google were to divest from Chrome, the prospects for competitors would drastically improve, and Google would be forced to innovate to a greater degree, no longer supported by its illegal monopoly. [30]
VI. Security and The Case Against Chrome Divestiture
One popular defense against forcing divestiture from Chrome, advocated by Google itself, is national security. Specifically, Google has told the Department of Justice directly that forcing the sale of Chrome could significantly harm both US national security and user security. [31] Part of this argument rests on the idea that hurting Google’s ability to compete against countries such as China weakens America’s role in the global technology sector. [32] Additionally, Google claims that its interconnected ecosystem is essential for user security, and America’s position as a technological leader. [33]
When evaluating these claims, there is a concrete lack of evidence in support of the notion that Google’s size and control over search are important for either national or user security. Companies don’t need to be massive in order to have functional internet security, as seen with other browsers such as Firefox. [34] However, it is possible that increased competition could result in better security across the search industry, with the elimination of Google’s chokehold. And while Google has not cited any specific concerns that point to their monopoly being influential for the United States’ national security, the reality is that Google will remain a large and powerful company, capable of competing internationally even without Chrome. Additionally, there are potential security benefits to forcing the sale of Chrome. As noted by a senior analyst at Forrester, Chrome would be able to make decisions with user needs in mind, as opposed to advertisers, and might stop letting websites collect private user data, as well as updating Chrome’s incognito mode to a more private system. [35]
VII. CONCLUSION
The case for forcing Google to divest from Chrome represents a critical moment in antitrust enforcement, as society grapples with the increasing control of big tech giants. Through an analysis of Google’s monopolistic practices and control over search, this article has argued that structural remedies are the best path going forward. The evidence demonstrates that Chrome is at the center of Google’s dominance, and that breaking it up may be the only way to disrupt that control. That disruption may be necessary, not just to spur competition and lead to better search products, but to allow for the industry to evolve and grow in a natural way. At this point, it seems that the Department of Justice under the new administration is sticking with the demand that Google be forced to sell. Now, it's up to the court to decide, in a decision that will not only change search, but redefine what regulation of tech companies will look like, especially as await a decision in another major case against Google. Historical precedent shows that behavioral remedies have been ineffective against Google, and that structural remedies have succeeded in disrupting monopolies and spurring competition and innovation. Ultimately, the case for a heavy hand in antitrust today represents a crucial step in combating the unrestricted growth of power in the tech industry—a step that should be taken now, while it is still an option.
Endnotes
[1] Cecilia Kang, “DOJ Drops Google AI Divestment Demand but Keeps Pressure on Chrome,” The New York Times, March 7, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/technology/trump-google-search-antitrust.html.
[2] Cecilia Kang.
[3] United States v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-3010 (APM), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138798, at *26 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2024)
[4] United States v. Google LLC
[5] United States v. Google LLC, at 351
[6] Stephanie T. Nguyen, “Anticompetitive Practices,” Federal Trade Commission, March 5, 2022, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/anticompetitive-practices.
[7] Shaoor Munir et al., “Chrome Is the Forgotten Fulcrum of Google’s Dominance,” ProMarket, August 8, 2024, https://www.promarket.org/2024/08/08/chrome-is-the-forgotten-fulcrum-of-googles-dominance/.
[8] Hunt Allcott et al., Sources of Market Power in Web Search: Evidence from a Field Experiment, January 2025, https://doi.org/10.3386/w33410.
[9] Hunt Allcott et al.
[10] Google loses fight against $2.7 billion EU antitrust fine | Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/technology/eu-courtupholds-googles-27-bln-eu-antitrust-fine-2024-09-10/.
[11] Karina Montoya, “How US History and Google’s Own Behavior Justifies a Break-up to Restore Competition in Search,” Tech Policy Press, November 22, 2024, https://www.techpolicy.press/how-us-history-and-googles-ownbehavior-justifies-a-breakup-to-restore-competition-in-search/.
[12] Google LLC v. European Commission, Case T-612/17, Judgment of the General Court (2024)
[13] Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2018).
[14] Karina Montoya, “How US History and Google’s Own Behavior Justifies a Break-up to Restore Competition in Search.”
[15] Musk-led cuts drive US consumer protection agency to ask for Amazon trial delay | reuters, accessed March 12, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/legal/ftc-asks-delay-amazon-trial-due-severe-resource-shortfalls-2025-03-12/.
[16] “The Digital Markets Act: Ensuring Fair and Open Digital Markets,” European Commission, 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-actensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en
[17] “The Digital Markets Act: Ensuring Fair and Open Digital Markets,” European Commission.
[18] “Commission Sends Preliminary Findings to Alphabet under the Digital Markets Act,” European Commission - European Commission, March 18, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_811.
[19] Tim Wu, “What Should We Do about Google?.”
[20] Tim Wu, “What Should We Do about Google?.”
[21] Tim Wu, “What Should We Do about Google?.”
[22] Tim Wu, “What Should We Do about Google?.”
[23] Tim Wu, “What Should We Do about Google?.”
[24] “Why Boeing’s Problems with the 737 MAX Began More than 25 Years Ago: Working Knowledge.”
[25] James Pearce, “DOJ Pushes Google to Sell off Chrome Browser,” TechInformed, March 17, 2025, https://techinformed.com/doj-plays-hard-ball-with-google-over-chrome-sale/.
[26] David Mccabe, “Justice Dept. Doubles down on Request to Break up Google,” The New York Times, March 7, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/technology/trump-google-search-antitrust.html.
[27] David Mccabe, “Justice Dept. Doubles down on Request to Break up Google.”
[28] Courtney Radsch, “Trump DOJ Advances Google Chrome Divestiture Remedy,” Open Markets Institute, March 10, 2025, https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/publications/trump-doj-advances-google-chrome-divestitureremedy.
[29] Alissa Cooper, “The True Cost of Browser Innovation: Why Chrome’s Divestiture Wouldn’t End the Open Web,” Tech Policy Press, February 24, 2025, https://www.techpolicy.press/the-true-cost-of-browser-innovation-whychromes-divestiture-wouldnt-end-the-open-web/.
[30] Tim Wu, “What Should We Do about Google?.”
[31] Josh Sisco and Davey Alba, “Google Urges Trump Justice Department Not to Break up Company - Bloomberg,” Bloomberg, March 4, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-04/google-urges-trump-doj-toreverse-course-on-breaking-up-company
[32] Josh Sisco and Davey Alba, “Google Urges Trump Justice Department Not to Break up Company - Bloomberg.”
[33] Josh Sisco and Davey Alba, “Google Urges Trump Justice Department Not to Break up Company - Bloomberg.”
[34] Josh Sisco and Davey Alba, “Google Urges Trump Justice Department Not to Break up Company - Bloomberg.”
[35] Matthew Keegan, “Google’s Grip on Search at Risk as US Govt Pushes for Chrome Sell-off: News,” Campaign Asia, March 11, 2025, https://www.campaignasia.com/article/googles-grip-on-search-at-risk-as-us-govt-pushes-forchrome-sell-off/501244.