By: Arjun Sarkar ‘29
Volume XI – Issue I – Fall 2025
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright law, to this day, remains one of the most complicated legal fields in United States history. Copyright law also remains one of the most rapidly developing legal fields in the nation, as it exists at the crossroads of rigid legality and expressionist creativity. As the nation’s arts and sciences progressed, so has copyright law. With the rise of generative AI, it must be seen whether the current copyright law is able to properly evaluate the issue of AI copyright infringement. The answer to that question will be found in the landmark ruling held in Andy Warhol Foundation For The Visual Arts Inc. v Goldsmith, which established the framework for how modern copyright law will be used in the future.
Copyright law is fundamentally intertwined with artists' liberties. In fact, since 1790, the Constitution has ensured that “the author of a work may reap the fruit” of his or her labor for a limited span of time. [1] The origin of the first modern copyright law lies prior to the founding of the United States, with the passage of the Statute of Anne (1710) in Great Britain. [2] The Statute stated that the act of publishing authors' works without their consent had proved a “great detriment” to the livelihood of the authors. [2] In response to this detriment, the statute enforced a fourteen-year length of copyright that authors held over their works. In passing this statute, the British Government helped pave the way for intellectual property protection.
A few decades after the initial passage of the Statute of Anne, the then-newly formed United States government used the statute as a framework to develop the Copyright Act of 1790, the first federal copyright law. Notably, the initial act was relatively narrow in scope. The law originally applied only to “books, maps, and charters” and, like the Statute of Anne, imposed a fourteen-year copyright protection. [3] Over the next century, Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1790 to encompass a wider range of works, including: “historical and other prints (1802), dramatic works (1856), photographs (1965), and visual arts (1870).” [4] An 1831 amendment also increased the period of copyright protection from “fourteen years to twenty-eight years.” [28] The evolution of the initial Copyright Act, as new forms of media developed, also applied to the manner in which intellectual property was borrowed. The Supreme Court demonstrated this evolution in Folsom v. Marsh, with the introduction of the fair use doctrine, which established the proper manner a work could copy from and derive from previous works. During the tail end of the 20th century, the principles of the fair use doctrine were further developed with emphasis on transformative use, a core aspect of fair use.
II. BASIS OF TRANSFORMATIVE USE
The guiding principles of transformative use originated in the fair use guidelines established in Folsom v. Marsh. In this case, the United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts established four factors to serve as a guideline for fair use. The four factors considered are the following: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount drawn from the work, and the effect on the value of the work. Of these four principles, the court held the first one as the most important. Justice Story held that a work could fairly use the original work if that work “[superseded] the use of the original work.” [5] This definition of fair use meant that as long as a piece showed a certain degree of transformation, it fell within the boundary of fair use. The acceptable degree of transformation, however, was left to the discretion of the courts. Story’s definition would be used as the basis for transformative use for the next century, but would not be properly defined until Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music Inc. [6]
Although used for centuries, the modern federal standard of “transformative use” was first seen in the Supreme Court’s holding in the case of Campbell v. Acuff Rose-Music Inc. The central question at the center of the case was whether the Plaintiff’s parody song “Pretty Woman” infringed on Acuff Rose Music Inc.’s copyright of the song “Oh, Pretty Woman.” The Court established that the parody “quickly degenerates” from the original work and that this transformation rendered it fair use. [7] The Court went on to establish in the holding that the more “transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors.” [8] This holding by the Supreme Court established transformative use not only as a significant factor, but also often as a defining factor in deciding whether a work was within the bounds of fair use.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On December 2nd, 1981, Lynn Goldsmith, a photographer whose main subjects were “rock, jazz, and R&B performers,” photographed the famous singer Prince at a concert in New York City. [9] A day later, she took a series of photos of Prince at her studio for an “assignment from Newsweek Magazine.” Throughout the photoshoot, Goldsmith made certain artistic choices, such as applying more makeup to Prince and using colored film rather than black and white photographs. In total, Goldsmith had taken approximately eleven photographs of Prince, after which he ended the shoot early. After the photoshoot ended, Goldsmith sent her photos over to Newsweek. A few weeks later, Newsweek published one of Goldsmith’s concert photos, but none of the photographs she took from the “shoot in her studio.” [9]
Three years later, Vanity Fair licensed one of Goldsmith’s monochrome Prince photographs for use as an “artist’s reference.” [9] Although not specified at the time of licensing, the artist who used the photographs as reference was Andy Warhol, whom Vanity Fair commissioned to create a cover for the magazine “Purple Fame.” [9] Furthermore, the Purple Fame article had, in its table of contents, the following copyright: “source photograph © 1984 by Lynn Goldsmith/LGI.” [9] This text was explained by a Condé Nast representative—Condé Nast being the parent company of Vanity Fair—to mean that Lynn Goldsmith had taken the source photograph that was “used to create the artwork.” [9] Regardless of this credit, Goldsmith was not aware that her image was being used in the magazine, nor was she ever notified.
After Prince’s death in 2016, Goldsmith became aware of the “Prince Series”, a set that included thirteen silkscreen paintings, two screen prints, and two pencil drawings, when a “commemorative magazine” with one of the silkscreens was printed by Conde Nast. [10] At the time, the Prince Series was owned by the Andy Warhol Foundation (“AWF”), which, “in accordance with Andy Warhol’s will,” was created after he passed. [11] Goldsmith, learning about the infringement, contacted the AWF and informed them that the Prince cover “infringed on one of her copyrights.” [12] After contacting them, Goldsmith "obtained copyright registration” for her Prince photograph. [12] In response, the AWF sued her, seeking a judgment declaring they held the sole copyright ownership. [13]
IV. DISTRICT COURT OPINION
The case first reached the New York Southern District Court, where the AWF moved for summary judgment, asking the court to declare that no part of the Prince Series infringed upon the copyright of Goldsmith’s original photo of Prince. The AWF argued both that the Prince Series was not “substantially” similar to the photo and that, even if there were similarity, it would be protected under the fair use doctrine. [13] They also argued that the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations prevents Goldsmith from claiming that infringement occurred, as the event happened outside the three-year timeframe. [13] Countering this, Goldsmith motioned for a summary judgment blocking The AWF’s request, holding that AWF did infringe on her copyright. Along with this, Goldsmith stated that under the “discovery rule,” the legal principle that a statute of limitations does not begin until after the plaintiff has discovered a violation. In this case, Goldsmith was made aware of the violation in 2019, so if the discovery rule were to apply, she would be within the statute of limitations to sue. Furthermore, Goldsmith claimed that her infringement claim was in regard to the AWF’s licensing to Conde Nast in 2016, which placed the alleged infringement within the statute of limitations. The New York Southern District Court based its opinion on whether the Prince Series fell under four factors of fair use.
The court first looked at the “purpose and character of the use.” [14] In its finding, the court acknowledged that on one hand, the Prince Series was indeed commercial in nature—after all, 12 out of 16 pieces had been sold, and images from the series had been used in numerous books and magazines. The court also acknowledged, however, that some pieces have been donated to museums for the “public interest.” [14] Along with pieces being on display to the benefit of the public, the AWF is a non-profit organization, so any profits from the pieces would go towards said public interest. Although the series was used commercially, the court considered how it may have been intended for public interest, creating a broader positive impact. The court also noted the transformative nature of the pieces. Warhol’s pieces depict Prince as a “larger than life figure,” which deviates from the “vulnerable” individual that Goldsmith portrays him as. [14] The court also noted how the removal of the work would prove a detriment to the public. This consideration served as the deciding component to support the argument that the first factor was in favor of the Andy Warhol Foundation.
The second factor the court examined was “the nature of the copyrighted work.” [15] The two aspects of this factor were whether the work was an expressive piece and whether the work was published or unpublished. [15] As mentioned above, copyright laws were created with the intent to protect creative works. In this case, both the AWF and the court did not dispute the creative nature of photography. The court also established that the fact that “Goldsmith’s photography agency licensed the photo” to be used as a reference weighs against it. [15] Additionally, since the court established that the Prince Series met the standards of transformative use, the second factor’s importance was diminished. In the end, the court found that the second factor favored neither side.
The third factor in the court’s decision was the “amount and substantiality of the portion [of the original piece] used [in the new piece].” [15] Goldsmith’s argument for this factor was that she believed that the Prince Series contained “the essence of her work.” [15] She argued that Warhol had to have “expression” in her photo as he was commissioned by Vanity Fair to do just that. [15] The Andy Warhol Foundation contested that Warhol only used “a portion” of the photograph as reference, and that the final pieces contained none of the “protectable” elements of the photograph. [15] For this factor, the court looked back on the cases of Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, and Cariou vs Prince. In both cases, courts found the factor in favor of the defendant, as even if key elements of the original works were used, as stated plainly in Cariou's pieces, they were transformed “into something new and different.” [16] Likewise, in this case, the court ruled that Warhol’s pieces completely removed the essence of Goldsmith’s work. The only feature of Goldsmith’s photo that the court acknowledged as clearly borrowed was Prince’s pose and the angle of the image. The court clarified, however, that this cannot be copyrighted as the law protects the “expression of [a] pose” not the ideas behind it. [15] These previous cases and rulings led to the court ruling that the third factor weighed in the Andy Warhol Foundation’s favor.
The fourth and final factor the court looked at was whether the effect of “the use upon the potential market value of the copyrighted work.” [17] The primary aspect of this factor was whether the secondary work posed a potential threat to the value of “the market or derivative market” for the original piece. [18] For this aspect, the court once again looked at the transformative nature of the piece because, as established in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group., Inc. “the more transformative a secondary use,” the less likely it serves as a market “substitute.” [18] The New York Southern District Court noted that Goldsmith “did not contend that Warhol’s work” disrupted her direct market, as the market for Warhol’s art pieces and Goldsmith’s prints were vastly different. [15] She did contest, however, that Warhol’s works harmed her “licensing market,” as hers and the Andy Warhol Foundation’s licensing markets catered to the same groups and purposes specifically: “imagery for editorial and commercial uses, including magazines . . . [and] music album covers.” [15] The court, however, found no evidence to support her claims. They stated that Warhol’s stylized prints differed from Goldsmith’s “intimate” portrayal of Prince, and therefore no company would substitute one for the other. [15] Plainly, the court found it clear that Warhol’s Prince Series was so heavily transformed from Goldsmith’s work that it could not be used as a substitute, and therefore, would not compete directly with her work. With this evidence in mind, the court found the fourth factor in favor of the AWF.
With three out of the four factors of the fair use doctrine in favor of the AWF and only one factor that favored neither side, the court found the facts were in favor of the AWF. The New York Southern District Court therefore ruled in favor of the Andy Warhol Foundation and found the Prince Series protected by fair use, dismissing Goldsmith’s claim. One major aspect to note about this decision was the importance of the court’s interpretation of the transformative nature of the piece. When considering all factors, the transformative nature of the Prince Series played a major role in how the court weighed every single factor. The New York Southern District Court, finding the evidence in favor of the transformative nature of Warhol’s work, naturally found almost every factor in favor of the AWF. It can then be concluded that the transformative nature of the Prince Series and the New York Southern District Court’s view of this transformation played a pivotal role in the court’s decision.
V. SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
After the ruling by the New York Southern District Court, Goldsmith pursued an appeal. This appeal to the case was heard by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, scrutinized the transformative nature of the Prince Series in its reevaluation of the four factors of transformative use. Their analysis and subsequent opinion served as a complete reversal of the lower court’s opinion.
When analyzing the transformative nature of the Prince Series, the court stated that the New York Southern District Court made an “error” in its assumption that the pieces were transformative simply because of the difference in interpretations. [19] The court argued that the basis of transformation could not be held solely to the “stated or perceived intent” of any individual, because, if that were the case, then any work could be perceived as transformative. [19] The court argued instead that a judge must see if the secondary work is “fundamentally different and new” from its original source. [19] The court stated that, at a “bare minimum,” a secondary work must do more than simply “impose” an artist’s style on the original work. With this definition in mind, the Prince Series failed to be considered transformative as it “retains the essential elements of the Goldsmith Photograph” without adding anything different. [19] In a sense, they could therefore be viewed as a rendition of the original, rather than as a new piece. With this interpretation in mind, the Prince Series fails to meet the criteria of transformative use. The court also found in agreement with the New York Southern District Court that while the Prince Series was commercial in nature, it also served a greater “public interest.” [19] Despite this finding, the court also recognized that Warhol and AWF could profit from the series without paying Goldsmith a “customary price.” [19] This, along with the aforementioned lack of transformation, meant that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the first factor in favor of Goldsmith.
Following their judgment on the first factor, the court found that the second factor, with regard to the nature of the copyrighted work, tilted in favor of Goldsmith. The court disagreed with the New York Southern District Court in their opinion that “the second factor favored” neither party. [20] The court instead found that, regardless of the licensing, Goldsmith’s photo was still an unpublished creative work and Goldsmith therefore had a right to “decide when to make a work public.” [20] The court also found that since the transformative nature of the Prince Series was discredited, the factor was less likely to favor AWF. Additionally, the court stated that, regardless of the decision on the transformative nature of the Prince Series, the New York Southern District Court should have found the factor in favor of Goldsmith as the original work was both “creative and unpublished.” [21] With this evidence in mind, the court found the second factor in favor of Goldsmith.
For the third factor, the court objected to the New York Southern District Court’s argument that by “cropping and flattening” the initial work, Warhol removed all copyrightable elements. [22] The court found that although it was true that Goldsmith could not copyright “Prince’s face,” she had a “broad monopoly” over the exact image depicted in her photograph of him. [22] The court also found that the Prince Series is not just a screen print from any photo of Prince, but rather it is a screenprint of a “specific photograph of Prince”, that photo being Goldsmith’s. [22] With this in mind, the court concluded that the “essence of [Goldsmith's] photograph was” borrowed by Warhol for his Prince Series. [22] They argued that, in fact, there are aspects of Goldsmith’s photograph that Warhol ends up “amplifying, rather than minimizing.” [22] With this in mind, it becomes clear that the core essence of the Prince Series is drawn from Goldsmith's original photograph. With the substantial amount of details from Goldsmith’s photo used in the Prince Series and the lack of transformation, as established with the first factor, the court found this factor heavily weighing towards Goldsmith.
Looking into the fourth factor, the court agreed with the New York Southern District Court’s conclusion that the primary market for the Prince Series and the Goldsmith photo did not “meaningfully overlap.” [22] The court did not, however, find it reasonable that Warhol could create a separate market for only “Warhols.” [22] If this were to be the case, the court argued that any individual could find the fourth factor in their favor as long as they made a market for themselves. The court also found the New York Southern District Court’s conclusion that there was no threat from the Prince Series to Goldsmith’s licensing market to be inaccurate. The court found that in this decision, the New York Southern District Court erred in placing the burden of proof on Goldsmith. Rather, the burden should be placed on the Andy Warhol Foundation, which, in this case, had failed to prove that the Prince Series posed no threat to Goldsmith’s “actual or potential revenue.” [22] Furthermore, the court found that the New York Southern District Court failed to account for the harm the Prince Series could have caused to Goldsmith’s “derivative market”, specifically the harm it caused from the lack of royalty payment when the Andy Warhol Foundation licensed her work to Conde Nast without giving her any credit. [22] With all these factors in mind, the court found that since there was significant potential and current harm to Goldsmith’s licensing and derivative markets, the fourth factor consequently favors Goldsmith.
With all four factors in favour of Goldsmith and no extenuating factors brought forth by the Andy Warhol Foundation, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the Prince series to have infringed on the copyright of Goldsmith’s photograph. Following the finding, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Goldsmith, reversing the New York Southern District Court’s “summary judgment” in favor of the AWF. [23] Like the New York Southern District Court’s judgment, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ judgment hinged primarily on the transformative nature of the Prince Series. Deviating from the New York Southern District Court, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Prince Series was not a case of transformative use, as a difference in interpretations did not fulfill that criteria. Rather, AWF’s transformative use argument failed because there was no fundamental difference in the core of the work. This decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals marks a narrowing of the scope of transformative use and an elimination of the subjective interpretation used in the case.
VI. SUPREME COURT OPINION
After the reversal by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Andy Warhol Foundation requested a writ of certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court. In the Court’s opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court found in favor of Lynn Goldsmith due to their belief that the Prince Series failed to meet the criteria of transformative use. The Supreme Court looked towards the ruling it made in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music. In that ruling, the Supreme Court established two important aspects to consider in the first factor regarding transformative use. First, whether a use is "commercial as opposed to nonprofit,” and secondly, what the “justification of the use was.” [24] The first factor analyzes whether a secondary work has a “further purpose or different character” and whether the “degree of difference” between the secondary work and the original can be balanced against the commercial use. [25] In the Supreme Court’s finding, the “degree of difference” between the Prince Series and the Goldsmith photograph was not substantial enough to weigh in favor of the Andy Warhol Foundation. [25] Along with the nonsubstantial degree of difference, the commercial nature of the Prince Series, the factor weighs even more in favor of Goldsmith, as there is a financial loss on her end due to it. With this in mind, the Supreme Court found the first factor in favor of Lynn Goldsmith, and since the Andy Warhol Foundation did not challenge the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling on the other three factors, the Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two decision, affirmed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling.
In the concurring opinion delivered by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Justice Jackson, the justices established the narrow scope of the Supreme Court’s opinion. They stated that the Supreme Court in this case only focused on the “purpose and character of the use” factor. [26] This meant that although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision and the New York Southern District Court’s decision holistically reviewed the case through all four factors, the Supreme Court only focused on the contested first factor. The Justices stated in their concurring opinion that they favored Goldsmith’s view of the law over the Andy Warhol Foundation’s view. That is because of the commercial nature of Prince’s pieces and the overlap of “purpose and character” between the pieces and her photograph; the Andy Warhol Foundation was infringing on the copyright of her photograph. [26] The Justices then go on to enumerate three contextual clues in the statutory preamble of the Copyright Act of 1976 that point towards their opinion as the correct one. First, courts must analyze a use not for the “artistic purpose” but rather its purpose “under challenge.” [27] This is exactly what was followed by both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which based their decision not on the interpretation of the piece but rather the purpose of the piece. Second, courts must acknowledge the fact that copyright holders hold the sole right to create “derivative works.” [28] This means that simply creating a work in a different medium, as was the case with the Prince Series, is not transformative. Rather, a new purpose or character must be embedded into the secondary work. The justices go on to establish that their decision is a narrow decision focusing on the first factor of fairness, and that the true arbitrator in striking a balance between creators and their works was Congress. This statement can be seen as characteristic of a relatively cautious and conservative Supreme Court, afraid to overstep boundaries. Regardless of the Supreme Court’s nature or justification, however, the impact of their decision may be larger than expected.
In the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Kagan and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, the Justices warned about the impact the law could have on the future of the art world. The dissenting opinion argued that the majority conflated the distinction between the transformative nature of a piece with a market decision. The majority, the dissent argues, is "uninterested in the distinctiveness” of the piece, and rather uses a crude, simplistic view to give their judgment. [29] In doing so, the majority actually complicates the art world. The majority, in choosing to focus on the financial nature of Warhol’s work instead of the transformative nature of the piece, has left the first factor “in shambles.” [30] No longer can the question of whether the secondary work added “something new, with further purpose and different character” be used. [31] The Justices go on to state that copyright law, at its heart, does not grant artists exclusive “monopolies” over the work but rather copyright law is intended to further “the progress of both arts and sciences.” [32] This statement by the dissenting side reconfirms a crucial aspect of copyright law: the law serves not as a monopolistic tool designed to create roadblocks, but rather as a tool that creates environments conducive to the flourishing of arts and sciences. Fair use, the Justices go on to argue, was created to allow artists a “breathing space,” an area through which they were able to express their creativity and develop “fundamentally new works” for public enjoyment. [32] Andy Warhol serves as an iconic example of the way in which transformative use can be used to create new works, and the Prince Series was not the first time he used photographic work as a reference. The Justices explain that in an earlier painting of Marilyn Monroe, Warhol began with a “publicity photograph of the actress”, flattened it, and proceeded to use bright and “exotic colors” to create a striking portrait. [32] The Justices go on to state that the meaning of Warhol's painting of Monroe is wildly different from the painting. The majority, the Justices argue, is therefore conflating two vastly different pieces as legally being viewed the same. They go on to argue that almost every artist, from Shakespeare to Manet, has relied on the works of the past, and that without this ability to draw on past works, their art would not be what it is today. The Supreme Court’s ruling, the dissent argues, is not protecting the works of artists, but rather chaining them, and the consequences of this ruling, while narrow, may “make our world poorer.” [33] It will be poorer, not because of a lack of regulation for art, but rather because of its overregulation. It is a world where creativity is chained by legality.
VII. THE FUTURE OF TRANSFORMATIVE USE
A key component of art has always been the way in which artists have built on and been inspired by the works of their predecessors. As the saying famously attributed to Pablo Picasso goes, “good artists copy, great artists steal.” [34] As the Justices mentioned in the dissenting opinion, the copying of art has been common practice for millennia. To impose a restriction now would only serve to harm the creativity that exists within the American art world by creating a messy legal system imposed on the freedom that artists hold. As NYU Law Professor Amy Adler stated, the case took an “already complex area of law and made it even more complicated.” [35] Artists are now forced to be wary about the artistic decisions they choose to make. No longer could a work such as Titian’s Venus Urbino be published due to its similarity to Giorgione's rendition of Venus. Shakespeare must now be wary of the tragedies he writes in fear of infringing on Ovid. However, it must be noted that the holding does have its merit. As art critic Ben Davis noted, Sotomayor’s focus on limiting the usage of an image may prove critical in protecting artists' work from plagiarism by generative AI. [36] It also must be noted, however, that the art world is large and complicated. In the American Civil Liberties Union's Arts Censorship Project Director, Majorie Heins, words: “artists, dealers, curators, collectors, and everyone else in the art world must make a case-by-case guess whether a creative work that started out as fair use will lose that defense under copyright law depending on how it's shown, sold, or marketed.” The question that must now be asked is what is beneficial to society: policing the whole of the art world to protect the individual artist, or sacrificing the individual artist to ensure the freedom that is necessary for art to flourish? The answer to this question lies largely in how the ruling will impact the art industry, specifically in the developing issue of AI in art.
Generative AI programs, such as ChatGPT and Dall-E, draw upon preexisting human works to train themselves. This means that any work created by a generative AI is drawn upon an amalgamation of specific human works. In other words, generative AI contains a derivative component in each item it generates. This leads to the potential for copyright infringement in every single piece generated by AI. In his article, Artificial Intelligence and Transformative Use After Warhol, University of Missouri Professor Gary Myers notes that much of the analysis of whether an AI work infringes on copyright will be based on, in Justice Sotomayor’s words, whether it has a “further purpose or different character” from the original work and how that weighs against other factors such as “commercialism.” [37] One aspect of transformative use noted by Myers in the article is that the Supreme Court establishes that not only does the work itself have to be transformative, but so must its intended purpose. So if an “AI is merely replacing the original and potentially displaced sales,” then that use would fail to be transformative. Since almost all work from which AI derives is published, and almost all public works can be subject to parody, the major issue lies in regard to whether AI’s work is transformative in relation to the purpose of the work. The ruling in Warhol, in this sense, serves a primarily economic purpose in defending creators from AI-generated competition. The "critical inquiry” Myers finds in regards to whether AI is following fair use guidelines lies in whether or not the use of copyrighted work to train AI, which will later generate outputs derived from it, constitutes fair use. Myers rightly assumes that the usage of work to train AI, the input of the systems, will likely be found in favor of transformative use due to the difference in purposes. [38] The output, however, will need to be scrutinized, as the output has the potential to replace the original’s purpose. The issue with AI lies wholly in how it transforms the copyrighted works it derives from to generate a distinct and transformative piece of work that holds a considerable degree of difference from the original, both in its visual and in its purpose.
The ruling in Warhol works as a double-edged sword. On one hand, the Supreme Court’s ruling serves to stifle artists from borrowing from previous works. It further complicates an extremely complex legal field, and in an attempt to stifle subjectivity, it harms the freedom of the artist. On the other hand, the ruling serves as a basis to safeguard artists from the works of generative AI. It establishes a guideline through which transformative use can be determined on the matter. It must be acknowledged that despite the narrow scope of the Warhol decision, the Supreme Court could not have been able to gauge the extent to which generative AI would be used. Even now, AI as a field is rapidly developing beyond current legislation and poses a challenge to the future. U.S. copyright law has always been defined by a history of change and continuous development. Copyright law will continue to develop, and will have to develop more rapidly than ever to tackle the implications of AI. Regardless of how the law responds, however, it is clear that Warhol will serve as a landmark case to the legal concept of transformative use and that the ruling found in it will serve to define and reframe the past, present, and future of transformative use.
Endnotes
[1] United States Copyright Office, Timeline, (n.d.)., Accessed on October 18th, 2025.
[2] British Parliament, Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710)
[3] United States Copyright Office, Timeline-18th Century, (n.d.)., Accessed on October 19th, 2025.
[4] United States Copyright Office, Timeline-19th Century, (n.d.)., Accessed on October 19th, 2025.
[5] Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass.1841)
[6] Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
[7] Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 571
[8] Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 571
[9] Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 382 F. Supp. 3d 312, 318, 2019
[10] Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 382 F. Supp. 3d 312, 318, 2019
[11] The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts. About – The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, (April 25, 2023)., Accessed on November 15th, 2025.
[12] Andy Warhol Found., 382 F. Supp.3d 312, 321
[13] Andy Warhol Found., 382 F. Supp. 3d 312, 322
[14] Andy Warhol Found.,382 F. Supp. 3d 312, 327
[15] Andy Warhol Found.,382 F. Supp. 3d 312, 327
[16] Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013)
[17] Andy Warhol Found., 382 F. Supp. 3d 312, 330
[18] Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998)
[19] Andy Warhol Found., 992 F, Supp 3d 99, 113
[20] Andy Warhol Found., 992 F.3d 99, 117
[21] Andy Warhol Found., 992 F.3d 99, 117
[22] Andy Warhol Found., 992 F.3d 99, 118
[23] Andy Warhol Found., 992 F.3d 99, 125
[24] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 510
[25] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 509
[26] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 553
[27] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 554
[28] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 555
[29] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 558
[30] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 559
[31] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 571
[32] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 560
[33] Andy Warhol Found., 598 U.S. 508, 548
[34] Ben Shoemate, What Does It Mean — Good Artists Copy, Great Artists Steal, (August 2nd, 2012)., Accessed on November 15th, 2025
[35] Amy Adler, The Supreme Court’s Warhol Decision Just Changed the Future of Art, (May 26th, 2023)., Accessed on November 3th, 2025.
[36] Ben Davis, Why Andy Warhol’s ‘Prince’ Is Actually Bad, and the Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith Decision Is Actually Good, (June 1, 2023)., Accessed on November 4th, 2025.
[37] Gary Myers, Artificial Intelligence and Transformative Use After Warhol, (December 29th, 2023)., Accessed on November 18th, 2025.
[38] Gary Myers, Artificial Intelligence and Transformative Use After Warhol, (December 29th, 2023)., Accessed on November 18th, 2025.